GAUGING ETHNIC AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN URBAN CONTEXTS: THE CASE OF BRESCIA, ITALY by D. Zampatti
Ph.D. Programme
Economic Sociology and Labour Studies
31stcohort
doctoral thesis
Gauging ethnic and social inequality in urban
contexts:
The case of Brescia, Italy
PhD Candidate: Supervisors:
Davide Zampatti Prof. Flaminio Squazzoni
Matr.N°: R11275 Prof. Gabriele Ballarino
PhD Program director:
Prof. Gabriele Ballarino
SPS/09, SPS/07, IUS/07, SECS-P/07, SECS-P/10, SECS-S/04, M-PSI/06
Academic Year 2017–2018
The PhD programme in Economic Sociology and Labour Studies (ESLS) stems from
the collaboration between four Universities, namely Università degli Studi di Brescia,
Università degli Studi di Milano (administrative headquarter), Università degli Studi
di Milano Bicocca, and Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo
Avogadro".

Alla mia famiglia, che ha sempre creduto in me ed a tutti coloro che in questi
anni hanno creduto in me.

Contents
1 Immigration and Inequality: A Literature Review 15
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2 Housing market discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3 Segregation Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4 Segregation measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4.1 Evenness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4.1.1 Dissimilarity index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4.1.2 Gini concentration index . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4.1.3 Entropy indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.4.2 Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.4.2.1 Interaction index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.4.2.2 Isolation index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4.2.3 Eta2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4.3 Concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4.4 Clustering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.4.4.1 Global: Absolute Clustering Index . . . . . . . . 30
1.4.4.2 Local Clustering: Getis Ord G∗i . . . . . . . . . 30
1.4.4.3 Local Clustering : Local Indicator of Spatial As-
sociation (LISA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.5 Neighbourgh & Network effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.6 Job Market Integration and Penalties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.7 Social Inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.8 The Second Generation: Problems and Specificities . . . . . . . 37
1.9 Education Inequality in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.10 The Challenge of Social Cohesion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.11 Assimilation Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.12 Discussion and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5
2 Urban Spatial Segregation in Brescia 48
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2 Segregation Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3 The context of analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3.0.1 East Europeans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.3.0.2 South Asians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.3.0.3 Chinese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.3.0.4 Middle Easterns and North Africans . . . . . . . 56
2.3.0.5 Sub Saharan Africans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.3.0.6 East and South East Asians . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.3.0.7 South Americans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.4.1 Indices of Evenness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.4.1.1 Duncan and Duncan’s Dissimilarity Index . . . . 58
2.4.1.2 Gini index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.4.2 Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.4.2.1 Interaction index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.4.2.2 Isolation index Eta2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.4.3 Local Clustering : Local Indicator of Spatial Association
(LISA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.5.1 City level segregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.5.2 Centre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.5.2.1 Brescia Antica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.5.2.2 Centro Storico Nord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.5.2.3 Centro Storico Sud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.5.2.4 Crocifissa di Rosa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.5.2.5 Porta Milano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.5.2.6 Porta Venezia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.5.3 North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.5.3.1 Borgo Trento . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.5.3.2 Casazza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.5.3.3 Mompiano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.5.3.4 San Rocchino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.5.3.5 San Bartolomeo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.5.3.6 Sant’Eustacchio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.5.3.7 Villaggio Prealpino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.5.4 South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.5.4.1 Chiesanuova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.5.4.2 Don Bosco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.5.4.3 Folzano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.5.4.4 Fornaci . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.5.4.5 Lamarmora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.5.4.6 Porta Cremona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.5.4.7 Villaggio Sereno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.5.5 East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.5.5.1 Buffalora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.5.5.2 Caionvico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.5.5.3 Sant’Eufemia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.5.5.4 San Polo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.5.6 West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.5.6.1 Chiusure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.5.6.2 Fiumicello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.5.6.3 Quartiere Primo Maggio . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.5.6.4 Urago Mella . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.5.6.5 Villaggio Badia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.5.6.6 Villaggio Violino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.6 Discussion and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3 Egohoods that segregate. Immigrants, social contexts and in-
come penalties 95
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.2 Immigrants’ residential segregation and income . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.3 The definition of neighborhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.4 Segregation measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.5 The context and the data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.5.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.5.1.1 Dependent variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.5.1.2 Independent variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.6 Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.6.1 Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.7 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4 Is Ethnic Educational Inequality a Matter of Choice? A Study
on the Immigrant Population in Brescia, Italy 116
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.2 Theoretical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.2.1 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.3 The Italian Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.4 The Case of Brescia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.5 Data and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.5.1 Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.5.1.1 School Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.5.1.2 School and Individual Attributes . . . . . . . . . 124
4.5.1.3 Individual Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.6 The space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.7 Statistical Modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.8 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.9 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5 Conclusions 131
List of Figures
2.1 Italian spatial distribution of migrants on 31st December 2012.
Source: Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.2 Ethnic heterogeneity by neighbourhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.3 Immigrant dominance by neighbourhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4 Not European immigrant dominance by neighbourhood . . . . . 54
2.5 Dimension of residential segregation (Reardon & O’Sullivan, 2004) 57
2.6 Chinese spatial association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.7 East European spatial association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.8 East and South East Asians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.9 Middle Eastern and North Africans spatial association . . . . . . 91
2.10 South American spatial association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.11 South Asian spatial association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
2.12 Sub Saharan Africans spatial association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.1 Egohoods of 250m with the distribution of Polish immigrants in
the whole city. (Our elaboration on Google images maps) . . . . 103
3.2 Egohoods of 250m with the distribution of Polish immigrants
with a zoom in the city centre.(Our elaboration on Google images
maps) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
9
List of Tables
1.1 Axiomatic proprieties of evenness indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.1 Global segregation by macro-ethnic group . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.2 neighbourhood Multi Group Dissimilarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.3 Segregation in Central area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
2.4 Segregation in the Eastern Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.5 Segregation in the Northern Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.6 Segregation in the Western area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.7 Segregation in the Southern area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.1 Correlation indices between segregation indices measured as ex-
posure (EXP) and isolation (ETH). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.2 Variables and Instruments descriptive statistics. . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.3 Second stage regression results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.4 Immigrants macro-groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.5 Effects of ethnic segregation (ETH) and exposure to Italians
(EXP), by macro-area of origin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.6 First stage regression results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.1 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.2 Conditional logit regression estimations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
10

Abstract
This dissertation aims to improve our understanding of the link between migrant
ethnicity, space and socio-economic inequality. In the last three decades, the
migratory pressure in Europe has reached significant levels. The massive flux of
different ethnic groups has created significant tensions in many countries, caus-
ing widespread political conflicts and is now eroding the credibility of traditional
political institutions. Here, we focused on three main issues, i.e., the residen-
tial segregation of immigrants, the immigrant’s earnings at the neighbourhood
level and the school choice of immigrant families. Our approach has been quan-
titative and has tried to combine and integrate certain social, economic and
geographical factors. The core of our study has been a detailed analysis on a
census-style database on the Italian city of Brescia, which permitted us to ge-
olocalise households at a block level. The structure of the dissertation includes
four chapters.
Chapter 1 presents an extensive literature review that examined various
socio-economic aspects of migrations. We first considered housing market dis-
crimination, segregation theories, segregation measurement. Besides we intro-
duced literature on labour market discrimination, social inequality and neigh-
bourhood and network effects. Furthermore, we reviewed second generation
problems, education inequality, social cohesion and assimilation theories.
Chapter 2 presents an empirical study on Brescia, one of the most relevant
cities in Italy for the share of immigrants. While this context allowed us to reflect
on complex forms of segregation in South Europe, we explored segregation in
the city. We analysed segregation by aggregate ethnic groups to cover the whole
city immigrant population. These aggregates are East Europeans, South Asians,
Middle Easterns and North Africans, Sub Saharan Africans, Chinese, East and
South East Asians and South Americans. Segregation is particularly strong for
South Asians and Chinese communities.
Chapter 3 examines neighbourhood effect on immigrants’ earnings. This
chapter reproduces an article co-authored by F. Squazzoni and G. Ballarino,
which is currently under revision in an international journal. The chapter con-
siders the economic and social nexus of segregation by estimating neighbour-
hood effects on immigrants’ earnings within an urban context. For doing this,
we linked socio-economic and spatial-demographic characteristics of immigrants
by following an “egohood” approach, which jointly considers socialisation and
proximity effects. An egohood is an ego-centred circular neighbourhood of given
dimension around individual residence. We found that immigrants in areas with
high probability to meet co-ethnics had lower earnings; there was no effect for
the probability to meet natives.
Chapter 4 examines ethnic differentials in school choices in primary school as
a determinant of education inequality. It reproduces an article co-authored with
Jochem Tolsma and Flaminio Squazzoni, which is under preparation. Education
inequality is crucial in countries receiving considerable levels of migrations. We
hypothesised that households choose schools by homophily, i.e. they chose a
school with a high percentage of co-ethnics. Furthermore, we hypothesised
that and households prefer schools with a high share of high SES-pupils while
being constrained by geographical proximity. Households are sensitive to socio-
economic status, ethnic composition and home-school distance. However, we
also found that choices by second-generation immigrants, i.e., those who were
born in Italy, had lower differences with natives, while born abroad children
display different choices.
Chapter 5 presents conclusions, limitation and future developments of this
dissertation.
Finally, some chapters reproduce independent research articles. This implies
that some repetitions are possible, especially when discussing previous research
and presenting the study context.
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Chapter 1
Immigration and Inequality:
A Literature Review
1.1 Introduction
Europe historically was both places of immigration and emigration. In much of
the modern era, Europe has been a place of emigration. European emigrants
founded many modern nations, which were populated by other European mi-
grants, often to the detriment of indigenous peoples. Almost all the states of
Oceania and the whole of the states of the American continent had this fate.
These migratory flows were consistent until the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury (Moch, 2003). From this moment on, some European states became a
destination for migration.
These migrations were essentially post-colonial migrations. The labour de-
mand for post-war reconstruction required a large amount of workforce, first
through internal migrations and then through international migrations. It is
possible to underline North African’s migration of in particular from French-
Algeria to France and the migration of South and East Asians to England
(Hansen, 2003).
With the economic boom, migration also arrived in countries, such as Italy
and Germany defeated in the Second World War. In these countries also began
to migrate mostly internal. In Italy, there was a great migration of the southern
Italians to the industrial centres of the North (Panichella, 2012). In Germany
initially, there was a substantial migration DDR-DFR, so much so that in 1964
the DDR government closed the borders to avoid depopulation (Fassmann &
Münz, 1994). In the following years, Germany imported workforce from abroad,
the so-called Gastarbeiter, literally translated as Guest-workers. Germany be-
gan to use Guest workers mainly from Mediterranean countries, Spain, Greece,
Turkey and Southern Italy (Hochstadt, 1999). There were similar policies also
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in Austria (Herzog-Punzenberger, 2003) and Belgium (Del Boca & Venturini,
2005).
Countries of central and northern Europe from the 70/80s were the subject
of new migrations, often of a post-colonial or continuation of previous migra-
tions, e.g., Turkish migration in Germany, family reunification also boosted
it (Hansen, 2003). Differently, from other countries such as Italy, Spain or
Portugal, where regional disequilibria were strong, the internal migration was
exploited (Ballarino & Panichella, 2015; Bentolila & Dolado, 1990; Greenwood,
1997).
With the fall of the Soviet Union, a new wave of migration arrived in Eu-
rope. This wave was strengthened by the Balkan war and by migrations coming
from Africa and Asia directed towards Southern European countries that were
previously impermeable to migratory phenomena (Brubaker, 2004). In southern
Europe, migration began substantially during this period. Although initially,
there were only workers, over time they became immigration of family groups,
both for family reunification and for family migrations from scratch. Migration
changed the demographic structure of the population. European countries have
changed from being mono-ethnic countries to multi-ethnical countries. Due to
the ageing of the population and low fertility, the weight of immigrants will be
crucial in the coming years. For example, in Countries like Switzerland, the
share of born-aboard people is 28.3%, in Sweden or Ireland 15.9%, by looking
the population Germany has 11.9% foreign-born people, the UK 12.4%, and
France 11.6. South European states have a substantial share of foreign-born
people like 9.2% of Italy and 9.6% of Spain (Eurostat, 2013).
Our review has covered many aspects of the complex nexus of social, eco-
nomic and spatial factors involved in residential segregation patterns, which are
mostly interconnected with each other. Examining this complex nexus required
first to provide a systematic overview of previous research in the migratory field.
As pointed out by Hayek, (1942) in his critique of scientism, the actual basis of
any social science is multi-disciplinarity.
The literature review is designed to be broad and show arguments both di-
rectly treated in the thesis and indirectly treated. The review is shown according
to the logic of the steps of an immigrant arriving in the host country.
The first when immigrants arrive in a country they must find accommoda-
tion; usually, they could not directly buy a house. Therefore they have to rent.
The section 1.2 showed research about discrimination of groups with low social
status mainly in European rental market. Discrimination in the case was that
they had less consideration as potential tenants in European real estate market
contexts.
The section 1.3 had a strong correlation with section 1.2 and concerned
residential segregation. The review begins with the American theories on seg-
regation. These theories are often obsolete and linked only to the US context,
where there is strong racial segregation, however it is necessary to show them.
Many geographers showed how the hyper-segregation in the United States and
the theories that explain it were not applicable in European welfare systems.
Besides, historical development of the cities affected the presence of segregated
areas. However, European segregation models are different within them. The
central and northern European models show a higher propensity towards rented
social housing compared to the Mediterranean model where social housing was
oriented to subsided ownership. According to the literature shown, it is so-
cial housing that was a key variable of segregation in many Central and North
European countries. This can create a substantial difference in segregation
probability.
The existence of segregation, in many cases, was perceptible through mea-
surement only. Therefore the main segregation indexes were shown in section
1.4. Segregation was analysable in five dimensions: distributive uniformity or
evenness, interactive probability, i.e. isolation and exposure, clusterisation, con-
centration and centralisation. For each dimension, we revised indices.The review
continues with a section 1.5 about neighbourhood and network effects. These
effects are treated in the same section because they were often correlated. The
review shows research on the neighbourhood effects in the theoretical and em-
pirical way. It also shows literature about neighbourhood effects and ethnic
networks in job matching; the excess of homophily was a crucial factor in social
inequality formation. The section 1.6 first shows the survival-oriented strategies
that immigrants implement in their job research. After a definition of income
penalties, we gave evidence revising literature on discrimination suffered by low
social status groups. The difference in terms of wages created socioeconomic
inequality. In section 1.7 we introduce the Kuznets’ hypothesis and the link
between the economic cycle and social inequality and related test. Economists
show that economic growth was the main principal solution to social inequality.
Skill-Biased technical change shows the importance of education. Indeed, edu-
cation is the engine of growth and the fundamental variable for reducing social
inequality.
Main problems of the second generation were also shown in section 1.8. The
thesis did not deal directly with the problems of the second generation. However,
dealing with their education, it is necessary to show what may be the problems
they encounter. The second generation lives in a sort of limbo; in fact, it has
not the same social dignity as natives. However, second generations were not
even wholly immigrants because it grew up in the destination country of the
parents; at the same time they did not choose unlike their parents, the country
where they lived. Often the society of the host country continues to assign them
the same low social status as the previous generation, even though they want
the same rights and the same opportunities as the native peers.
Section 1.9 shows the problems of educational inequality in Europe. Unlike
in the United States in Europe, almost all education systems are freely accessible
until the end of secondary education. This section shows how there was a de-
valuation of education in immigrant communities. In light of what was found in
the previous review of the community, which assessed less education, they were
the same as those who lived segregated and suffered more significant problems
of discrimination. Therefore there are two main problems, the first being the
devaluation of the value of education. The second is the state of poverty proba-
bly due to inadequate human capital and entrapment in ethnic social-networks.
This does not allow us to evaluate investments in human capital properly.
In section 1.10 we revise works on social cohesion. The thesis did not deal
directly with social cohesion. However, it was necessary to show that diversity
could be harmful to social cohesion. A lack of social cohesion was a strong
determinant in many social problems. Multi-Ethnic immigration could increase
diversity and then have a deleterious effect on the social and economic system.
However, this has a link to the last section number 1.11. The only solution to
the lack of social cohesion on an ethnic basis is assimilation. The 1.11 section
shows the main theories of assimilation. These theories are entirely developed
in the United States and are not coherent with each other. In the section 1.12
there are a discussion and conclusions.
1.2 Housing market discrimination
Usually, immigrants do not have money to buy a house and so are more depen-
dent on the local rental market. Such a market incorporates and reproduces
discriminatory practices. Indeed, house-owners are less likely to rent houses to
immigrants.
Experimental research examined ethnic discrimination in this type of mar-
kets, especially for specific ethnic groups. Carpusor & Loges (2006) performed
a seminal e-mail based field experiment in Los Angeles County. They e-mails to
landlords advertising apartments vacancies. The letter was signed by different
names, one was White American, one Arab, and another was Afro-American.
They found strong discrimination for Afro-American, mild for Arabs and almost
none for Whites. Ahmed & Hammarstedt (2008) in Sweden used a methodology
similar to Carpusor & Loges (2006). They found both gender (against male)
and ethnic discrimination in the Swedish rental housing market, for Arabiac
sounding name.
Bosch, Carnero, & Farré (2010) performed a field experiment on the Spanish
rental market, following the same methodology of Carpusor & Loges (2006) They
used different names for both Spanish natives and Moroccan for half candidate
they provided information about their socioeconomic status, and for other half-
not, also they controlled for spatial distribution of the immigrants. They found
traces of discrimination especially against Moroccan males, regardless socio-
economic status. Moreover, in neighbourhoods with low presence of migrants,
there was a differential of answer of 30%, while this differential was reduced to
zero when the immigration share increased. Bosch, Carnero, and Farre (2015)
followed a similar design and differentiated between Spanish and Moroccanm in
Spanish rent market. They found that Moroccans had 15% less probability to
receive a response. However, in case of some Moroccan applicant, they included
positive information about the application. This increased the response prob-
ability of 9%. Similar results also in Germany for Turkish immigrants (Horr,
Hunkler, & Kroneberg, 2018).
In a field experiment in Italy in 41 Italian cities with the same design of
Carpusor & Loges (2006) Baldini & Federici (2011) showed a multifaceted pic-
ture. The degree of discrimination varied across ethnic groups, sex and the level
of information. In particular, Arabian/Mid-Eastern names faced more discrim-
ination then East Europeans and Italians. This was confirmed by a qualitative
analysis of housing policies in Northern Italy in 2011 by Ambrosini and Boniz-
zoni (2012), who showed that 80% of respondents found it difficult to find a
house. This percentage was lower for East Europeans (65%) and higher for
Sub-Saharan Africans (97%).
The results of the experimental literature show that groups considered of
low status group suffer discrimination on the rental market. The problem with
this literature is that often there is only one control group, that is the native one
and no more groups except for Carpusor & Loges (2006) and Baldini & Federici
(2011), which implemented an experiment with more groups. Moreover, this
type of analysis can not control some fundamental variables, such as the personal
cognitive experiences of the subjects or subjects belonging to the landlord social
networks and their personal experiences.
1.3 Segregation Theories
Discriminative attitudes and practices can determine that immigrants have a
high probability of living in an area with many co-ethnics, thus contributing to
residential segregation. However, different causal mechanisms can account for
this.
Many theories of segregation are developed in the United States, a coun-
try founded on migrations. However, these theories are very much affected by
the specificity of the American society. In the American society every group
except the English one faced segregation. Through assimilation, this segrega-
tion diminished over time. These theories reflect the American society and the
zeitgeist of when they were formulated are now obsolete (Tosi et al., 2000).
Segregation theory of the Chicago school (Carey, 1975; Parks & Burgess, 1921;
Rosenthal, 1960), shows how immigrants were discriminated against because
they were socially inferior and stop being so when they were assimilated. The
institutional theory (McGovney, 1945; Wong, 2013) shows how institutionalized
discrimination leads to segregation. This theory is based on the segregation of
African-Americans and explained both old Afro-American segregation (Wiese,
1999), both new kind of internationalized discrimination as happened before
sub-prime crisis (Massey, 2005; Sanders, 2008).
Besides, more modern approach like structuralist one (Arthur & Wilson,
2018; Fernandez, Massey, & Denton, 1993) explained segregation as reflection
of social structure. Poor people face segregation in area where they could afford
rent house, that usually were poor areas. Poor people live in area with low ser-
vices, mainly poor educational facilities, then were trapped in this area. Other
theoretical approaches tend to be more generalist. These were the Neo-classical
approach and the Analytical approach that is a derivation of the previous one.
Considering the mechanics of choices, neoclassical economists suggested that
property buyers or renters choose their houses depending on their willingness
to pay for specific characteristics of buildings and areas (Bayer, McMillan, &
Rueben, 2004; Wong, 2013). Analytical sociologists shared the idea of the
importance of individual choices but considered segregation as an aggregate
outcome of interaction in which unintended consequences can have a pivotal
role. This includes the fact that segregation cannot merely reflect individual
(discriminative) preferences, being only an interaction effect of adaptive deci-
sions under social influences (Schelling, 1971). Schelling’s model is logical and
straightforward and explains ethnicity based residential segregation. It has a
counter-intuitive explanation as it suggests that residential segregation is an
outcome of agent interaction rather being the intended purpose of certain racist
people. Schelling’s approach is based on homophily. The model highlights
segregation as a local rather than a global phenomenon and the tendency of
individuals to self-segregate in their own community.
Not only did migrations target the US. Europe was also a target of mi-
gration. However, many authors highlight that American segregation model
cannot be applied to study west European segregation. These problems were
initially pointed out by Droogleever Fortuijn, Musterd, & Ostendorf (1998) and
Kesteloot, Weesep, & White (1997) and successively developed by Van Kempen
& Özüekren (1998), which showed that spatial segregation was dependent on the
implemented welfare model. Moreover Musterd (2005), in a comparative study
on both sides of the Atlantic, showed that spatial segregation is influenced by
the welfare state and the particular role of the urban history in the European
cities. This makes it difficult to compare inter-Atlantic contexts. Moreover, he
highlighted that generally, segregation in Europe was mild compared to North
American cities.
Due to differences between American and European contexts, we decided to
focus only on European cases. France has been one of the primary destinations
of migrations. Pan Ké Shon (2010), using a panel approach, with data between
1990 and 1999 showed that in France, there was segregation for African Immi-
grants, both North Africans and Sub-Saharans. European immigrants were not
exposed to it. Contrary to common perceptions, residential mobility in social
housing district was high. Residents were usually not trapped in them, with
the only exception of Africans, both north and sub Saharan, that found harder
to move out and they are three times more likely to move in. Furthermore, the
author underlines that continuous migratory phenomena increase segregation.
However, this is not typical only of France and can also be found in Britain
(Simpson, 2004) and Sweden (Bråmå , 2006).
Rathelot & Safi, (2014) using a panel approach, with data between 1982
and 1999, found that there is a substantial heterogeneity when it comes to seg-
regation since the pattern is concentrated only in large urban areas. There is
a marked difference in the state of segregation between Europeans and non-
Europeans. Note that their findings did not confirm the hypothesis of a white
flight in France. Moreover, they underlined that the highly heterogeneous com-
position of migrant populations decreased the strength of social segregation.
Verdugo (2011) used data from 1968 to 1999 to check segregation dynamics
in France. He found that public housing neighbourghoods (Banlieue) increased
the degree of ethnic segregation. This was so regardless of the year of arrival of
immigrants or their ethnic origin. He found that North Africans lived in segre-
gated areas. Pan Ké Shon and Verdugo (2015) used a panel data approach from
1968 to 2007 to check inter-generational segregation in France. They found that
the segregation of the first generation decreased with the increase of permanence
in France. They highlighted that there is not a pattern of mono-ethnic ghet-
toisation; by contrast, many immigrants live in an area with high exposure to
natives. Musterd and Deurloo (1997) found higher segregation for people living
in public social housing in the Netherlands, particularly for Turks, Moroccans
and Surinamese. Musterd and Elorduy-Zapaterieche (2008) found in Amster-
dam segregation for non-Western foreigners especially located in post-war so-
cial housing. In particular, segregation was stronger for Moroccans. However,
Surinamese people were strongly segregated by social housing in middle-value
areas. Musterd & Ostendorf (2009) found decreasing segregation in the Hague
and Rotterdam for Turks, Surinamese and Moroccans. Instead, they found a
consistent increase of segregation for the same groups in Amsterdam, although
the level of segregation of Turkish was still higher in Hague and Rotterdam than
in Amsterdam.
In the UK, there were vast areas populated by South Asians residents with
a significant amount of urban segregation (Peach, 1996). The same author later
confirmed the same in a later work (Peach, 2009). Similar results were also
found in Burgess, Wilson, & Lupton (2005) and Simpson (2004). They found a
high level of residential segregation for South Asians in the UK even more than
for Blacks. In Belgium, there was a high level of segregation for Moroccans
and Turkish in the Bruxelles (Dujardin, Selod, and Thomas, 2008), although
Italians composed the main minority. In Sweden, Malmberg et al. (2018) found
high segregation for non-European immigrants though decreasing over time.
Semyonov & Glikman (2009) found high level of segregation in Frankfurt of
Turkish people.
It is worth noting that previous studies in varying contexts, such as France,
Britain and The Netherlands, found that one of the primary determinants of
segregation has been public social housing programmes. In fact, in all these
countries mentioned above except Germany and Belgium, a considerable pro-
portion of families live in public housing. For instance, 6.5% of Belgian stock
of houses is public housing. The number of social housing grew for Denmark
(20.9%), France (16.8%), with studies suggesting that social housing is the main
responsible determinant of segregation (Pan Ké Shon, 2010; Pan Ké Shon & Ver-
dugo, 2015; Rathelot & Safi, 2014); Netherlands (30%); UK (17.9%). Note that
these studies have focused on segregation by enclave. This type of segrega-
tion is typical of Central/Northern Europe, or British, except France where the
immigrant population has been ethnically fragmented.
If we consider the Mediterranean countries, we must consider that Mediter-
ranean segregation model has been characterised by more heterogeneity, as
highlighted by Malheiros (2002). With the unique exception of the Nether-
lands, which has a mixed composition as suggested by Van Kempen and Van
Weesep (1998). The absence of international migration in the post-war pe-
riod implied that the existence of degraded suburbs has been rare compared
to central and northern Europe, where migration started early. Unlike these
areas, informal housing in the suburbs was not the only choice that immigrants
can make when they choose where to live. In Barcelona, Spain, Musterd and
Elorduy-Zapaterieche (2008) found a strong propensity for Ecuadorians to live
in working-class urban areas, with Moroccans live more frequently in old and
worst rented houses. In Italy, there are no mono-ethnic/racial ghettos or en-
claves like those of Central/Northern of Europe. Instead, there are areas with
a shared non-Italian mixed population (Davico & Mela, 1999; Golini, 1997).
This is probably due to the heterogeneity of migrants present in Italy, the type
of urbanisation which characterised the country and a more stable real estate
market. Crosta, Mariotto, & Tosi (2000) underlined that migration has been
a typical phenomenon of Centre-north of the country, with a collective change,
from the 2000s, towards a “wanted but not welcome” approach. They also un-
derlined that the standard geographical approach in Italy is less relevant because
unlike central and north European countries, micro-segregation is stronger than
macro-segregation.
It is surprising that previous segregation studies have focused on southern
Italian cities. However, 60% of the immigrant population resides now in the
North, 25% in the centre and a marginal 15% in the South and the islands.
For instance, Cristaldi (2002) examined segregation in Rome, an urban context
influenced by the presence of the Vatical State. She found that the most segre-
gated communities were Spanish and French, Sinhalese and Chinese. Busetta,
Mazza, and Stranges (2015) measured segregation in Palermo. They found re-
markable segregation of South Asians, especially Bangladeshi and Sinhalese.
A similar result was found by Mazza, Gabrielli, & Strozza (2018) in Naples.
While they found no segregation for eastern Europeans, Chinese were reported
to have the highest voluntary segregation, followed by Sri Lankans, Filipinos
and Dominicans.
To sum up, many theories of segregation were formulated in the United
States. However, these theories were scarcely applicable in a European context.
This poor applicability was due to differences in welfare models and historical
differences between young America and old Europe. However, even in Europe,
there were differences derived from differences in the welfare model. In countries
with models of welfare Nordic, Continental or Anglo-Saxon where there was an
availability of social housing were these to create segregation. However, in the
Mediterranean model, this availability did not exist. It was the market through
discrimination processes that generated segregation.
1.4 Segregation measurement
Evenness indices measure how much the distribution of population groups is
uniform across the spatial units of the city area. It is a measure of over or under-
representation of one or more groups in a city area or sub-area. High values of
evenness indices mean that there is a high level of unevenness, therefore there
is segregation.
Evenness is a relative measure, and it refers to a differential distribution
of ethnic groups.It measures the degree of heterogeneity between two or more
groups and reflect the heterogeneity in the composition of the population.
The main indices of Evenness used in the measure of segregation are in
tree groups (although there are many others), the dissimilarity indices, the
concentration indices, the entropy indices. These indices are income inequality
indices adapted to the extent of segregation. Indices are constructed according
to an axiomatic approach, i.e. built on the basis of certain properties that must
satisfy. These properties are:
Organisation Equivalence (OE), i.e., when two geographical units are iden-
tical, the measure of segregation should not change when combined into one
single unit. OE allows us to compare systems with different numbers of units.
Size Invariance (SI). Given two units, the segregation measurement must be
invariant as the two units differ in the same and constant proportion. SI allows
us to compare discrimination in different areas when dividing the population by
a constant factor.
Composition Invariance (CI), i.e., a segregation measure should not be af-
fected by proportional changes in any observed group. Therefore, CI allows us
to compare units with different structures.
Pigou-Dalton’s Principle of Transfer (PT). Ideally, any segregation measure
should vary when people move from neighborhoods, where there is a high pro-
portion of co-ethnics over total population, compared to neighbourhoods where
there are fewer co-ethnics. PT allows us to control for the effect of neighbour-
hoods with different ethnic composition.
Possibility of Standardisation (PS), i.e., the possibility of scaling the varia-
tion of the index in a 0-1 (or 0-100) range, while maintaining full comparability
with other measures.
1.4.1 Evenness
Evenness indices measure how much the distribution of population groups is
uniform across the spatial units of the city area. It is a measure of over or under-
representation of one or more groups in a city area or sub-area. High values of
evenness indices mean that there is a high level of unevenness, therefore there
is segregation.
Evenness is a relative measure, and it refers to a differential distribution
of ethnic groups.It measures the degree of heterogeneity between two or more
groups and reflect the heterogeneity in the composition of the population.
The main indices of Evenness used in the measure of segregation are in tree
branches (although there are many others), the dissimilarity indices, the concen-
tration indices, the entropy indices. Some of these indices are income inequality
indices adapted to measure segregation. Indices are constructed according to
an axiomatic approach, i.e. built on the basis of certain properties that must
satisfy. These properties are:
1. Organisation Equivalence (OE), i.e., when two geographical units are iden-
tical, the measure of segregation should not change when combined into
one single unit. OE allows us to compare systems with different numbers
of units.
2. Size Invariance (SI). Given two units, the segregation measurement must
be invariant as the two units differ in the same and constant proportion.
SI allows us to compare discrimination in different areas when dividing
the population by a constant factor.
3. Composition Invariance (CI), i.e., a segregation measure should not be
affected by proportional changes in any observed group. Therefore, CI
allows us to compare units with different structures.
4. Pigou-Dalton’s Principle of Transfer (PT). Ideally, any segregation mea-
sure should vary when people move from neighborhoods, where there is
a high proportion of co-ethnics over total population, compared to neigh-
bourhoods where there are fewer co-ethnics. PT allows us to control for
the effect of neighbourhoods with different ethnic composition.
5. Possibility of Standardisation (PS), i.e., the possibility of scaling the vari-
ation of the index in a 0-1 (or 0-100) range, while maintaining full com-
parability with other measures.
1.4.1.1 Dissimilarity index
The more straightforward and most commonly used measure of evenness is Dis-
similarity index. It measures the percentage of population that have to change
residence to has an even distribution of the population in analysed area. The
most common index of dissimilarity is Duncan and Duncan (1955) dissimilarity
index; it is defined as follows:
IS =
1
2
∣∣∣xi
X
− yi
Y
∣∣∣ ,
where xi and yi are the population counts for the two subgroups in the area
unit i, while X and Y are the total counts for the two groups in the city object
of the study.
However, despite its popularity this index it shows has some certain weak-
nesses. More importantly, like all evenness indices, it this index depends is
dependent on the way a given the geographical area of interest was is fractioned
into sub-units. The the smaller the units, the higher the index value is (Car-
rington & Troske, 1997). Furthermore, It it also does not fully satisfy the PT
which requires to reflect the index to be sensitive to all transfers of minority
members over neighborhoods where they are differently represented (James &
Taeuber, 1985). Considering that The the dissimilarity index explains depends
on the difference that needs to be transferred to have obtain evenness, the in-
dex estimation can bias any segregation measure therefore in socio-geographical
contexts characterized by a setting not presenting many only a few enclaves,
such as the Southern European countries, it might lead to biased measures.
Index can be also Multigroup (Sakoda 1981), it was defined as follow:
ISM =
∑M
m−1 pim
∑J
j−1
tj
T 2
∣∣∣pijmpim − 1∣∣∣
2
[∑M
m−1 pim(1− pim)
]
where pimis proportion of m group, tj is total cases of area j, T is total cases
in the area.
1.4.1.2 Gini concentration index
Evenness indices usually adapted indices of income inequality, one of the most
famous indices of income inequality is the Gini coefficient R1 it is also used
as segregation index. Indices of evenness are income inequality indices and as
income inequality indices they are based on some axiomatic
First approach to inequality measurement were made by Max Lorenz with
Lorenz Curve in 1905. Its curve is and its broken line are graphical technique
of representing income inequality.
In 1912 the Italian statistician Gini published its famous coefficient. This
coefficient is derived from the concept of mean absolute difference ∆ a measure
of variability; i.e. a measure that highlights the inequality of data between
them, regardless of any average value, introduced by Whilem Jordan fifty year
before.
∆ =
∑n
i
∑n
j |xi − xj |
n(n− 1)
with i 6= j.
The Gini coefficient definition hold usually on Lorenz’s curve. But it can
be easily calculated with the definition of the mean absolute difference. That
is equivalent to the definition based on Lorenz’s curve (Gini, 1912). The Gini
concentration index, R, is the ratio between the concentration area and the
area of maximum concentration underlying the line of equation of the Lorenz
curve. By dividing the area of concentration into trapezoids, after some steps
it is possible to derive the following formula:
1Although it is often abbreviated as G, in the original Italian version it is abbreviated as
R for reddito, the Italian word for Income.
R =
∑n
i
∑n
j |xi − xj |
2n
∑n
i xi
=
∆
2x¯
The multinomial version purposed by Reardon and Firebaug (2002) is de-
fined as follows
RM =
∑M
m−1 pim
∑J
i−1
∑J
j−1
titj
T 2
∣∣∣piimpim − pijmpim ∣∣∣
2
[∑M
m−1 pim(1− pim)
]
where pimis proportion of m group, tj is total cases of area j, ti is total cases
of area i, T is total cases in the area.
1.4.1.3 Entropy indices
Entropy is not originally a sociological concept; it is instead a physical concept
introduced by Clausius in 1868 in thermodynamic studies. The second princi-
ple of thermodynamics is based precisely on the concept of entropy. The use
of entropy indices in the social sciences derives however from the contribution
of Shannon (1948), the father of information theory and the use of his index in
ecology. Entropy in information theory is the index that measures impediment
to clarity and univocity of the message. The higher the entropy, the less infor-
mation is available. Translated into the social sphere entropy is the measure of
social diversity, the larger entropy, the higher the social diversity. The Shannon
entropy quantifies the uncertainty in predicting the species identity of an indi-
vidual that is taken at random from the data-set. The necessary assumption of
the Shannon index, however, is that the population tends to infinity. The index
is created for electrical communications so an assumption like this is plausible,
but it makes it less applicable to social contexts. Shannon index is equivalent
to Gini Heterogeneity Index (also known as Gini-Simpson, Blau, Hirschman),
G = 1 −∑ p2i , where piis the proportion of i − th group, and commonly used
as index of heterogeneity.
The Shannon entropy index measures the weighted average deviation of each
areal unit from the metropolitan area “entropy” or ethnic diversity. It is defined
as follow:
HShannon = −
N∑
j=1
pj log2(pj)
where pj is the proportion of characters belonging to the j− th type of letter
in the string of interest.
Theil’s index introduced by Theil (1973) is a generalised version on Shan-
non’s index that can be computed also in finite population.
H = k
N∑
j=1
(
pj log
1
j
)
= −k
N∑
j=1
(pj log pj)
then it is possible to see how:
HTheil =
N∑
j=1
(
xj
Nx
log
Nx
xj
)
The Theil index is TT = Hmax −HTheil where Hmax is the theoretical maxi-
mum entropy that is reached when there in only one group, i.e. xj = x ∀ j. This
is substituted into HTheil to give Hmax = lnN , a constant determined solely by
the population. So the Theil index gives a value in terms of an entropy that
measures how far HTheil is away from the ideal Hmax.
OE SI CI PT PS
Dissimilarity YES YES YES YES* YES
Dissimilarity Multinomial YES YES NO NO YES
Gini YES YES YES YES* YES
Gini Multinomial YES YES NO NO YES
Theil YES YES NO YES YES
Theil Multinomial YES YES NO YES YES
*in weak form only
Table 1.1: Axiomatic proprieties of evenness indices
1.4.2 Exposure
Exposure indices measure the degree of potential contacts with people of one
group to one-other or members of two groups inside a spatial unit. Expo-
sure could be measured as isolation, i.e. the probability to have contacts with
members of the same group. Besides, it could be measured as interaction, i.e.
the probability to have contacts with another group inside the spatial unit.
Exposure indices measure the potential experience of segregation. The equi-
distribution measured by the indices of evenness does not imply that there is
less potential contact between those living in a segregated area and the majority
group.
1.4.2.1 Interaction index
Bell (1954) proposed the so-called “index of interaction”, Massey and Denton
(1988:288) describe it as “the minority-weighted average of each spatial unit’s
majority proportion”. Interaction index measures the extent to which a given
group is exposed to another or relatively isolated in a given context.xPy mea-
sured the exposure of each minority group to natives as follows:
xPy =
N∑
i=1
(
xi
X
yi
ti
)
where X is the total population of ethnic group in the area, xi is the pop-
ulation of the ethnic group in the tract, yi is population of the natives in the
tract, tiis the total population of the tract.The index can be interpreted as the
probability that two individuals randomly extracted from the population of two
different groups can be in the same egohood, thus in contact with each other.
1.4.2.2 Isolation index
Moreover Bell (1954) proposed the so-called “index of isolation”, which measures
the extent to which a given group is exposed to itself or relatively isolated in
a given context.xPx the ethnic isolation index measured the degree of each
minority is isolated from other population:
xPx =
N∑
i=1
(
xi
X
xi
ti
)
wherexi was the number of co-ethnics in the area, X was the total number of
co-ethnics, and ti was the total population of the tract of interest. This allowed
us to derive the expected probability that each individual has to interact with
another one from the same ethnic group.
1.4.2.3 Eta2
Isolation index could be very asymmetric, therefore Bell(1954) purposed an ad-
justed index of isolation that compensate for asymmetry, the correlation ratio,
also known as eta-squared. Bell shows that eta2 is just a standardized proba-
bility. It represents the probability standardised probability to meet co-ethnic:
The index is defined as follow:
Eta2 =
∑N
i=1
(
xi
X
xi
ti
)
− XT
1− XT
wherexi was the number of co-ethnics in the area, X was the total number
of co-ethnics, and ti was the total population of the tract of interest, and T is
total population. This allowed us to derive the expected probability that each
individual has to interact with another one from the same ethnic group.
1.4.3 Concentration
Concentration refers to the physical space occupied by a group. It is used
to measure overcrowding phenomena, according to Massey and Denton (1988),
minority generally live in a small amount of space in area. However, such indices
may suffer from bias if the areas include spaces in which the area is divided are
heterogeneous, e.g. agricultural and housing areas or mining and housing areas.
Main measure of concentration was Delta index.Delta is first measure of con-
centration,proposed by Hoover (1941). It computes the relationship between
minority members residing in an area and the average density of minority mem-
bers in a wider area. Similarly to Dissimilarity index it gives the proportion
that must be transfer to another area to have uniform density. It was defined
in the same way of Duncan and Duncan dissimilarity index:
4 = 1
2
∣∣∣xi
X
− ai
A
∣∣∣ ,
where xi are the population counts for a subgroup in the area unit i and
ai is the area where minority live in unit i, while X is the total count for the
group in case of study andA is the total area. Moreover there are other two
measures that can evaluate concentration in better way. These two measure are
Absolute Concentration Index (ACI) and Relative Centralization Index (Massey
and Denton, 1988).
ACI calculate total area where a group resides and compares this with the
minimum and maximum areas that could accommodate a group of that size.
ACI index varies from 0.0 to 1.0, where a score of 1.0 means maximum segre-
gation.
ACI =
∑n
i=1
xiai
X −
∑n1
i=1
tiai
T∑n
i=n2
tiai
T2
−∑n1i=1 tiaiT1
where xi are the population counts for a subgroup in the area unit i and
ai is the area where minority live in unit i, while X is the total count for the
group,n1rank of area where the sum of all ti from area 1 (smallest in size) up
to area n1 is equal to X. T1 =
∑n
i=1 ti in area 1 up to area n1; n2rank of area
where the sum of all ti from area 1 (largest in size) up to area n2 is equal to X.
T2 =
∑n
i=1 ti in area 1 up to area n2.
Besides, RCI is measured similarly. Instead it into takes account of the
distribution of the majority group as well. This measure varies from -1.0 to 1.0.
RCI =
(∑n
i=1
xiai
X∑n
i=1
Yiai
Y
)
− 1( ∑n1
i=1
tiai
T1∑n
i=n2
Tiai
T2
)
− 1
where xi are the population counts for a subgroup in the area unit i and
ai is the area where minority live in unit i, while X is the total count for the
group, n1rank of area where the sum of all ti from area 1 (smallest in size) up
to area n1 is equal to X. T1 =
∑n
i=1 ti in area 1 up to area n1; n2rank of area
where the sum of all ti from area 1 (largest in size) up to area n2 is equal to X.
T2 =
∑n
i=1 ti in area 1 up to area n2.
1.4.4 Clustering
As evenness clustering is an important segregation dimension, spatial clustering
indices have been widely employed as an indicator of spatial segregation. Oc-
cupation of adjacent spaces might form an ethnic enclave. Higher is the level
of clustering, therefore, greater the segregation degree. The spatial association
analyses allow eliminating the problem called modifiable areal unit problem. In
which the geographic aggregation is to undermine the results of the analysis, in
our case of segregation. Using an egohood approach also dampens the checker-
board problem. In this approach, segregation is therefore shown not as a single
index but as a spatial dependence on the map, not limited to administrative
neighbourhood. However, this type of analysis does not show the separation
between the communities, but shows where the communities live. Instead other
indices like Getis Ord G∗i , or Anselin’s Local Indicator of Spatial Association
are able to spot where people are locally segregated.
1.4.4.1 Global: Absolute Clustering Index
Absolute clustering measure proportion between minority members nearby a
defined area and total population in the same defined area. Area and distance
are measured by centroids (Massey and Denton 1988: 294). It varies from 0.0 to
1.0. This kind of measure is a global clustering measure, i.e. does not identity
clustering, but identify if there are clusters.
AC =
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where xi are the population counts for a subgroup in the area unit i, X =∑i
n=1 xi , ti the total population of area i, tj the total population of area j, n
is the number of areas.
1.4.4.2 Local Clustering: Getis Ord G∗i
In the case of the Getis-Ord G∗ index (Ord & Getis, 1995), it shows us where
the spatial association is higher then average community value. It is the local
version of Getis-Ord G (Getis & Ord, 1992). Getis-Ord G∗ spatial statistics, is a
tool to detect the presence of spatial hot spots of an attribute of the population.
As a result, it is possible to see if an attribute has a spatial clusterisation in an
area of predefined dimensions, in this case a circle of radius 500m around the
block of residence of each immigrant.
The G∗ statistic consist of a ratio of the weighted average of the values in
the neighbouring locations, to the sum of all values including the value of the
location:
G∗i =
∑n
j=1 wi,jxj∑n
j=1 xj
where xj is the value of the j attribute; wi,j is the spatial weight between
attributes i and j, n is equal to the total number of locations. To compute the
local Getis-Ord statistics we need to generate z-score Z (G∗i ) for each location
Z(G∗i ) =
∑n
j=1 wi,jxj −W
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The presence of a hot spot, i.e. a point of a high clusterisation, means that
the Z-value is higher than excepted. It means the presence of high segregation
from a sociological point of view. Oppositely the presence of a cold spot, i.e. a
point of a low clusterisation, means that the Z-value is lower than excepted. It
means the presence of low value surrounded by other low values, so significantly
low segregation. The absence of significance means that there is no segregation.
The interpretation of the Getis-Ord statistics on the map is very straightfor-
ward: a positive value suggests a high cluster or hot spot, usually indicated as
red on the map, a negative value indicates a low cluster or cold spot, indicated as
blue on the map. For generating the weight matrix wi,j it uses row-standardized
weights.
1.4.4.3 Local Clustering : Local Indicator of Spatial Association
(LISA)
There are in addition spatial distribution indices. On the opposite way of even-
ness, it is possible to see the clustering indices. LISA was the acronym of
Local Indicator of Spatial Association Anselin (1995). It was a technique based
on Moran’s I index an indicator of spatial auto-correlation[?]. Spatial auto-
correlation was as a proximity cluster of parameters with similar values. If the
similar values of the parameters had a spatial localisation, positive spatial auto-
correlation was present. On the other hand, spatial proximity of different values,
which was not stable in space, indicates a negative spatial auto-correlation or
spatial heterogeneity. Moran I is an index of spatial auto-correlation and it
is comparable to index r of Pearson. Moran’s I that is a global spatial auto-
correlation index, i.e. measures the spatial auto-correlation on all location in a
territory. Its definition is as follows:
I =
N
W
∑n
i
∑n
j wij(xi − x¯)(xj − x¯)∑
i(xi − x¯)2
Where xi is an attribute for feature i , X¯ the mean of the corresponding
attribute, wi,j is the spatial weight between feature i and j, n the total number
of features and W is the sum of all wi,j .
LISA is a local indicator, i.e. it measures the presence of similar values in
the considered sub-area. Local Moran definition is:
Ii =
xi −X[∑n
j=1,j 6=i wi,j(xj−X)
2
n−1
]2 · n∑
j=1,j 6=i
wi,j
(
xj −X
)
Where xi is an attribute for feature i , X¯ the mean of the corresponding
attribute, wi,j is the spatial weight between feature i and j, n the total number
of features and W is the sum of all wi,j .
To compute the LISA we need to generate z-score Z (I∗i ) for each location:
ZIi =
Ii − E [Ii]√
E [I2i ]− E [Ii]2
where E [Ii] is the excepted value of Ii and it is defined as E [Ii] = −
∑n
j=1,j 6=i wi,j
n−1
A positive value of I indicates that a location has a neighbouring location
with similar value, hence this feature is a part of a cluster. If their value is
positive, we have a core of spatial cluster that can be characterized by high
values High-High (HH) i.e, groups of features with high values or low values
Low-Low (LL) i.e, groups of features with low values. On the other hand, a
negative value for I indicates that a location has a neighbouring location with
dissimilar value. If their value is negative, we have palce of interest that can be
characterized by high values High-Low (HL) i.e, dissimilarity outliers with an
high number of low values or Low-High (LH) i.e, dissimilarity outliers with an
low number of high value. By comparison HH and LL are the core of a spatial
cluster, instead HL and LH where we can see outlayer values. Is mandatory
remark that core HH and LL are the core of cluster and not cluster themselves,
like an iceberg where only a small part emerges. Instead, HL and LH are like
boats where all interesting part is emerged.
The presence of a hot spot, i.e. a point of a high clusterisation, means that
the Z-value is higher than excepted. It means the presence of high segregation
from a sociological point of view. Oppositely the presence of a cold spot, i.e. a
point of a low clusterisation, means that the Z-value is lower than excepted. It
means the presence of low value surrounded by other low values, so significantly
low segregation. The absence of significance means that there is no segregation.
1.5 Neighbourgh & Network effects
Research shown that networks effects affect behaviour of actors in a wide number
on decision about social and economic aspect of their lives. Networks effects
have influences on student graduation rates (DeGiorgi et al. 2009), student
performances (Fletcher & Tienda 2009) employment out of college (Marmaros
& Sacerdote 2002), employment in the same block (Bayer, Ross, & Topa 2004;
Calvo-Armengol & Jackson 2004) and Calvó-Armengol & Jackson, 2007), ethnic
based job matching (Galster 2007; Frijters et al. 2005; Battu et al. 2005), co-
working and trust (Bianchi, Casnici, & Squazzoni, 2018)
However this thesis deals with social inequality, therefore we focus on net-
works and social inequality and related neighbourghood effects.
A large part of the studies on networks are studies on neighbourghood, in
fact the primary source of social bonds is given by the place where one lives.
People living in the same context are socially constrained in their decisions
(Manski, 1993). In the same way, a contextual effect can occur (Manski, 1995).
These two effects were correlated. However without a correct explanation of
social mechanism these effects are hardly distinguishable (Durlauf and Ioan-
nides 2010). Furthermore, they have endogenous effects that bias estimations
(Durlauf 2003; Blume and Durlauf 2001; Cohen-Cole and Zanella 2008). Durlauf
and Akerlof examined membership and inequality. Durlauf (2002, 2006) theo-
rised poverty as a membership-based theory. His idea was that individual’s
socioeconomic prospects influenced by groups, such as neighbourhood, schools
and firms. Durlauf (2006) argued that groups and their social influences cause
inequality. Akerlof (1997) suggested that class positioning, for each different
ethnic group, depends from choices like education or childbearing. Akerlof and
Kranton (2010) showed that social identity was a determinant of socioeconomic
behaviour, using a principal-agent model. Wilson (1987) showed that living
in a deprived or segregated neighbourhood penalised minorities. This situa-
tion reinforced attitudes and behaviour, for instance, adopting different work
ethics or stigmatisation by natives. Massey (1990) showed how black immi-
grants remained segregated in their neighbourhood. In addiction Fernandez,
Massey, and Denton (1993) showed the circular causal mechanism of segrega-
tion of Black Ghettos in the US. Case and Katz (1991), in a study in the Boston
Area, showed that living in low-income neighbourhoods increased the likelihood
of adopting a negative behaviour. Evidence suggests that such patterns are not
only typical of an American context but can also cast light on Europe.
In the case of job matching in particular the neighborhood network effects
play a very strong role. Often the persistence of unemployment arises from a
failure to meet demand and supply of work. Topa (2001) for example showed
that certain minority communities could have higher job opportunities thanks to
preferential attachment via ethnically cohesive social networks. Lately, Bayer,
Ross, & Topa (2004) showed the causal link between the living in the same block
and had the job in the same place. This was possible through the exploitation
of strong ties in the social network of the observed subjects. From a sociological
point of view can be seen as the effect of the social structure on job opportu-
nities. People live in the same block because of the social class they belong to,
which reflects their ability to pay. Calvo-Armengol & Jackson (2004) and Calvó-
Armengol & Jackson (2007) offered robust evidence that sow correlation of wages
and employment of individuals linked network. Andersson, (2004) showed that
Swedish people with lower job market position gain better benefits if they live in
a high-income neighbourhood due to the better probability to access to a good
information network. Better influences are effective if people were members of
similar classes, similar result also in Galster (2007). Frijters et al. (2005) showed
the importance of local social networks to account for immigrants’ weak perfor-
mance in job matching. Similarly, Battu et al. (2005) found that Pakistani and
Bangladeshi in the UK tend to overuse their social networks to find a job, which
penalises them significantly. In a study on Boston, Bayer et al. (2008) showed
that co-ethnics residing in the same block had a 33% probability of having a
job in the same location due to referrals via social networks, similar results were
also in Boeri et al. (2015). In a study on the effect of minorities’ social networks
on their labour market outcome in England, Patacchini and Zenou (2012) found
that social network effects are relevant only for people living nearby. However,
in ethnic economies on metropolitan areas, the access to a homo-ethnic social
network can have a long term effect of lock minority members into a secondary
labour market characterised by low-paying jobs with fewer career opportunities
(Porter & Landolt, 1997; Portes & Zhou, 1993). Reardon et al. (2000) to con-
sider ethnic networks as sources of inadequate social capital because immigrants
can benefit from connections with local natives more than from contacts with
co-ethnics. In the American literature for justifying the discrimination effect of
minorities. However, as pointed out by Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo (2006),
explanations in terms of “wrong networks” are consistent only if minorities are
underrepresented in each step of the recruitment process. Moreover Granovet-
ter (2017) suggested that network effects can greatly depend on context-specific
conditions, for example neighbourghood conditions.
To summarize the effects of networks they were very important in job search-
ing. Job search was a problem of information asymmetry between supply and
demand. Social networks made it possible to bring together demand and sup-
ply, thus lowering the likelihood of unemployment. However, the presence of
social networks on an ethnic basis can be exclusive, especially when minorities
are excluded from some selection steps.
1.6 Job Market Integration and Penalties
The theory of human capital explained why immigrants have problems in access-
ing the labour market in their new countries. Research considered in particular
individual endowment of skills, job experience and other educational compe-
tencies. An educational qualification which is considered high in the migrant’s
country of origin could be considered scarce in the host country. Educational
certifications gained in the country of origin may even not be recognised in the
host countries. Human capital developed in the country of origin could often be
useless as it is not portable. Usually, immigrants did not know the functioning
of the host labour market and sometimes have linguistic barriers that do not
help (Chiswick, 1978; Friedberg, 2000).
The perception of the temporary status of migration implies that any em-
ployer can have a low propensity to train immigrants. Furthermore, the strate-
gies implemented by foreign workers were often oriented to survive. They did
not look for well-paid jobs. Instead, their search is limited to jobs that would
provide an income in the short-term. They did this even though this income
meant having a low status (Chiswick, 1978; Dustmann, 2000; Kogan & Kalter,
2005).
Job markets tend also to discriminate against people of a different culture.
For instance, de Beijl (2000) documented the existence of immigrant discrimi-
nation in Western Europe. His contribution focused on Belgian, German, Dutch
and Spanish labour markets. Many scholars stressed that after many variables,
such as education, gender, experience, an unexplained residue survives stan-
dard control variables; this residue is called the ethnic penalty (Berthoud, 2000;
Heath & Cheung, 2007; Heath & McMahon, 1991). This penalty seems not
to correlate with class attainment, as suggested by Reyneri and Fullin (2010).
Moreover, Bisin et al. (2011) indicated that the probability to be employed is
a function of ethnic identity. It is thus likely that the unequal social conditions
in which immigrants are embedded could originate from the labour market.
An ethnic penalty determinant was ethnic hierarchy (Hagendoorn, 1995;
Kleinpenning & Hagendoorn, 1993). Groups in lower tier of hierarchy face
more discrimination then others.
When human capital presents ethnical elements, ethnic penalties can also
be inter-generational. This is likely when members of a specific group are in
the minor positions of the ethnic social hierarchy. The descendants of people of
Germanic or Celtic ethnicity, such as Germans, Norwegians, English, Dutch or
Irish immigrants in the US in the twentieth century had the same job positions of
natives (Heath, 2007). Empirical evidence suggests that in the United States,
groups from southern Europe have similar performance of those from central
Northern Europe.
On the contrary, the same groups, mostly represented by Italians, struggle
to find work, especially in Belgium and Germany (Heath, 2007) where their
status was lower. The situation of groups from non-European countries, such
as Turkey, Morocco, Pakistan or Bangladesh, was more serious. In an analysis
of guest workers in 40 years in Austria, Herzog-Punzenberger (2003) found that
the Turkish group had systematically high levels of unemployment and that this
pattern was stable over time. Similar evidence was found by Crul, Schneider, &
Lelie (2012) in Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. On the contrary, Turks
did not have the same penalty in France or Sweden (Crul & Mollenkopf, 2012;
Lessard-Phillips, Fibbi, & Wanner, 2012).
In this respect, numerous field experiment of employment discrimination was
performed in many European countries. In Italy Allasino, Venturini, & Zincone
(2004) performed a pioneering field experiment. They tested discrimination of
Moroccan workers in three main Italian cities, Turin, Naples and Rome.They
found that natives were more appreciated then immigrants; in many cases, Mo-
roccan were excluded from the selection process without their skill even begin
evaluated.
In France, Duguet, Leandri, L’horty, & Petit (2010) tested the simultaneous
effect of place of residence and ethnicity. They found consistent discrimination
against Moroccans. Moreover, they found no stigma effects from the place of
residence, while also gender had no effect.
In the Netherlands, Andriessen, Nievers, Dagevos, & Faulk (2012), tested
labour market discrimination for Dutch, Moroccan, Turk, Surinamese and An-
tillean ethnicity. They found substantial discrimination for non-Dutch immi-
grants. In Germany, Kaas & Manger (2012) constructed a field experiment
about labour market discrimination with the same techniques used in experi-
ments about housing market discrimination for Turkish immigrants. They found
a call-back level for Germans 10% higher then Turkish applicants.
Discrimination disappeared for applications including reference letter with
favourable information about candidate personalities.
Similar findings with the similar experimental design were made also in
Switzerland, in which Fibbi, Lerch, & Wanner (2006) found discrimination for
ex-Yugoslavians in both French-Speaking cantons and German Speaking can-
tons. Turkish still subjects faced discrimination, but less then ex-Yugoslavians.
In Greece, Drydakis & Vlassis (2010) found that for Albanian males in the low
skilled job position face more discrimination in job market compared to na-
tives. Moreover, in Sweden, Bursell (2014) found discrimination against Arabic
and North African sounding named people, but no discrimination against fe-
males. They found that male employer tended to overcompensate female name
applicants. Instead, female employers tended to favour foreign named man in
particular.
To sum up, the research shows us how human capital varies according to
the context in which it is generated. It also shows how immigrants use survival
strategies to get safe jobs instead of well paid. Furthermore, literature shows us
how the actors of the labor market tend to discriminate people from different
cultures. It is carried by experimental literature that shows how people with
low social status derived from ethnicity face discrimination in the labor market.
1.7 Social Inequality
Historically, the solution to inequality has been economic growth. Differently
from economic theory, Kuznets (1955) showed a non-linear relationship between
income inequality and economic growth. He hypothesised an inverted U-shaped
relationship between income inequality and economic growth. His hypothesis
was the subject of extensive debate and in the end successfully tested by Persson
& Tabellini (1991). Ravallion (2014) argued that inequality dynamics was a
function of the development reached by a country’s economy. Moreover, social
inequality was a complex phenomenon and probably this is why many theorists
explained it differently.
Neoclassical economists used the concept of human capital . According to
this theory, persons gain earnings by their own human capital (Becker, 1964;
Mincer, 1958, 1974). The first agent allocates time and resources investing in
the constitution of his own human capital. The agent earning profile depends
on the amount of this investment and personal characteristics, such as gender,
family background and personal skills. Agents can develop skills, which an be
learnt by experience. The main source of inequality is skill formation from
investments by employers.
The end of the "golden age" was characterised by the late trend of the de-
mand for mid-skilled workers. The introduction of new technologies which im-
proved productivity and required high-skilled personnel (Goldin & Katz, 1999),
was called Skill-Biased Technical Change (SBTC). SBTC polarised high paid
jobs to high skilled people, and promoted STEM jobs, by creating consistent
education-driven inequality (Aghion, 2002). Over the last decades, SBTC cre-
ated income inequality mainly in Western economies, by skilled job polarisation
(Adermon & Gustavsson, 2015; David, Katz, & Kearney, 2006; Goos, Man-
ning, & Salomons, 2009, 2014). Recently, SBTC affected even social inequality
in emerging economies, such as India (Berman, Somanathan, & Tan, 2005) or
Brazil (Fajnzylber & Fernandes, 2009).
The advent of the Schumpeterian theories considered innovation as the en-
gine of growth (Aghion, 2002; Schumpeter, 1942). Education and technology
investments are the engines of growth and therefore are seen as sources of a pos-
sible reduction of inequality. In the post-WWII period, Blau, Boudon and Jenks
have looked at the effect of social structure and education on social inequality
(Blau, 1977; Boudon, 1974; Jencks, 1972). Shavit and Blossfeld (1993) consid-
ered education as the main catalyst of social mobility as it could have a disrup-
tive effect on previous social structure equilibrium. In this respect, micro sociol-
ogists have stressed the role of education. Gambetta (1987) focused on the indi-
vidual decision in education based on the rational–choice paradigm. Similarly,
Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) showed that education was the main equaliser of
class and gender differences. Several empirical analysis found that the inequality
of educational opportunities was less effective in developed economies (Breen,
Luijkx, Müller, & Pollak, 2009, 2010).
Several studies underlined the importance of the embeddedness of educa-
tional choices by examining social contexts in more detail (Stocké, 2007; Van de
Werfhorst & Hofstede, 2007).
To sum up, in the modern society social inequality was a function of educa-
tional attainment. In the industrial age education was an advantage to improve
one’s social status. After the skill biased technical change, education is the key
advantage to improve one’s social status, both from a sociological and an eco-
nomic point of view.However, some factors such as the social environment in
which the neighborhood or, for example, the family lives, can strongly influence
educational choices and distort them.
1.8 The Second Generation: Problems and Speci-
ficities
The First Generation (FG) of migrants were motivated by finding new and
better-living conditions. Their pay-offs were specific. They accepted a degrading
job to have the opportunity to live in the host country. Portes (1995) called
this process "downward-assimilation". Instead, the Second Generation (SG) of
migrants, i.e., the immigrant’s children, lived a different situation. Portes and
MacLeod (1996) underlined that the primary goal of FG is the well-being of SG.
In pursuing this ambition, the family background is decisive in influencing the
scholastic success and the socio-professional positions of children. This depends
on a variety of social and economic factors. Social factors could be related to
ethnicity, religion, family education level; economic factor concerns the family
income. According to Portes and Rumbaut (2001), FG with higher human
capital could better promote the social inclusion and integration of SG.
In the sociological literature, the second generation means every person born
into a family where at least one parent was an immigrant. Children of immi-
grants have a hybrid position compared to children of natives. They were grown
between two nations, the parent’s country and the host one. The influence of
parent’s national culture matters if they were born in the country where they
grew up. In some way, they were mediators of the culture of their parents and
the culture of the host society. Unlike the first, the second generation did not
choose the country in which they live. This means that SG migrants are usually
minority members, who grew-up in close contact with natives.
Moreover, they are sensitive to rights, at least in theory as natives. Even
more than their parents, SG migrants require equal treatment, social promotion
and identity recognition (Ambrosini, 2004). For the SG ties with the parent,
country societies are usually less tight. Their expectation formation depends on
their socialisation process. If they socialise in ethnic segregated neighbourhood,
their expectation will be the bounded by SG ethnic group. On the other hand, if
SG socialise with natives, their expectation will be the same as natives. However
usually, SG migrants are in a disadvantaged position. Indeed, they are in the
between of their parents’ world and the world of their native peers, whose social
needs are different. The SG assimilation process is therefore vital to the well-
being of SG members.
The second generation lives in a sort of limbo; in fact, it has not the same
social dignity as natives. However, second generations were not even wholly
immigrants because it grew up in the destination country of the parents; at
the same time they did not choose unlike their parents, the country where they
lived. Often the society of the host country continues to assign them the same
low social status as the previous generation, even though they want the same
rights and the same opportunities as the native peers.
1.9 Education Inequality in Europe
The children of non-European migrants where the social value of education was
low usually face educational problems. These educational disadvantages were
especially relevabt for Turkish, North Africans, South Asians and Caribbean
Black migrants. Burgess, Wilson, and Lupton (2005) in an analysis school
population and census data in 2001 considered the main thirteen migrant groups.
They showed higher segregation for South Asian pupils, such as Bangladeshis
and Pakistanis, in particular. Their segregation was also higher than that of
Black pupils in England. Furthermore, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis suffered
higher education segregation compared to other South Asians, such as Indians.
Moreover, for most ethnic groups, children face more segregation at school
than in the neighbourhood where they live. Jackson, Jonsson, and Rudolphi
(2012) performed a longitudinal study on Swedish and English schools and found
education segregation in England for the Black Caribbean. However, they found
that segregation and school leaving was a matter of choice. They found the same
for Turkish and South American in Swedish school system. Research conducted
in France suggested a high level of educational segregation of Africans. Segre-
gation was unusually high for North Africans, either FG or SG (Brinbaum &
Cebolla-Boado, 2007). In Belgium, educational segregation was found for three
main groups, i.e., Moroccans, Turks and Italians. The Italian ethnic group was
the first foreign minority in Belgium. Phalet and Swyngedouw (2003) found
that in case of Moroccans and Turks segregation was persistent over genera-
tions, whereas in case of Italians, it disappeared with the second generation.
Indeed, while Italian migration in Belgium was concentrated between 1946 and
1961, Moroccan and Turks experienced mechanisms of exclusion through a class
disadvantage, which in turn increased their chance of disinvesting in tertiary ed-
ucation, as it is reflected in their high drop-out rate.
In the Netherlands, research suggested high levels of education segregation
for Turkish, Moroccans of second generation if compared with their Dutch coun-
terpart (Crul and Doomernik, 2003). They found that Turks and Moroccans
had language deficiencies and poor primary school achievements. This explains
problems in vocational training or lower secondary short school tracks. How-
ever, it is important to note that Moroccan SG now outperformed Turkish SG,
but their students have higher dropout rates, especially in case of girls. Tolsma,
Coenders, and Lubbers (2007) in a study on the Netherlands focused on ethnic,
educational inequality of four of the largest groups, i.e., Turks, Moroccans, Suri-
namese and Antilleans. They used an immigrant survey, the SPVA, for years
1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, and 2002. They found that ethnic minorities improved
their situation at the lowest educational levels. Under-representation faced by
them within vocational tracks of secondary education decreased over time, al-
though inequality was still significant in case of the tertiary education. They
also found that the university system was monopolised by Dutch natives.
Herzog-Punzenberger (2003) in an analysis over forty years of Guest workers
policy in Austria found that Turkish migrants were over-represented in lower
school levels, even without evidence of high levels of residential segregation.
Furthermore, she found that Turkish pupils were less present in high tier part
of the education system. This penalty had a substantial effect on unemployment.
Kristen and Granato (2007) analysed factors leading to Abitur obtainment
(German-style high school diploma) in Germany. They found ethnic segregation
among Turkish of FG and SG and Italians of FG only. Similar evidence for
Turkish was found in Worbs (2003), Kalter and Granato (2007), to name a few.
A panel data analysis from 1984 to 2001 in Denmark by Colding (2006),
revealed that being Turkish or Pakistani led to a poor completion rate of sec-
ondary school. This is particularly true for Turkish students. This was ex-
plained by the inter-generational transmission of parents’ weak socio-economic
status, which encouraged school dropout. The dropout rate however for Pak-
istani has experienced a substantial reduction. Interestingly, the study found
that in Copenhagen education segregation was high for immigrants though res-
idential segregation was low. This was due to presence of private schools as
suggested by Rangvid (2007). These private schools allowed circumventing the
block imposed by the state regulation that connects the district of residence to
the school.
Fekjær and Birkelund (2007) in a study on Norway found that the impact
of social background on low education performances was significant for Indians,
Pakistani and Turkish. In the UK, Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi (2008) exam-
ined the general certificates of Secondary Education examinations. They found
that Indians outperformed all other immigrant groups. They also outperformed
white British peers. For the top class, white also outperformed other minorities
(Blacks and Pakistani/Bangladeshi). Moreover, if we look at the lower classes,
Indian and Whites were better than Blacks, Pakistani and Bangladeshi.
In any case, education inequality can be the outcome of individual choices.
Research usually focused on secondary and tertiary education because this had
direct and measurable outcome on the job market. There is general consensus
on the fact that ethnic education inequalities are connected to school choice.
As noted by Denton (1995) in systems without freedom of school choice, res-
idential segregation and school segregation conflate with each other. Indeed,
school choice is shaped by local information, home-school distance and other
social constraints related to neighbourhoods. These social mechanisms create a
persistent school segregation outcome. However, there is research considering
also freedom of school choice as a source of segregation. This is especially true
where private schools were the only alternatives to state schools. Johnston,
Burgess, Wilson, and Harris (2006) suggested that they hindered transaction
costs of white flight.
Furthermore, research suggested that school composition influences school
choice, especially in periods of massive migrations. In a study on Germany, Kris-
ten (2008) found that Turkish families were more likely to send their children to
schools with a high share of foreigners. On the contrary, native families preferred
homogeneity. These results were also found by Riedel, Schneider, Schuchart, &
Weishaupt (2010) and Schneider et al. (2012). In a study on England, Burgess,
Greaves, Vignoles, & Wilson (2015) found a significant effect of schools’ ethnic
composition. Natives prefer schools more homogeneous ethnically. This effect
also correlates with the social stratus of families. Middle or upper-class ma-
jorities prefer not enrolling their children in schools with a certain amount of
minority pupils (Uusitalo 2005).
In Europe almost all education systems are freely accessible until the end
of secondary education. This section shows how there was a devaluation of
education in immigrant communities. In light of what was found in the previ-
ous review of the communities that less evaluated education are same as those
who lived segregated and suffered more significant problems of discrimination.
Therefore there are two main problems, the first being the devaluation of the
value of education. The second is the state of poverty probably due to inade-
quate human capital and entrapment in ethnic social-networks. This does not
allow us to evaluate investments in human capital properly.
1.10 The Challenge of Social Cohesion
Social group conflicts usually arose when there is no homogeneity in social
groups. These differences are called heterogeneity or diversity. They could
affect social and economic factors, such as economic growth, institutional per-
formance and social cohesion. While research has developed semi-quantitative
or quantitative variables to measure heterogeneity, it must be noted that these
measures are based on arbitrary factors. This is due to the fact that these
factors can be relevant to examine an ethnic group, but irrelevant in case of
others.
First, heterogeneity could be explained in terms of transaction costs. These
transaction costs are often created by prejudices or fear. Politicians often exploit
these mechanisms for electoral purposes. Research on social conflict suggested
that the weaker is social cohesion caused by ethnic heterogeneity (EH), the
stronger the effect of socio-cultural polarisation is on individual life. Previous
studies indicated that EH affects the government quality, commons manage-
ment, altruism, trust and as consequence, social capital.
Mauro (1995) showed a positive correlation between ethnic heterogeneity
and corruption. In a similar study, Treisman (2000) showed that heterogeneous
countries have a higher level of perceived corruption. Glaeser & Saks (2006)
showed that ethnic-bonds could be tight. Ethnic group members tend to sup-
port politicians or bureaucrats of their group when they know that they are
corrupt. Porta & Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) found that ethnolinguistic hetero-
geneity undermined the quality and performance of institutions. In a study
on Australian neighbourhoods, Leigh (2006) found that ethno-linguistic hetero-
geneity had a stronger effect on institutional factors than economic inequality.
Dinesen & Sø nderskov (2012) analysed Danish dynamics of trust and popu-
lation heterogeneity from 1979 to 2009. They found a negative intertemporal
relationship between trust and heterogeneity. In the same vein, Dinesen & Sø
nderskov (2015) found that ethnic diversity affects trusts in case of microsegre-
gation.
Not only do ethnicity or language are potential sources of conflict; reli-
gious heterogeneity could increase social conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 2002;
Reynal-Querol, 2002). Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2003) suggested that reli-
gious polarisation can be a deflator of a country’s economic development. Costa
and Kahn (2003) suggested that one of the reasons why public policies in frag-
mented communities have been less efficient was a lower level of social cohesion.
Similar results were found in (Dincer, 2011; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Uslaner,
2002).
Outside Europe, the effect of heterogeneous society composition has been
comprehensively investigated. In a review on over 90 recent publications on
ethnic heterogeneity and social cohesion, Meer and Tolsma (2014) found con-
sistent support for the spatial effect of social cohesion at the neighbourhood
level. They also found that in the United States the effect of heterogeneity on
social cohesion was stronger, with serious problems of greater segregation in the
US urban areas. They concluded that as far as social cohesion is concerned,
countries are not comparable. A similar conclusion was reached by Alesina &
Glaeser (2005) and Alesina, Glaeser, & Sacerdote, (2006) who underlined that
US and Europe have different institutional contexts and this must be consid-
ered in any analysis of the link between ethnic composition of societies, social
cohesion and conflict.
The lack of social cohesion can lead to a series of consequences such as those
reported above. Immigration leads to diversity, therefore it is a source of lack
of social cohesion. Therefore it is potentially problematic. The only solution to
immigration is the assimilation of immigrants.
1.11 Assimilation Theories
Brubaker (2001) started from the etymology of the word "assimilate", i.e., be-
coming similar. Here, the point is not the outcome but the process of assimila-
tion itself.
It is worth noting that the literature on assimilation has most US origins.
These origins found their justifications in the vast migration that targeted the
USA throughout its history. The first assimilation theory was in Park & Burgess
(1921), which formulated the classical structural theory of Chicago School’s
Assimilation theory (CS), Zeitgeist. CS considered incoming cultural traits
as “inferior”, targeting the “superior” American White Anglo-Saxon Protestant
(WASP) culture. The assumption was that a hosted group must integrate it-
self into a host country main group. The hosted group must also abandon its
cultural models, institutional and language and dissolve into the host group.
Park (1930) gave the best definition ‘the name was given to the processor pro-
cesses by which peoples of diverse racial origins and different cultural heritages,
occupying a common territory, achieve cultural solidarity sufficient at least to
sustain a national existence’.
After WWII, Gordon further developed this theory by providing a system-
atic dissection of the concept (Gordon, 1964). He purposed a multistage model
that starts with cultural assimilation followed by large-scale inter-ethnic mar-
riage and ethnic identification with the host society. The Gordon’s approach
however was ambiguous. Gordon’s theory refers to two possible groups and loses
relevance when referring to many groups. Gordon model, as for all CS models,
considered only macro aspects.
Lieberson, (1985) and Lieberson & Waters (1993) indicated that groups
never abandoned their origins to embrace those of the new nation. In this way,
Gordon bypassed the problems of a meso-social approach. Moreover, Portes and
Rumbaut (1996) stressed the importance of a micro approach in a context of
assimilation. Furthermore, Alba and Nee (2009) criticised Gordon for neglect-
ing the micro-macro link. In their review, any serious theory of assimilation
should consider macro-micro sequential processes to capture the emergence and
persistence of institutional factors.
One of the other significant theories of assimilation has been the ’straight-
line’ assimilation popularised by Gans (1973). This theory has been a further
development of Gordon’s theory by assuming by-step dynamics in which each
generation increased its integration (Lieberson, 1973). This theory assumed a
linear growth of assimilation over time. It did not consider heterogeneity be-
tween ethnic groups and so it was criticised (e.g., Conzen, Gerber, & Morawska,
1992; Glazer & Moynihan, 1970; Yancey, Ericksen, & Juliani, 1976). Due to
these criticisms, Gans (1992) reformulated it as a ’broken line theory’.
In 1965. a review of the existing immigration policies and new migration
from Asia and South America was published. Results suggested that new mi-
grants had a very different culture compared to old European immigrants. To
account for this, Portes and Zhou (1993) formulated the so-called ’segmented
assimilation theory’, in which there was no longer a vision of integrative assimi-
lation. Instead, they looked at which social segment immigrants were part of the
process and which were not. They theorised the existence of certain structural
barriers, which would trap immigrants in the lower stratus of the population.
Such impairments could lead to stagnant or downward mobility (Portes, 1995).
This kind of assimilation targeted only some ethnic groups, usually the poorest
one. SG immigrants who suffered segmented assimilation were induced to be-
lieve in an insurmountable discrimination by the local majority. Social isolation
and deprivation caused oppositions as a form of reaction to a perceived hostile
reality.
Later, a new theory was developed by Alba and Nee (1997), which was called
neo-assimilationist theory. This theory lost the Chicago School’s assumption of
irrational assimilation and tried to integrate micro factors with an institutional
macro corollary. Unlike the segmented assimilation theory, these authors as-
sumed that assimilation can take place even inter-generationally. This implies
that in the second, third and fourth generations, “ethnic” aspects would be
lost and differences in the labour market positions between migrants and na-
tives would vanish. Moreover, migrants would blend in with natives by ceasing
to have endogamous relationships. Brubaker (2001) pointed out that assimi-
lation was an economic and cultural process and suggested that economically
marginalised people could never become truly natives.
In the section the main theories are reported. These theories analyze long
or very long time situations like three generations. They are strongly influenced
by their formulation in American contexts where any group except the English
one was segregated. However, the theories show that there is hope for an end
to discrimination and to avoid problems of social conflict on an ethnic basis.
1.12 Discussion and Conclusions
Rent market discrimination was with high probability one of segregation de-
terminants . It showed that not all landlords are available to rent to anyone.
Although there was no experimental literature for all groups, it is likely that
discrimination for all not-Europeans is worst then discrimination for Europeans
or Westerners. Immigrant presence was a key variable of house value determi-
nation. Bosch, Carnero, & Farré (2010) noted that the presence of immigrants
reduced discrimination against them. This practice might have an almost ratio-
nal motivation; Accetturo et al. (2012) showed that from one hand, immigrant
presence in the house proximity decreases its value. On the other hand, where
there was a low immigrant presence in the area, there was an increase in prices.
Segregation theories of North-American origin, were scarcely applicable to the
European context, due to different implemented welfare systems and histori-
cal urbanisation differences. This principle opens the way to study different
characteristics of welfare model also in Europe (Malheiros 2002; Arbaci 2008).
Research shows that in Europe segregation was typical for non-European im-
migrants. Groups that typically face segregation are Turkish, South-Asians,
i.e. Pakistanis, Bangladeshi, North Africans, Moroccans in particular and sub-
Saharan Africans. Unlike other countries, e.g. Germany of the UK, in France,
there ware no atypical mono-ethnic neighbourhoods (Pan Ké Shon, 2010). Lit-
erature about Centre-North Europe shows that is the public housing the leading
cause of segregation (Verdugo, 2011; Pan Ké Shon and Verdugo, 2015; Musterd
and Deurloo, 1997 and Musterd and Elorduy-Zapaterieche, 2008; Peach 1996,
2009). Unlike what happens in central and northern European countries, in
southern European countries the welfare propensity to build rented social hous-
ing was low (Malheiros 2002; Arbaci 2008). In southern Europe, immigrants
tended to live poor homes and in central areas, abandoned by natives or sub-
urban areas. This tendency was linked to discrimination in the rental market.
Suburban or old abandoned historic centres were areas where the rental market
was usually low, and immigrants were more likely to be present. The pres-
ence of immigrants contracts the market and attracts other immigrants to the
area because unlike the natives, the presence of immigrants was not a problem.
The orientation of the Mediterranean welfare to property ownership had the
effect that rented the houses were few. In this way, a complex and fragmented
presence was more likely than in other European areas. Research has shown
that networks effects affect the behaviour of actors in a vast number of decision
about social and economic aspect of their lives. The literature showed how the
neighbourhood determined the construction of the social network, and individ-
uals weave social networks through proximity social contacts. In the case of
job matching, in particular, the neighbourhood network effects play an influ-
ential role. Often the persistence of unemployment arises from a job-matching
a failure. Moreover, immigrants usually suffer a penalisation, in fact that the
human capital of immigrants was often non-transferable outside the country of
origin. The education obtained in the country of origin was often invalid in host
countries. Linguistic barriers and unfamiliarity about the local labour market
severely penalised them. Immigrants without local support could be in a state
of need; therefore, immigrants were more likely to adopt survival-oriented work
strategies. This means that even if qualified immigrants prefer less paid sta-
ble jobs. The literature showed a long series of field experiments on labour
market discrimination. The groups with the lowest social status were those
who suffer more discrimination. Existence of generalized ethnic penalties was
country-specific because in every country the social status of the groups was
different, e.g. in the UK, was south Asians (Heath, 2007), while in Germany,
Austria, the lower social status was of the Turkish group (Herzog-Punzenberger,
2003), while in France was of north Africans (Lessard-Phillips et al., 2012) and
in the Netherlands both (Crul et al. 2012; Crul and Mollenkopf, 2012). If the
country’s labour market was discriminating against immigrants, they had to
rely on their social networks to get a job. The literature showed how networks
were important in job-matching. Topa (2001) for example showed that some
minority could have higher job opportunities thanks to preferential attachment
via ethnically cohesive social networks; this allowed minority members to avoid
labour market discrimination. Research in European contexts showed that in
the presence of ethnic enclaves, neighbourhood social networks were for immi-
grants the primary source of information for work, but had deleterious effects on
income in the long term. An ethnic social-network can be helpful when immi-
grants arrive by providing jobs, but they might in the following years lock them
into a secondary labour market characterised by low-paying jobs with fewer ca-
reer opportunities. Moreover, much research justified the poor performance of
immigrants in the labour market due to the abuse of ethnic, social networks.
However, as pointed out by Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo (2006), this is pos-
sible only in the case of under-representation of immigrants in the recruitment
processes. Besides, Granovetter (2017) pointed out suggested that network ef-
fects might significantly depend on context-specific conditions. People who live
in the same area had similar behaviours and resulted due to social constraints
that affected their decisions, in the same way, a contextual effect can occur
(Manski, 1993;1995). However, without a correct explanation of social mecha-
nism, these effects are hardly distinguishable. However, they can statistical bias
estimations due correlation between the place of living and opportunities given
by the context. Beyond this, there is a vision based on neighbourhood effects.
The behaviours are affected by the environment in which people live; there is
evidence for which even at the migratory level the segregated immigrants’ live
situations of social and informative penalties.
The discrimination on the labour market and the exploitation of ethnic
social-networks to obtain it had as a consequence an immigrant income inequal-
ity. Historically the only solution to inequality was economic growth. However,
in his seminal contribution, Kuznetz showed the presence of inverse U shaped
relationship between growth and inequality; this means that growth by itself
was not the solution to the inequality problem. In addition, the Skill-Biased
technical change boosted inequality from the 70s this phenomenon based on
education the most educated people and therefore with higher skills obtained
higher salaries. Therefore, after the 70s, education became a critical variable
inequality reduction. Education was also one of the engines of economic growth,
that although it was not the only solution to inequality remains of fundamental
importance. In a migratory context, this raised the problem of the education of
second-generation immigrants. The second generation lives in a sort of limbo; in
fact, it has not the same social dignity as natives. However, second generations
were not even wholly immigrants because it grew up in the destination country
of the parents. At the same time, they did not choose unlike their parents, the
country where they lived. Often the society of the host country continues to
assign them the same low social status as the previous generation, even though
they want the same rights and the same opportunities as the native peers. The
research showed that the second generation of intra-European immigrants, with
the exclusion of the Italian community in Germany, had similar results to the
natives. In some rare cases such as those of the Chinese and Indian commu-
nities in the UK or Vietnamese in France, the second generations had better
results than the natives. However, most of the second generations faced school
segregation, usually school segregated groups where the same that faced resi-
dential segregation. The education of second generations becomes substantial
in order not to create pockets of poverty and social exclusion. According to the
literature it was, therefore, possible to see an association between segregation
and inequality. This relationship became self-replicating.
Coming to the limitation of studies presented in this review, in section 1.2
there was a fundamental limitation. It was the absence of a third control variable
of people that can be considered almost on the same social level of native, for
example in Germany made a test with a Dutch-sounding name. Using this
control group give us the possibility of a check if discrimination occurred due
to ethnic group diversity or homophily. It seems that the experiments were
intended to show the extreme differences. This type of study also does not give
us information on the ethnicity of the landlord. Therefore, it is not possible to
know if problems of discrimination give the refusal by the landlord. Moreover,
since we do not have information on the landlord, we cannot know whether
his/her actions were grounded on social prejudice or prejudice established on
his/her experience.
In section 1.3 on the theoretical part, we have to underline that there is
not a unified or at least an umbrella theory of segregation, in particular for
European segregation. Besides, usually previous studies examined segregation
almost in one dimension, evenness. However, evenness alone was not implying
the presence of segregation directly, because segregation was a multidimensional
phenomenon. Another limitation of the literature is its primary focus on Central
and North Europe; while segregation of immigrants in Southern Europe is less
studied or studied in an area with a low number of immigrants.
In section 1.6 this kind of study has the same problem of housing discrim-
ination studies. Field experiments focus on one or two groups usually on the
bottom of the social hierarchy. Moreover, they seem more like studies on eth-
nic stigmatised groups in the job market. There is never a control group with
similar characteristics to the natives that can underline if the effect is out-group
discrimination or stigmatisation of a specific ethnic group. In another way, this
kind of experiment does not take into account the cultural and linguistic differ-
ences between groups that in a strong determinant. These experiments have the
problem of testing numerous variables and encapsulating them in ethnic preju-
dice only. In such an experiment it should be replicated on second generations.
Having grown up in the same area, they have no language and cultural barriers.
In section 1.5 the research tends to be dated and focused with the United
States or Central-Northern Europe where the segregation problems are different,
there are no studies in areas where there is a heterogeneous foreign population
often related to micro-segregation. Furthermore, the research shows only results
based on prior division of space. In this way, he runs into the modifiable areal
unit problem. This problem could bias significantly the estimations and have
a significative impact on the results. In order to eliminate this problem, it is
necessary to analyse neighbourhoods based around the subjects to be analysed,
such as the egohood approach.
In section 1.9 research is missing in Southern Europe where the welfare
state model is different. Research shows that inequality starts from secondary
school and research almost ignored the primary school choice. Even though the
primary school lays down the foundations for student learning and can have
effects on long-term learning and skills, not to mention future school choices
Furthermore, research had no attention for primary school choice; the little
literature has its focus on North of Germany, the Netherlands and the US. The
primary school lays down the foundations for student learning. This can have
effects on long-term learning and skills, not to mention future school choices.
Chapter 2
Urban Spatial Segregation in
Brescia
2.1 Introduction
Modern Italy from its foundation had a history of emigration country. In a cen-
tury (1870-1970) more than eighteen million Italians left the country for France,
Germany, and countries of the South and North America (Del Boca and Ven-
turini 2005). With the economic boom of the 60s, there was a strong demand
for internal labour, which promoted industrial development in southern Euro-
pean countries (Panichella, 2014; Greenwood, 1997). Therefore foreign-oriented
migrations turned into internal migrations. Besides, it the country began to at-
tract former emigrants, from the 80s onwards Italy became a destination country
for migrations. With the ageing of the population and low demographic rates
in Italy since the 1990s, it began to attract a growing number of immigrants.
Until the early 90s only about 0.7 millions of inhabitants were foreigners, now
5.45 millions of resident were foreigner plus an estimated 9-10% of irregular
immigrants and 1.2 millions of foreign-born that got citizenship by naturalisa-
tion. Immigration in Italy differs from that of other European countries both
because it began in a period following the urban development of cities, and
because of a different ethnic composition. In fact, despite other countries like
former colonial empires such as the UK, France or the Netherlands migrations
started from former colonies from the 50s (Hansen, 2003). Moreover, differently
from Central and Northern European countries received many labourers immi-
grants mainly from southern European countries such as Italy, Spain, Greece,
former Yugoslavia, as well as Asian countries such as Turkey and Africans like
Morocco (Del Boca & Venturini, 2005; Herzog-Punzenberger, 2003; Hochstadt,
1999). Migrations in Italy were heterogeneous, with a prevalence of east Eu-
ropeans over other groups. Until the first half of the 20th century, European
cities were mainly mono-ethnic and people faced segregation according to the
social class they belonged (Arbaci, 2007; Sako Musterd, 2005). Research about
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immigration in Europe shows a tendency of the immigrant community to live
in separated areas from natives. This usually happens in central and north Eu-
ropean countries, such as the Netherlands, France, England or Germany, where
migrations started decades ago (Musterd & Deurloo, 1997; Pan Ké Shon, 2010;
Pan Ké Shon & Verdugo, 2015; Peach, 1996; Schönwälder, 2007; Verdugo, 2011).
In Central and Northerner Europe, migrations that took place during the post-
war reconstruction period, therefore the immigrants’ settlements were merged
into urban city structure. It was possible to see neighbourhoods populated by a
majority of immigrant population, e.g. Rikenby in Stockholm or sub-urban zone
in Paris or Molenbeek in Bruxelles. Segregation was typical of groups in the
lower tier of social status hierarchies. In France, although there is a high het-
erogeneity, segregation was high for African groups, with no difference between
the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa. These groups lived mainly in the social
housing area (Pan Ké Shon, 2010; Verdugo 2011). This segregation becomes
problematic especially in high urbanised areas (Rathelot & Safi, 2014). Pan Ké
Shon and Verdugo (2015) highlighted that there is not a pattern of mono-ethnic
ghettoisation; by contrast, many immigrants live in an area with high exposure
to natives. Segregation differences were significant among groups, in fact as
noted by Rathelot & Safi, (2014) European immigrants did not face segrega-
tion. Furthermore, Pan Ké Shon (2010) underlines that continuous migratory
phenomena increase segregation. However, this is not typical only of France and
can also be found in Britain (Simpson, 2004) and Sweden (Bråmå, 2006). Mus-
terd and Deurloo (1997) and Musterd and Elorduy-Zapaterieche (2008) found
higher segregation for people living in public social housing in the Netherlands,
particularly for Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese. Similar results were also in
Musterd & Ostendorf (2009). In the UK, there were vast areas populated by
South Asians residents with a significant amount of urban segregation (Peach,
1996), the author confirmed results in a later work (Peach, 2009).
Segregation affects various aspects of the immigrants’ life due to effect on
social network creations, such as employability (Boeri, De Philippis, Patacchini,
& Pellizzari, 2015), language proficiency (Danzer & Yaman, 2016), educational
attainment (Danzer, Feuerbaum, Piopiunik, & Woessmann, 2018). A litera-
ture review on education and inequality in Europe by Heath, Rothon, & Kilpi
(2008) showed that ethnic groups living in segregated areas suffer persistent in-
equality. Segregation may also affect immigrants’ integration and therefore the
assimilation of second generations. However, this depends on country-specific
and ethnic-specific factors, such as employment and labour markets, the edu-
cational system, housing market, and social and cultural values, as suggested
by Musterd (2003), Schönwälder (2007) and Bolt, Özüekren, & Phillips (2010).
Although there is a link between employment segregation and integration or
assimilation (Brubaker 2001), economically marginalised immigrants cannot ef-
fectively integrate into the host society. Except for outdated studies like Crosta,
Mariotto, & Tosi, (2000) or Sristaldi (2002), in Italy, there are two main stud-
ies about segregation. Mudu (2013) made a study on segregation in Rome, he
found that the most segregated communities were American and Bangladeshi,
followed by France, Sinhalese and Chinese. The segregative presence of Ameri-
cans and French was a clear relationship of presence of Vatican State. Busetta,
Mazza, & Stranges (2015) used a bootstrapped Dissimilarity index to measure
ethnic residential segregation in Palermo. They found remarkable segregation
for South Asians in particular Bangladeshi and Sinhalese, but the share of immi-
grants in Palermo was, and still is, tiny: at 1st of January 2015, they were 3.8%
of the population. And both this two studies studied only a single dimension of
segregation.
Chapter is structured as follows in section 2.2 we show segregation pattern of
southern European segregation. In section 2.3 we show the context of analysis
in particular we focus on the migratory context and city composition.
2.2 Segregation Patterns
Although there is a strong literature of US origin about the causes of segregation,
as reported by Crosta, Mariotto, & Tosi (2000), a large share of this literature
was outdated or strongly focused on the American context and its institutions.
Segregation patterns were in fact influenced by country-specific, welfare sys-
tems. Differences in social welfare such as the presence of good quality and
almost free public education in Europe, presence of almost free healthcare and
poverty prevention policies, make the American and European system little com-
parable. Institutional factors, therefore, determine for instance the difference
between segregation patterns in the US and Europe, making any comparison
problematic (Kesteloot, Weesep, & White, 1997; Droogleever Fortuijn, Musterd,
& Ostendorf, 1998; Van Kempen & Özüekren, 1998).
However, the European institutional contexts are different (Esping-Andersen,
1996). Ferrera, (1996) , differently from claimed by Esping-Andersen (1996),
pointed out that there is a model of Mediterranean welfare different from the
continental model where he placed the Mediterranean countries. These differ-
ences also influenced social housing policies. Malheiros (2002) discussed the
differences of Mediterranean welfare model showing that: (1) Immigrants live
in poorer housing condition. (2) There is a high level of informality in access to
real estate market. (3) South European cities show lower levels of spatial seg-
regation. (4) Non-European ethnic groups show high level of sub-urbanisation,
in particular they live in ex labourer or former industrial areas.
These differences have been discussed by and further corroborated by a sys-
tematic review by Arbaci (2008), who underlined the differences in segregation
patterns between the centre-north and the south European countries. Difference
welfare regimes unemployment policies and social housing policies may have a
very different outcome in segregation patterns. While Liberal, Continental and
Nordic models have in common generous social housing policies, the Mediter-
ranean model has almost no support to social housing policies (Allen, 2006;
Castles & Ferrera, 1996). For example, Italy spends 0.9 % of welfare budget in
social housing, Spain 1.5 %, Portugal 0.9 %, Greece 0.6% while the Netherlands
spends 6 %, the UK 7%, France 5.5%, Sweden 4.9%, Denmark 7% (Eurostat
data 2015). Besides this in Mediterranean countries houses are usually privately
owned (Delladetsima, 2006; Earley, 2004).
In addition, experimental research highlighted a strong presence of ethnic
discrimination in the rental market. Housing discrimination is strictly linked to
ethnic stratification. This kind of discrimination emerged by field experiment
on house rent. People with an Arabian name, for example, face more problems
in finding a house, as found in Sweden, by Ahmed & Hammarstedt (2008), in
Spain by Bosch, Carnero, & Farré (2010) and in Italy by Baldini & Federici
(2011). These experiments showed that landlords that advertise for apartment
vacancies tend not to respond positively to people with Arabian sounding names,
especially if males. In a qualitative analysis on housing policies in North of Italy
in 2011,Ambrosini & Bonizzoni (2012) showed that 80% of interviewed people
found it difficult to find a house, this percentage is lower for East Europeans
(65%) and higher for Sub-Saharan Africans (97%).
The purpose of this chapter is to explore segregation in a Mediterranean
context.
2.3 The context of analysis
In Italy, in the last decades, the stock of immigrant population grew exponen-
tially and switched from a share of 0.5% in 1991 to a share of 8.1% in 2018 that
grow up to around 10% if we consider also naturalised immigrants. The immi-
grant population lived mainly in the central and the northern part of the country
with a share of approximately about 86% of the entire immigrant population.
Centre and North Italian cities have a high share of the resident immigrant
population. In Lombardy two of the main cities, Brescia and Milan, have an
immigrant share of over 18%. A high share of the immigrant population can be
found in other areas, such as Prato and Piacenza and 15% in Turin, Bologna
and Florence. Furthermore, many villages in the Po Valley have an immigrant
share of at least 12%. Figure 0.1 shows a spatial distribution of the immigrant
settlement in Italy: the darkest blue represents the area in which Brescia (the
red point) is embedded.
Figure 1:
We focused on the city of Brescia, one of the leading Italian manufacturing
areas, fifth in Italy for GDP and forty-eighth in Europe. Brescia is the second
city of Lombardy and seventeen in Italy with about 195000 inhabitants. Brescia
is the centre of its province, an area characterised by a high industrial special-
isation in manufacturing. The city and provincial area are characterised by a
high diffusion of small and medium-sized enterprises; such small and medium-
sized enterprises attract many immigrants to work in manufacturing. The area
came to have a percentage of immigrants living in the city of just under 20%
and the province of about 12%. It has the highest share of immigrants in Italy
with a highly composed population. Describing the population with a Gini het-
erogeneity index (also known as the index of Blau, Herfindahl, Gini-Simpson),
the population has a diversity index of 0.379, i.e. extracted two individuals at
random there was 37.9% of probability that they belong to two different groups.
Figure 2.1: Italian spatial distribution of migrants on 31st December 2012.
Source: Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
By excluding Italian from the analysis, the heterogeneity was 0.947; it means
that extracted two individuals at random there was 94.7% of probability that
they belong to two different groups. Immigration to Brescia began in the 80s. It
was very different from the current one. At the time immigration was a residual
phenomenon; the largest communities were the Egyptian, Moroccan, Chinese,
Philippine and Senegalese; however, their number was less the 1% of the city
population
The composition of today’s population was utterly different from that of the
past. After a first migration in the 90s characterised by numerous South Asian
and Eastern European countries of Balkan origin (Albanians and ex-Yugoslavs),
a substantial migration from Eastern Europe from 2000s mostly of Romanians,
Moldovans and Ukrainians women working as carers for the old people.
Numerous small groups characterised the current ethnic composition of the
city. The group with the maximum size is the Pakistani group which has
about 4,000 members. The leading ethnic groups that populate the city are:
Albanians, Bangladeshi, Chinese, Egyptians, Filipinos, Ghanaians, Indians,
Moldovans, Nigerians, Sinhalese, Romanians, Pakistanis, Ukrainians.
As it was possible to see in the figure 2.2 ethnic heterogeneity in the neigh-
bourhoods was very high. Many neighbourhoods were ethnic mosaics, and there
was no mono-ethnic neighbourhood. In extreme cases, there were neighbour-
hoods in which there was a lack of natives, e.g. Fiumicello. The analysis,
therefore, shows the groups in an aggregate way.
It was important to underline that considering previous migration patterns
of Italians and the frequency of returns of migrant Italian families after an
extended period abroad, we classified any individual as being Italian who had
Italian citizenship in 2012 and was born before 1971 from Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, Switzerland, and Belgium. This also applied for all Italians who had been
expelled by post-colonial regimes from former colonies, namely Libya, Eritrea
and Ethiopia, and who were born before 1948 in Croatia, a country with some
Italian ethnic enclaves who became part of Yugoslavia after WW2.
Ethnic composition was measured with the Gini Heterogeneity Index (also
known as Gini-Simpson). neighbourhood with higher heterogeneity are Cen-
tro Storico Nord, Fiumicello, Quartiere Primo Maggio and Don Bosco. With
some less heterogenous composition, it was possible to see Centro Storico Sud,
Porta Milano and Chiesanuova, and peripheral neighbourhoods are usually less
heterogeneous due to different urban structure and different market orientation.
As it was possible to see in figure 2.3, the dominant not Italian group in the
whole city was the East European, with the only exception of Fiumicello that
has a South Asian dominance and San Polo Parco that has a Middle Eastern
and North African Dominance. If figure 2.4 it was possible to see the presence
of not European ethnic groups in the city.
Visible differences in the presence of foreigners are only without consider-
ing the Europeans, because visibly similar to the natives. The predominant
immigrant ethnic group is South Asia. It is followed by some areas namely
the Prealpino Village and Mompiano and Sanpolino where the majority of non-
European immigrants are African. In addition to the aforementioned San Polo
Park, North Africans are the majority in Caionvico, Buffalora, Centro Storico
Nord.
Figure 2.2: Ethnic heterogeneity by neighbourhood
Figure 2.3: Immigrant dominance by neighbourhood
Figure 2.4: Not European immigrant dominance by neighbourhood
2.3.0.1 East Europeans
East Europeans (EAST_EU) are mainly members of four groups: Albanians,
Moldovans, Romanians and Ukrainians, however, members of other groups are
also present, as originating in the former Yugoslavia, Russians, Belorussians and
to a much lesser extent others from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet bloc.
There is differentiation within groups in the workplace. Ukrainians, Russians,
Belarusians and Moldovans are oriented mostly towards caring for old people
(Marchetti & Venturini, 2014). Albanians and former Yugoslavs work in the
industry, and in construction, Romanians work in both the caring and industrial
sectors. Differently, from Romanians, Moldovans and Ukrainians which are the
result of somewhat recent migration, started massively at the beginning of the
2000s, Albanian migration began at the beginning of 90s. Albanian migrations
in Italy started in 1991. The second immigration begins with the fall of the
communist regime and is composed of three waves. The first with the fall of
the communist regime in 1991, the second with the financial crisis of 1997 and
the third with the Serbian-Kosovar war in 1999. The Albanians in the 90s were
the most stigmatised ethnic group (Mai & King, 2009); today they represent
paradoxically one of the most integrated ethnic groups (Baldassar, 2012).
2.3.0.2 South Asians
Immigration from South Asians (SAS) countries was composed mainly of four
groups, Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Sinhalese. The migration of the
Bangladeshi in Italy began in the 80s, when immigration controls were deficient,
initially concentrated in the Rome area (Knights, 1996) and it still continuously
increased. One of the main groups is the Indian one, predominately coming
from Punjab (Bertolani, 2012; Gallo, 2012; Sahai & LUM, 2013; Singh, 2006)
like in Brescia. Also, Pakistanis population comes from the Punjab macro-region
(Bonfanti, 2015; Bonizzoni & Marzorati, 2015). The first significant migratory
phenomena from Sri Lanka to Italy were in the second half of the 70s (Roberts,
1978). They were predominantly Catholic women hired as domestic workers.
Since the 80s immigration has begun an emigration driven by the civil war of Sri
Lanka and is ethnically differentiated (Henayaka-Lochbihler & Lambusta, 2004).
The Tamil populations emigrated to southern Italy (Henayaka-Lochbihler &
Lambusta, 2004). Instead, the Singhalese populations emigrated mainly in the
north of the country.
2.3.0.3 Chinese
With the modernisation policies of the 80s, the People’s Republic of China
(CHINA) opened the possibility for its citizens to migrate. The Chinese com-
munity comes from Wenzhou, a prefecture-city located in the south-eastern part
of the Chinese province of Zhejiang (Ceccagno, 2007). It was present in Brescia
since the 80s (Corsini & Zane, 2014). The Chinese community consists mainly
of unskilled workers, who work mainly in textiles, catering and trade.
2.3.0.4 Middle Easterns and North Africans
Middle Easterns and North Africans (MENA) were in the city since the 80s
main groups are Egyptians, Moroccans and Tunisian communities (Corsini &
Zane, 2014). North African immigration is well established also for spatial
proximity. Despite the religious denominations that emerged in recent years, the
community is well established, in XVII legislature one of the elected deputies
in Brescia area to Chamber of deputies was a second generation Egyptian. The
Middle Eastern communities of both Arabs and Turks heritage, which tend to
be poor, have therefore been aggregated to North Africans.
2.3.0.5 Sub Saharan Africans
Historically the largest community Sub Saharan African (SSA) in the city was
the Senegalese one. The Senegalese immigrated at the beginning of the 80s to
work in the numerous smelters in and around Brescia. Until 2008 the most
extensive area occupied by the community was the Prealpino Residence on the
border with the municipality of Bovezzo (Kaag, 2008). Other African communi-
ties are present in the city, like Ghanaians and Nigerians as well as much smaller
communities such as Ivorians. The African communities tend to be less isolated
from the working point of view, and often there are many specialised workers or
people who have studied in Italy as the case of Cameroon and Ivorians (Grillo
& Mazzucato, 2008; Riccio, 2008).
2.3.0.6 East and South East Asians
As East and South East Asia (ESEA), we refer to the Philippine community
to which all the other communities of East Asia are aggregated except for the
Chinese ones. The Filipino community started as a purely feminine community
at the end of the 1970s. Filipino women immigrated to Italy as housemaids
(Andall, 1992; Colombo & Sciortino, 2004; King, 1993; Pe-Pua, 2003), and then
there was also male immigration always in domestic work.
2.3.0.7 South Americans
The South American (SAM) community is mainly composed of Argentineans
and Brazilians, such communities have more cultural surroundings with Italy,
given that 50% of the first and 30% of the second have Italian roots. There are
also small communities of Bolivians and other Andean communities. However,
among the macro communities present, the SAM one is the small with about
1500 members.
With such an analysis, it is essential to describe how the composition of the
population in the various neighbourhoods was, in order to give a correct inter-
pretation of the results. The heterogeneity index shows us how the population is
divided, i.e. it explains how two randomly extracted individuals do not belong
to the same ethnic group. The complexity of the population composition was
high, particularly in the popular neighbourhoods, a high composite population
characterised them.
2.4 Methodology
There are two dimensions of segregation. The first is on the axis exposure-
isolation. The second is on the axis evenness-clusterisation. Segregation must
be evaluated in both dimensions.
Figure 2.5: Dimension of residential segregation (Reardon & O’Sullivan, 2004)
To evaluate segregation, we used a multidimensional approach correctly. Seg-
regation was assessed by isolation, exposure and evenness. In addition to these
we used a local spatial clustering index graphically reported. Although the
literature usually shows mono-dimensional analyses, in a highly heterogeneous
setting it is necessary to isolate the cases of segregation from the cases in which
individuals live isolated from their community. Classical clustering indices are
excluded from the analysis. They show the presence of clustering, but not their
position. Centralization indices are also excluded, since the irregular area of the
blocks and the presence of agricultural and extraction areas, in which people
live, may limit the validity of the indices.
2.4.1 Indices of Evenness
2.4.1.1 Duncan and Duncan’s Dissimilarity Index
The most common index of dissimilarity is Duncan and Duncan (1955) dissim-
ilarity index; it is defined as follows:
IS =
1
2
∣∣∣xi
X
− yi
Y
∣∣∣ ,
where xi and yi are the population counts for the two subgroups in the area
unit i, while X and Y are the total counts for the two groups in the city object
of the study.
However, despite its popularity this index it shows has some certain weak-
nesses. More importantly, like all evenness indices, it this index depends is
dependent on the way a given the geographical area of interest was is fractioned
into sub-units. The the smaller the units, the higher the index value is (Car-
rington & Troske, 1997). Furthermore, It it also does not fully satisfy the PT
which requires to reflect the index to be sensitive to all transfers of minority
members over neighborhoods where they are differently represented (James &
Taeuber, 1985). Considering that The the dissimilarity index explains depends
on the difference that needs to be transferred to have obtain evenness, the in-
dex estimation can bias any segregation measure therefore in socio-geographical
contexts characterized by a setting not presenting many only a few enclaves,
such as the Southern European countries, it might lead to biased measures.
Index can be also Multi-group (Sakoda 1981), it was defined as follow:
ISM =
∑M
m−1 pim
∑J
j−1
tj
T 2
∣∣∣pijmpim − 1∣∣∣
2
[∑M
m−1 pim(1− pim)
]
where pimis proportion of m group, tj is total cases of area j, T is total cases
in the area.
2.4.1.2 Gini index
Evenness indices usually adapted indices of income inequality, one of the most
famous indices of income inequality is the Gini coefficient R1 it is also used
as segregation index. Indices of evenness are income inequality indices and as
income inequality indices they are based on some axiomatic
First approach to inequality measurement were made by Max Lorenz with
Lorenz Curve in 1905. Its curve is and its broken line are graphical technique
of representing income inequality.
1Although it is often abbreviated as G, in the original Italian version it is abbreviated as
R for reddito, that is "Income", the Italian word for Income.
In 1912 the Italian statistician Gini published its famous coefficient. This
coefficient is derived from the concept of mean absolute difference ∆ a measure
of variability; i.e. a measure that highlights the inequality of data between
them, regardless of any average value, introduced by Whilem Jordan fifty year
before.
∆ =
∑n
i
∑n
j |xi − xj |
n(n− 1)
with i 6= j.
The Gini coefficient definition hold usually on Lorenz’s curve. But it can be
easily calculated with the definition of the mean absolute difference, in fact the
Gini index is one half of ∆. That is equivalent to the definition based on Lorenz’s
curve (Gini, 1912). The Gini concentration index, R, is the ratio between the
concentration area and the area of maximum concentration underlying the line
of equation of the Lorenz curve. By dividing the area of concentration into
trapezoids, after some steps it is possible to derive the following formula:
R =
∑n
i
∑n
j |xi − xj |
2n
∑n
i xi
=
∆
2x¯
The multinational version purposed by Reardon and Firebaug (2002) is de-
fined as follows
RM =
∑M
m−1 pim
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i−1
∑J
j−1
titj
T 2
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2
[∑M
m−1 pim(1− pim)
]
where pimis proportion of m group, tj is total cases of area j, ti is total cases
of area i, T is total cases in the area.
2.4.2 Exposure
Exposure indices measure the degree of potential contacts with people of one
group to one-other or members of two groups inside a spatial unit. Expo-
sure could be measured as isolation, i.e. the probability to have contacts with
members of the same group. Besides, it could be measured as interaction, i.e.
the probability to have contacts with another group inside the spatial unit.
Exposure indices measure the potential experience of segregation. The equi-
distribution measured by the indices of evenness does not imply that there is
less potential contact between those living in a segregated area and the majority
group.
2.4.2.1 Interaction index
Bell (1954) proposed the so-called “index of interaction”, Massey and Denton
(1988:288) describe it as “the minority-weighted average of each spatial unit’s
majority proportion”. Interaction index measures the extent to which a given
group is exposed to another or relatively isolated in a given context.xPy mea-
sured the exposure of each minority group to natives as follows:
xPy =
N∑
i=1
(
xi
X
yi
ti
)
where X is the total population of ethnic group in the area, xi is the pop-
ulation of the ethnic group in the tract, yi is population of the natives in the
tract, tiis the total population of the tract.The index can be interpreted as the
probability that two individuals randomly extracted from the population of two
different groups can be in the same neighbourhood, thus in contact with each
other.
2.4.2.2 Isolation index Eta2
Moreover Bell (1954) proposed the so-called “index of isolation”, which measures
the extent to which a given group is exposed to itself or relatively isolated in
a given context.xPx the ethnic isolation index measured the degree of each
minority is isolated from other population xPx =
∑N
i=1
(
xi
X
xi
ti
)
.
Isolation index could be very asymmetric, therefore Bell (1954) purposed
an adjusted index of isolation that compensate for asymmetry, the correlation
ratio, also known as eta-squared. Bell shows that eta2 is just a standardized
probability. It represents the probability standardised probability to meet co-
ethnic: The index is defined as follow:
Eta2 =
∑N
i=1
(
xi
X
xi
ti
)
− XT
1− XT
wherexi was the number of co-ethnics in the area, X was the total number
of co-ethnics, and ti was the total population of the tract of interest, and T is
total population. This allowed us to derive the expected probability that each
individual has to interact with another one from the same ethnic group.
As evenness clustering is an important segregation dimension, spatial clus-
tering indices have been widely employed as an indicator of spatial segregation.
Occupation of adjacent spaces might form an ethnic enclave. Higher is the level
of clustering, therefore, greater the segregation degree. The spatial association
analyses allow eliminating the problem called modifiable areal unit problem. In
which the geographic aggregation is to undermine the results of the analysis, in
our case of segregation. Using an egohood approach also dampens the checker-
board problem. In this approach, segregation is therefore shown not as a single
index but as a spatial dependence on the map, not limited to administrative
neighbourhood. However, this type of analysis does not show the separation
between the communities, but shows where the communities live. Instead other
indices like Getis Ord G∗i , or Anselin’s Local Indicator of Spatial Association
are able to spot were people are segregated.
2.4.3 Local Clustering : Local Indicator of Spatial Asso-
ciation (LISA)
There are in addition spatial distribution indices. On the opposite way of even-
ness, it is possible to see the clustering indices. LISA was the acronym of Local
Indicator of Spatial Association Anselin (1995). It was a technique based on
Moran’s I index an indicator of spatial auto-correlation (Moran 1950). Spa-
tial auto-correlation was as a proximity cluster of parameters with similar val-
ues. If the similar values of the parameters had a spatial localisation, positive
spatial auto-correlation was present. On the other hand, spatial proximity of
different values, which was not stable in space, indicates a negative spatial
auto-correlation or spatial heterogeneity. Moran I is an index of spatial auto-
correlation and it is comparable to index r of Pearson. Moran’s I that is a global
spatial auto-correlation index, i.e. measures the spatial auto-correlation on all
location in a territory. Its definition is as follows:
I =
N
W
∑n
i
∑n
j wij(xi − x¯)(xj − x¯)∑
i(xi − x¯)2
Where xi is an attribute for feature i , X¯ the mean of the corresponding
attribute, wi,j is the spatial weight between feature i and j, n the total number
of features and W is the sum of all wi,j .
LISA is a local indicator, i.e. it measures the presence of similar values in
the considered sub-area. Local Moran definition is:
Ii =
xi −X[∑n
j=1,j 6=i wi,j(xj−X)
2
n−1
]2 · n∑
j=1,j 6=i
wi,j
(
xj −X
)
Where xi is an attribute for feature i , X¯ the mean of the corresponding
attribute, wi,j is the spatial weight between feature i and j, n the total number
of features and W is the sum of all wi,j .
To compute the LISA we need to generate z-score Z (I∗i ) for each location:
ZIi =
Ii − E [Ii]√
E [I2i ]− E [Ii]2
where E [Ii] is the excepted value of Ii and it is defined as E [Ii] = −
∑n
j=1,j 6=i wi,j
n−1
A positive value of I indicates that a location has a neighbouring location
with similar value, hence this feature is a part of a cluster. If their value is
positive, we have a core of spatial cluster that can be characterized by high
values High-High (HH) i.e, groups of features with high values or low values
Low-Low (LL) i.e, groups of features with low values. On the other hand, a
negative value for I indicates that a location has a neighbouring location with
dissimilar value. If their value is negative, we have place of interest that can be
characterized by high values High-Low (HL) i.e, dissimilarity outliers with an
high number of low values or Low-High (LH) i.e, dissimilarity outliers with an
low number of high value. By comparison HH and LL are the core of a spatial
cluster, instead HL and LH where we can see outlier values. Is mandatory
remark that core HH and LL are the core of cluster and not cluster themselves,
like an iceberg where only a small part emerges. Instead, HL and LH are like
boats where all interesting part is emerged.
The presence of a hot spot, i.e. a point of a high clusterisation, means that
the Z-value is higher than excepted. It means the presence of high segregation
from a sociological point of view. Oppositely the presence of a cold spot, i.e. a
point of a low clusterisation, means that the Z-value is lower than excepted. It
means the presence of low value surrounded by other low values, so significantly
low segregation. The absence of significance means that there is no segregation.
All spatial models are based on a spatial matrix that defined on a weighting
matrix W. Each non-negative matrix W = (wij : i, j = 1, . . . , n), is a possible
spatial weight matrix summarizing spatial relations between n spatial units.
Therefore each spatial weight, wij , reflects its influence of unit j on unit i. For
calculate W we used a spatial contiguity weights matrix. The simplest of these
weights simply indicate whether spatial units share a boundary or not. The
matrix considers all the boundaries from the polygon that forms the block as
represented on the imagine as follows:
• • • • •
• ↖ ↑ ↗ •
• ← • → •
• ↙ ↓ ↘ •
• • • • •
The matrix used, uses two levels of spatial correlation, then uses the bound-
ary level with the block in question, the first circle of neighboring blocks and
the second circle of neighboring blocks. About the z-values generation we boot-
strapped indices for 99999 times and limited significativity to 0.0001 to avoid
type-1 error, that is very common in this kind of analysis as alleged by Anselin
(1995), with this kind of estimation we do not fall in type-2 error problem.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 City level segregation
The analysis of segregation in the city of Brescia begins with two indices of
multinomial segregation, the dissimilarity index of Sakoda and the Gini multi-
nomial index; these indices assume values of 0.4119 and 0.5556, respectively.
This means that global segregation in Brescia was not particularly high. How-
ever, the multinomial indices do not explain who was segregated. To do this it is
necessary to analyses the population with binomial indices, these indices explain
the segregation of a group compared to the total population and to natives for
exposure index.
As it was possible to see in table 2.1 segregation to the total population mea-
sured as evenness with both Gini and Dissimilarity index was high for Chinese
and EAST EU, instead was low for SAM immigrants. Segregation measured as
isolation was pretty high for South Asians, followed by EAST EU, it was instead
very low for ESEA.
To better understand how people faced segregation we analyzed segregation
at neighbourhood level, as before we started from multinomial indices and then
we explored segregation for each neighbourhood. As it was possible to see in the
table 2.2 multi-group segregation was high (highest then median, 0.5) in Brescia
Antica, Centro Storico Sud, Chiesanuova, Fiumicello, Folzano, Porta Venezia,
Sant’Eufemia, Sant’Eustacchio, San Polo Cimabue, San Rocchino, Urago Mella,
Villaggio Prealpino, Villaggio Violino. These neighborhoods are both central,
semi-peripheral and suburban, therefore segregation was not a problem of pe-
ripheralization, like for example happens in the UK, in Sweden, or in France.
By analyzing each neighbourhood, it was possible to better understand those
which groups are more segregated and have a better idea of where they live.
The neighbourhoods were presented for five geographical areas: Centre, North,
South, East, West; each area corresponds to a table that shows segregation, for
Evenness to whole population and Italians, Isolation and Exposition to Italians.
2.5.2 Centre
2.5.2.1 Brescia Antica
The neighbourhood of "Brescia Antica" represents the original city part of Gallo-
Roman origin, and it was half of the city centre. It was a generally wealthy
neighbourhood where the age of the inhabitants was generally high. The price
of housing was medium-high. The district has some uninhabited areas such
as the Castle, the Roman-Lombard complex, the former Military Hospital, a
former barracks, a former hospital. Like other neighbourhoods of the historical
centre, e.g. Centro Storico Sud and Centro Storico Nord, this neighbourhood
was also mostly pedestrian (Corsini & Zane, 2014).
In this neighbourhood, as it was possible to see in table 2.3 segregation mea-
sured as evenness was pretty high for all groups except for Eastern Europeans.
In a particular way, there was segregation for the Chinese community. Other
segregation phenomena were for SSA with a mild degree of isolation, there was
also for MENA. However, exposure to natives for all groups still pretty high.
In the northern area of Brescia Antica on the slopes of the castle, there was
an LL cluster, i.e. a low amount of people surrounded by a low amount of
people for Eastern Europeans, as it was possible to see in figure 2.7. A similar
LL cluster is also present on the northern side of Piazza Arnaldo.
In the same area, there was a large Chinese LL cluster , as it was possible
to see in figure 2.6. The Chinese present LL clusters in via Martiri di Belfiore,
i.e. in the area behind the new Dome, near Piazza del Foro and Piazza Tebaldo
Brusato, as it was possible to see in figure 2.6. It means that there is a little
spread Chinese population around the city. a Furthermore, LL-type segregation
was present in the area rebuilt in the post-war era close to the local chamber
of commerce. Besides, there were LH insulation clusters near the Milan-Venice
railway line, the Court and the former fruit and vegetable market. The houses
in which these clusters were located are of high-density housing. The spatial
association analysis did not show other segregation areas for other ethnic groups.
2.5.2.2 Centro Storico Nord
The neighbourhood of “Centro Storico Nord” better known as Carmine represent
almost a quarter of the city centre. From the nineteenth century it became the
most impoverished neighbourhood, it hosts many waves of migration, first of
the people from the valleys, then people of the Veneto, then immigrants from
southern Italy and then foreigners (Scaglia, 2003).
In the 80s inhabitants of social houses were relocated to the new neighbour-
hood of San Polo, now San Polo Parco. In order to clean the neighbourhood
by social disease. The reallocation had opposite effects. Lack of customers led
to the closure of numerous shops and boosted the micro crime activity in the
area. Strong micro-crime presence kept property and rent prices lower then
other areas also with numerous empty houses. This favored the presence of
immigrants who were looking for cheap houses. The narrow streets and the lack
of parking make it unsuitable for cars. The buildings are old, and for decades
they had little maintenance. The neighbourhood is almost wholly pedestrian.
In the 2000s the municipality implemented a gentrification project aimed at
restoring the neighbourhood and strongly reducing the micro-crime in the area
Briata (2010;2013). The project succeeded by transforming the ill-fated neigh-
bourhood in place of the nightlife. In the neighbourhood, due presence of a
Muslim community there is a Mosque.
Centro Storico Nord, as it was possible to see in table 2.3, displayed an
overall low level of segregation. The most segregated were EAST EU, but their
isolation was tiny. South Asians displayed a conspicuous level of isolation al-
though the segregation level is low. The low segregation in this neighbourhood
can be explained as the effect of the high multi-ethnicity of the area; in fact,
the exposure to Italians here was low.
The MENA community shows LL-type segregation in one of the most central
area between the Italian Post Office and via X Giornate near Piazza della Loggia
as it was possible to see in figure 2.9. The SAM showed an area of strong HH
segregation in the area next to the former Randaccio barracks, as it was possible
to see in figure2.10. The area was primarily miserable, and often there was much
micro-crime. Two LL clusters were also present near this area.
Robust was the HH clustering of the ESEA, particularly of the Filipino
community, as it was possible to see in figure 2.8, which was visible in the area
due to the presence of ethnic shops. The concentration was highest in the area
of the district near the church of San Faustino and the university departments of
Economics and Law. The Filipino community was very present in the area due
to close ties in the area. Many Filipinos work as household workers at wealthy
homes in adjacent neighbourhoods.
2.5.2.3 Centro Storico Sud
Unlike the Centro Storico Nord neighbourhood, the Centro Storico Sud has been
the subject of numerous urban redevelopments during the 20th century, even
with large areas demolition. It is a neighbourhood that became gentrified in
the post-war era, becoming a middle-class neighbourhood, also by the economic
boom and the consequent increase of social status of original inhabitants. The
neighbourhood also includes the railway station area. This area belongs to
this neighbourhood even though it is separated by two avenues that make up
the so-called Ring or the double ring road that runs around the historic centre
(Corsini & Zane, 2014). Railway station displayed high traffic and high crime,
two features that does not have a good impact on property values and related
rent prices. Area is composed by high-density buildings built in the 60s.
As it was possible to see in table 2.3, this neighbourhood was pretty seg-
regated in terms of evenness for all groups except SAM. The most segregated
group was Chinese. The Chinese community was concentrated in the area to the
west of the train station. In this small area, there is a little China Town. How-
ever as it was possible to see from spatial analysis the segregation for Chinese
had a wider extension then what it was possible to see by urban observation as
it was possible to see in figure 2.6. If we consider that the spatial matrix takes
into consideration the block and the nearest blocks for two levels, it becomes
evident that there was a strong cluster of segregation in the southern part of
the neighborhood. The area was composed of buildings built at the end of the
60s with a high population density. Other segregated groups with a lower level
of isolation are the SSA and the North African. Moreover it was possible to
notate that ESEA community had HH clustering were present also in northern
part of Centro Storico Sud for its proximity to Centro Storico Nord, as it was
possible to see in figure 2.8. The spatial association analysis did not show other
segregation areas for other ethnic groups.
2.5.2.4 Crocifissa di Rosa
The Crocifissa di Rosa neighbourhood of borders to the south with the Castle, to
the west with Borgo Trento and to the east of San Rocchino. The neighbourhood
has arisen in the 50s of the last centuries. Previously it was an industrial area
and agricultural area (Corsini & Zane, 2014). The neighbourhood was oriented
to services and commercial areas, and it was built with high density buildings
that develop mainly in height. The relative proximity to the historical centre
and the presence of hospitals that rise to the north certainly favored its growth.
Like other residential areas where property prices were high, the penetration of
immigrants was scarce. As it was possible to see in table 2.3, in Crocifissa di
Rosa neighbourhood there was high segregation in terms of evenness, but poor
isolation due to the lack of immigrant population in the area. It is possible that
foreigners living here could afford to do so or they live in marginal areas. The
spatial association analysis did not show any segregation areas any other ethnic
group.
2.5.2.5 Porta Milano
The Porta Milano neighbourhood once known as Campo Fiera borders to the
north with Sant’Eustacchio, to the east with the Centro Storico Nord and the
Centro Storico Sud, to the south with Quartiere Primo Maggio and to the east
with Fiumicello. This neighbourhood developed as an industrial area in the late
nineteenth century, becoming one of the central working-class neighbourhood.
In the southern part of the neighbourhood near the local police station, in the
same area there are numerous social houses built at the beginning of the 20th
century. In the on the opposite side to the Vantiniano monumental cemetery,
there are social houses owned by a private foundation called the "Congrega della
Carità Apostolica" (Corsini & Zane, 2014). The area consists of four buildings
for a total of 80 apartments built in 1906, and still inhabited by both Italians
and immigrants.
The Porta Milano neighbourhood, as it was possible to see in table 2.3, shows
strong combined segregation for evenness and isolation for the Sub-Saharan
African group. All other groups show a low level of both segregation as evenness
and isolation. The spatial association analysis did not show any segregation or
isolation clusters any other ethnic group.
2.5.2.6 Porta Venezia
Porta Venezia borders to the north with Mount Maddalena, the Mount was
largely uninhabited except its southern part is part of the neighborhood .The
district except for a small part to the south near the Milan-Venice railway is
composed of villas populated by wealthy people; it is distributed in the hilly and
foothills of the city (Corsini & Zane, 2014). Also this neighbourhood hosts a
Mosque, in its southern side. As it was possible to see in table 2.3 Porta Venezia
showed average segregation levels as evenness, with a low level of isolation. The
only exception was the South Asian community which shows a medium level
of segregation as evenness and a comparison with the others, greater isolation.
Given the low-density urban structure except for the southern area between
Viale Piave and Viale Venezia, it is likely that there is low spatial segregation
in the hilly and elevated part in the southern part. Was in fact possible to see
numerous LL type clusters on the hilly area. In particular, there is a presence
of Chinese, EAST EU, MENA, SAS and SSA in the area near via Turati, as it
was possible to see in figure 2.6, 2.7, 2.9,2.12 and 2.11. The area was composed
of villas and populated by rich and often of high age people. Therefore, it
was possible that space clusters are due to the presence of carers and domestic
workers. In particular, we noted the presence of a strong HH segregation cluster
with the presence of numerous LH isolation clusters for the East South East
Asians area between viale Venezia and Viale Piave, as it was possible to see
in figure 2.8. This area is characterised by large villas of the upper Brescia
bourgeoisie.
2.5.3 North
2.5.3.1 Borgo Trento
The neighbourhood of Borgo Trento is a neighbourhood north of the historical
centre (Corsini & Zane, 2014). In post-war development, Borgo Trento becomes
a residential neighbourhood of a middle class, except for the northern part where
there are many council houses. The presence of immigrants was limited; at the
same time, the age of the neighbourhood was high. An ancient area characterises
the urban structure of Borgo Trento made up of historical buildings with a low
population density.
Moreover, a current area made up of modern high-density residential build-
ings. House prices in the area tend to be medium to high, especially in the
historic area. Borgo Trento has excellent public transport connections by both
Buses and Subway. Segregation in this neighbourhood was almost absent and
the presence of migrants, as it was possible to see in table 2.5, almost null level
of isolation compensated high level of evenness; moreover exposure to natives
was high. Spatial analysis did not show any spatial association for any group
in Borgo Trento.
2.5.3.2 Casazza
The neighbourhood of Casazza is a neighbourhood of the northern suburbs of the
city. In 1967 there were the first residential settlements (Corsini & Zane, 2014).
Casazza neighbourhood had mainly an urban structure based on large condo-
minium complexes characterised by buildings that develop vertically usually of
subsidised social housing. The neighbourhood has no great spatial barriers like
railways or motorways, moreover has excellent public transport connections by
both Buses and Subway. Segregation in this neighbourhood was almost absent,
as it was possible to see in table 2.5, high rates of evenness indices were compen-
sated by almost nil levels of isolation, moreover exposure to natives was high.
Spatial analysis did not show any spatial association for any group in Casazza.
2.5.3.3 Mompiano
Mompiano, is a neighbourhood north of Brescia. It is about 2 km from the city
centre, and borders to the north with municipalities of Bovezzo and Nave, to the
east with the mountainous territory of Mount Maddalena, to the west with the
neighbourhood of Casazza. It has its maximum development in the post-war
period also and above all thanks to the central city hospital, to which is added
in 1987 a second private hospital and the University from 1982 with faculties
of Engineering and Medicine (Corsini & Zane, 2014). Mompiano is a bourgeois
neighbourhood. Both Buses and Subway well serves the area.
Segregation in this neighbourhood was almost absent, high rates of evenness
indices were compensated by almost nil levels of isolation, moreover exposure
to natives was high, as it was possible to see in table 2.5. Spatial analysis
shows only LL clusters for the Chinese community in the northern area of the
district as it was possible to see in figure 2.6. These areas are high income
therefore justifies the scarce widespread presence of people of Chinese ethnicity.
It is wrong to think that all immigrants are by definition poor and live in poor
areas, some also live in rich areas.
2.5.3.4 San Rocchino
The toponym of San Rocchino identifies the district crossed in length by the
homonymous street. The largest hospital in the city is located to the north
west of the district; built after World War II and inaugurated at the end of
1950. This structure has certainly influenced the development of the district
and its viability (Corsini & Zane, 2014). Here is one of the most popular subway
stations. Costalunga is an area in Brescia belonging to the neighbourhood of
San Rocchino, in the post-war period it has become a residential district with
very high costs.
San Rocchino both in terms of evenness and isolation was strongly segregated
for South Asians, as it was possible to see in table 2.5. A South Asian that live
in has 10% of probability to meet another South Asian in the neighbourhood.
For other groups segregation was mild for mostly all except Eastern Europeans,
but isolation level was low. Chinese community, as it was possible to see in
figure 2.6 showed both LH isolation cluster near Città di Brescia hospital and
other LL clusters in Costa Lunga area. In the same area it was also possible to
see some LL clusters for MENA and SSA as was respectively possible to see in
figures 2.9 and 2.12.
2.5.3.5 San Bartolomeo
The S. Bartolomeo neighbourhood, except for a small sixteenth-century nucleus
in Gabbiane area, has been built as a social housing unit since 1957 in order
to accommodate the Istrian refugees (Corsini & Zane, 2014). Although the
majority of the homes were initially rented, the tenants bought them when the
social housing management company. The neighbourhood from the 80s changed
its social status from a poor neighborhood to a middle-class neighborhood. Only
a small part of the neighbourhood in the northern part remains a rented social
housing area. The area is well served by Buses.
San Bartolomeo both in terms of evenness and isolation was strongly segre-
gated for South Asians, as it was possible to see in table 2.5. A South Asian
that live in has 29.39% of probability to meet another South Asian in the neigh-
bourhood. For other groups segregation was mild for mostly all except Eastern
Europeans, but isolation level was low. There were clusters of low segregation
in the northern part of the district for the Chinese community as it was possible
to see in figure 2.6 in the area of social housing that was established north of
the neighbourhood. Spatial analysis did not show any other spatial association
for any other group in San Bartolomeo.
2.5.3.6 Sant’Eustacchio
The neighbourhood of Sant’Eustacchio was founded as an industrial and military
area, three-quarters of the neighbourhood is now occupied by industrial, former-
military areas and the police academy. From the residential point of view, the
Sant’Eustacchio was a public initiative. It was built in early XX century as
social housing for workers of Brixia Züst plant (now IVECO) in the area of
via Volturno, in addition in the area of via Montegrappa, other social houses
were built in the 20s for post office workers (Corsini & Zane, 2014). Except the
original area it is mostly made up of villas and buildings.
Sant’Eustacchio had consistent levels of segregation with evenness combined
with isolation for North Africans and South Asians, as it was possible to see in
table 2.5„ this segregation mainly derives from their presence in social housing of
via Volturno and via Montegrappa. Other groups isolation was low despite level
of segregation. The exposure to Italians was mainly high. There were clusters
of high isolation in the northern part of the district for the Chinese community,
as it was possible to see in figure 2.6, cluster is located in a tall building in via
Randaccio, any other community had no significant spatial association in the
neighbourhood.
2.5.3.7 Villaggio Prealpino
The district borders to the south with Mompiano and Casazza, to the west with
Concesio, to the north with Bovezzo and to the east with Nave. Until the 50s
area of Villaggio Prealpino was open countryside. Father Ottorino Marcolini
founded the Prealpino village as other neighbourhoods. The village rises in the
last part of the valley formed by the river Garza. The construction work began
in Brescia in 1959 and ended definitively in 1973 (Corsini & Zane, 2014). The
structure is the same as any other village built by Marcolini, semi-detached
houses with gardens organised according to the Roman plan. The population is
usually of high age, often belonging to the first generation who bought houses
since 1973. Segregation in this neighbourhood was almost absent, high rates of
evenness indices were compensated by almost nil levels of isolation, moreover
exposure to natives was high, as it was possible to see in table 2.5,
Villaggio Prealpino shows numerous LL clusters for all communities except
SSA, as it was possible to see in figures 2.6, 2.7,2.8,2.9,2.10,2.11, this kind of
spatial association was particularly strong for Chinese that had diffusion in the
whole neighbourhood, as it was possible to see in figure 2.6. Besides, Villaggio
Prealpino displayed an isolation cluster HL for ESEA as it was possible to see
in figure 2.8, the clustered area had no urban difference with the rest of the
district.
2.5.4 South
2.5.4.1 Chiesanuova
The neighbourhood of Chiesanuova located southwest of the city is a popular
neighbourhood, bordered to the north by the Milan-Venice railway. The neigh-
bourhood is very heterogeneous from the urban point of view. There are areas
of semi-detached houses built by the presbyter Ottorino Marcolini, and there
are areas of council houses and above all large industrial areas that cover most
of the area of the neighbourhood (Corsini & Zane, 2014). The main mosque
of Brescia is in the neighbourhood Chiesanuova. The neighbourhood is heavily
polluted. There are pollutants of organic origin generated by Caffaro Spa, in
addition, there was heavy metal pollution (Turrio-Baldassarri et al., 2009). The
northern part of the area is characterized by a large former ironworks plant
and by numerous textile companies mainly belonging to the Chinese commu-
nity. The central-western part of the district is characterized by numerous social
housing. This part has numerous buildings that develop vertically with a strong
population density. The population that inhabits them is of a medium-low class.
The central part is characterized by numerous villas of the Marcolini type, i.e.
semi-detached houses with gardens. The southern part of the district after a
commercial area is characterized by a small settlement area of the Noce district
and by a large industrial area, the largest in the city.
Chiesanuova was characterised by a strong segregation for South Asians,
followed by North African and Middle Eastern and South Saharan Africa, as
it was possible to see in table 2.7. These two effects might be justified by
religious centres such the presence of the main Mosque of the city and numerous
social housing in via Livorno area. Also remarkable is segregation for Chinese
community with the same evenness and isolation combination of MENA. The
southern area of Chiesanuova called Girelli showed a LL segregation cluster for
the EAST EU, as it was possible to see in figure 2.7. Besides, there was a
cluster of isolation for the SAM in the residential part of the industrial area, as
it was possible to see in figure 2.10, where there is a large farmhouse of previous
construction to the industrial area. Area does not show any kind of spatial
association for any ethnic group.
2.5.4.2 Don Bosco
The Don Bosco neighbourhood was founded around 24 semi-detached houses
built at the beginning of the 20th century by the railway worker’s cooperative.
In that years there is also an industrial growth generated by railway investments,
such as the freights yard, general warehouses and railway service companies.
In the early post-war period, the population grow-up exponentially. In the
second post-war period neighbourhood grown in the majority with high-density
vertical buildings, ten-folding the population. The neighbourhood borders to
the north with the Milan-Venice railway, to the east with the neighbourhood
of Lamarmora to the west with that of Chiesanuova and to the south with the
motorway. The urban structure except for the original 24 semi-detached houses
is mostly composed of buildings with medium and high population density.
Due to an extensive multi-ethnic population of the neighbourhood, segre-
gation Don Bosco neighbourhood was almost absent. High rates of evenness
indices were compensated by almost null levels of isolation, moreover exposure
to natives was high, as it was possible to see in table 2.7.
The Chinese were clustered throughout the district with the exception of
the north-west, the proximity with the district "Centro Storico Sud" allowed
them to be close to ethnic services as it was possible to see in figure2.6. The
Eastern European countries were clustered throughout the district, with the
exception of the northern part, as it was possible to see in figure 2.7. These
areas are characterized by a high population density. North Africans live in
the north-eastern part of the district in area proximate the train station, in the
same area there is a segregated cluster of SAM and South Asians. There is no
spatial association for other groups.
2.5.4.3 Folzano
Folzano until the 70s was a peripheral village of Brescia. It was an island
outside the city, and also a forgotten neighbourhood whose streets were not
paved until end of 70s. Now a neighbourhood of about 1500 people remains
strongly detached from the city about 6km from the centre and despite the
improved links remains an agricultural area. It borders to the west with the
neighbourhood of Fornaci, to the north with the neighbourhood Villaggio Sereno
and to the east with the municipality of San Zeno sul Naviglio. The urban
structure consists mainly of cheap small houses.
Folzano compared to all other neighbourhoods of the city had a peculiar
characteristic. It had a strong East European segregation in both evenness and
isolation, as it was possible to see in table 2.7. Differently from all other neigh-
bourhoods where EAST EU were less segregated and less isolated compared to
all other groups, probably for the main presence of immigrants as caretakers.
Folzano displayed also a pretty consistent segregation for MENA and SSA, both
in terms of evenness and isolation. For all other groups although there was seg-
regation in terms of evenness, but the degree of isolation was very low. Folzano
showed an area of LL segregation for the Chinese communities near the Church
as it was possible to see in figure2.6. It did not show other spatial associations
relevant to other ethnic groups.
2.5.4.4 Fornaci
Fornaci is a vast neighbourhood of the city mainly oriented to agriculture and
manufacturing. In the neighbourhood, there is the second city prison, Verziano.
Fornaci borders with the municipalities of Castelmella and Flero. While it
borders to the north with the village of Castelmella and neighbourhood of Vil-
laggio Sereno. Besides, it show strong organic pollution like the neighbourhoods
of Chiesanuova, Primo Maggio, and Fiumicello (Turrio-Baldassarri et al., 2009).
The village of Fornaci, unlike the size of the neighbourhood is tiny, with a pop-
ulation of about 2600 inhabitants, although it is part of the urbanised area of
the city maintains the distinctive features of a small country village.
Fornaci display segregation both as evenness and isolation for South Asian
group, as it was possible to see in table 2.7. For all other groups although there
was segregation, the degree of isolation was very low. It did not shows any
segregation or isolation cluster.
2.5.4.5 Lamarmora
The neighbourhood of Lamarmora is built in the post-war period beginning
in 1948. It was a labourer neighbourhood initially built with state-subsidised
buildings (Zane, 2010). During the 70s it had an expansion with a large urban
area partially residential and partially business oriented. The original popula-
tion had mixed origins it was composed mainly by poor natives, immigrants
from the countryside and southern Italy.
Lamarmora was the only neighbourhood with a considerable SAM segre-
gation in both evenness and isolation , as it was possible to see in table 2.7,
moreover it was possible to see that this segregation happened in the original
area of the council houses built in the 40s, as it was possible to see in figure 2.10.
Differently from all other neighbourhoods where SAM less segregated and less
isolated than all other groups, with exception of EAST EU. However, there is
also a mild level of segregation for South Asians. For all other groups, although
there was segregation, the degree of isolation was meager. Lamarmora showed
strong HH segregation for eastern Europeans in the central-northern area and
LH-segregation North eastern area of Lamarmora, as it was possible to see in
figure 2.7.
2.5.4.6 Porta Cremona
The Porta Cremona area is full of settlements built since the end of the 1920s
after World War II. These settlements are built as suburban neighbourhoods to
accommodate demographic expansion of the city. The first nucleus to rise in the
area was the so called Leonessa district. The goal was to make a neighbourhood
for white and blue collars with four stories houses with gardens, protected from
the traffic. In 30s the industrialist Ferrari built 40 houses for workers employed
in the nearby Calzificio Ferrari, but in 1954, the factory moved away, and the
40 houses were sold to the city bourgeoisie.
In Next to it, there is the Villaggio Sant’Antonio built in 1953 for the Istrian
refugees, and the tenants subsequently bought houses. South of the Ferrari
village, on the initiative of the Congrega di Carità Apostolica a charity foun-
dation, houses are built for poor people, the area takes the name of Quartiere
Bonoris (Zane, 2010). The last district is the Villaggio Verde, built for those
who lost their homes during the massive bombing of WWII on the border with
Brescia-Cremona and Brescia-Parma railway lines. In the southern part of the
neighbourhood, there is a Mosque.
Porta Cremona neighbourhood was almost absent segregation as a combi-
nation of Evenness and isolation, as it was possible to see in table 2.7. Almost
null levels of isolation compensated high rates of evenness indices, moreover,
exposure to natives was high.
From spatial association point of view, it was possible to see an extensive
Eastern European segregation cluster HH in the Ferrari Village area and the
Bonoris district, as it was possible to see in figure 2.7. In addition there was a
strong HH cluster in high destiny building in the southern part of the neighbour-
hood proximate to Volta Area. Furthermore, an isolation cluster was present in
the area next to the Brescia-Cremona and Brescia-Parma railway tracks for the
Chinese community, as it was possible to see in figure 2.6. This cluster connects
to the segregation present in the railway station area.
2.5.4.7 Villaggio Sereno
The neighbourhood was built in large part by the presbyter Father Ottorino
Marcolini in the 60s (Zane, 2010). The neighbourhood has the typical structure
of the villages built by Marcolini, semi-detached houses with gardens, the houses
are arranged with a Roman-style urban structure. The neighbourhood was
created ex-novo and populated mainly by families of blue and white collars.
The urban structure is the same as the other Marcolini villages, i.e. semi-
detached houses with gardens. At the time of delivery in 1963, the village had
823 houses, but in the 70s it was expanded. The neighbourhood to the north
borders the highway that restricts pedestrian accessibility.
Villaggio Sereno compared to all other neighbourhoods of the city had a
peculiar characteristic. It was the only neighbourhood with a strong ESEA
segregation in both evenness and isolation, and here isolation was tremendously
high , as it was possible to see in table 2.7.Although there was no evidence from
a spatial point of view.
The neighbourhood also displayed segregation both in terms of evenness and
isolation pretty consistent for MENA, spatial analysis show an LL cluster in the
southern part of the neighbourhood and an HL cluster in the area at the north
of primary school, as it was possible to see in figure 2.9. Unlike the rest of
the district dominated by semi-detached villas with gardens, in this area, there
are high-density housing block. SAS also displayed a consistent segregation in
terms of isolation and evenness, but without any evidence in terms of spatial
clustering.
For all other groups, although there was segregation, the degree of isola-
tion was meager. Villaggio Sereno displayed an extensive segregation isolation
cluster HL in the southern part of the neighbourhood in low-density area for
EAST_EU, as it was possible to see in figure 2.7.
2.5.5 East
2.5.5.1 Buffalora
Buffalora neighbourhood is a neighbourhood isolated in the countryside south-
east of the city about 7km from the centre. The neighbourhood was built in
large part by the presbyter Father Ottorino Marcolini and delivered in 1980
(Zane, 2010). The area is full of quarries and fields. The neighbourhood has
the typical structure of the villages built by Marcolini, semi-detached houses
with gardens, the houses are arranged with a Roman-style urban structure. In
Buffalora segregation was particularly strong for South Asians, followed by East
Asians and South East Asians, as it was possible to see in table 2.4. For all
other groups, although there was segregation, the degree of isolation was tiny.
The space association in Buffalora had not statistical significance for all groups.
2.5.5.2 Caionvico
Caionvico is a small neighbourhood on the eastern outskirts of the city, in the
foothills area. It borders to the north with Mount Maddalena, to the south
with San Polo Cimabue and the Milan-Venice train line, and to the east with
the village of Botticino. For its position of proximity to the city, but also of
separation from it is inhabited by the bourgeoisie.
In Caionvico segregation was unusually low for all groups, both in terms of
evenness and in terms of isolation, exposure to natives was unusually high, as it
was possible to see in table 2.4. The space association in Caionvico was absent
for all groups.
2.5.5.3 Sant’Eufemia
Sant ‘Eufemia is a neighbourhood of Brescia located to the east of the city,
bordered to the east with Caionvico, to the north with Mount Maddalena, to
the south by the Milan-Venice railway and to the west by the neighbourhood
of Porta Venezia. Two parts compose Sant ‘Eufemia; in the upper part is a
village in the hills of Marcolini (Zane, 2010), a quiet area away from traffic. In
the lower part is the ancient village of pre-industrial times. This area is much
more exposed to traffic, and it was possible to get rented apartments. There are
also limited parking facilities. At the time of construction considered economic
houses for the working class, have now become medium-priced and challenging
to rent homes because of the surface that inflates the cost. Sant’Eufemia it is
a semi-peripheral area it borders to the south with a high traffic road and the
north with Mount Maddalena, part of the neighbourhood is in a foothills area,
to the west, it borders the district of Porta Venezia and to the east with the
neighbourhood of Caionvico.
Sant ‘Eufemia both in terms of evenness and isolation was strongly segre-
gated for South Asians, as it was possible to see in table 2.4. For other groups,
segregation was mild for mostly all except Chinese, but the isolation level was
low. There was a cluster of LL segregation for Chinese in the central area of the
neighbourhood, as it was possible to see in figure 2.6. The area was made up of
small semi-detached houses with a typical garden of the Marcolini villages.
2.5.5.4 San Polo
Until a few years ago the San Polo district was a unique neighbourhood. The
district has been divided into four parts: San Polo Houses, Sanpolino, San
Polo Park, San Polo Cimabue. The neighbourhood located southeast of the
city. It had ancient origins, as evidenced by archaeological finds and buildings
of medieval origin still present. However, until the 50s it was formed only by
small groups of houses and some farms. Until a few years ago the San Polo
neighbourhood was a unique neighbourhood. The neighbourhood was divided
into four parts San Polo Houses (historical part), Sanpolino, San Polo Park,
San Polo Cimabue. San Polo is a neighbourhood born from the experimental
public initiative for the time. Designed in the seventies and built in the eighties,
it has endowed the city with a large residential green neighbourhood of social
housing, characterised by the presence of residential towers and terraced houses,
and large parks.
San Polo Case The core of San Polo Case was created as a construction
cooperative in the context of the Christian-Social, such as the cooperative "La
Famiglia" of the presbyter Ottorino Marcolini (Zane, 2010). Semi-detached
houses with a garden characterise its structure. It is close to large and polluting
industrial plants and coasts to the north with the Milan-Venice motorway.
San Polo Case both in terms of evenness and isolation was strongly segre-
gated for South Asians and EAST EU, as it was possible to see in table 2.4.
The last group in particular despite low segregation had a substantial rate of
isolation. An east European that lives here has at least 26.2% of probability to
meet a co-ethnic. For other groups, segregation was mild for mostly all except
ESEA, but the isolation level was low.
Sanpolino The Sanpolino neighbourhood is proposed in 1998 and built in
the following decade. It is located between the neighbourhoods of San Polo
and Sant’Eufemia. The neighbourhood was created to respond to a request for
housing in particular of a social type. The building types range from multi-store
houses in line to terraced houses and tower houses, however, with a maximum
height of seven floors, to two-family villas. The Municipality owns a quarter of
the houses. The remaining three quarters are rented through Cooperatives or
sold.
Sanpolino had a robust level of segregation for SSA, as it was possible to
see in table 2.4, and this derives from its strong social housing orientation. For
other groups, segregation was mild with low isolation level. Sanpolino shows big
HH clusters for sub-Saharan Africans, as it was possible to see in figure 2.12;
this was a result of the actively social vocation of the area.
San Polo Cimabue The San Polo Cimabue district is the part closest to
the city centre of the area, of San Polo, its area extends from the Milan-Venice
railway to the outer tracks of the subway. It consists of small houses all owned,
in the district, there are also many industries, and there is the headquarters of
the city police. It is a middle-class neighbourhood (Zane, 2010).
San Polo Cimabue had a robust level of segregation for SSA, as it was possible
to see in table 2.4. For other groups, segregation was mild with low isolation
level.
There is an extensive segregation area of strong HH space association for
sub-Saharan Africans in the southern area of the district, as it was possible to
see in figure 2.12. This was the main area where African groups live. However,
given the segregation indices, it was not configurable as a ghetto.
San Polo Parco This area consists of two types of houses, small houses sim-
ilar to the one that can be found in San Polo Cimabue and five large build-
ings, visible from any area of the neighbourhood because of their height called
Tiziano, Raphael, Michelangelo, Tintoretto and Cimabue (Zane, 2010), from
the name of the streets where these buildings are located. They were built in
the eighties and are buildings of public housing, intended to house the residences
of the less well-off families of the city. In particular, the two most eastern towers
(Tintoretto and Cimabue) mostly host very low-income families. These families
originally populated the Centro Storico Nord neighbourhood. They were trans-
ferred there with the purpose of giving a quiet home that could improve their
living conditions. However, with the transfer, the municipality also transferred
the crime that infested the historic neighbourhood of the centre.
San Polo Cimabue had a robust level of segregation for South Asians, as it
was possible to see in table 2.4. This derives from its strong social housing ori-
entation. For other groups, segregation was mild with low isolation level. There
is a HH segregated cluster for MENA in the southern area of the neighbourhood
next to the large steelworks company, as it was possible to see in figure 2.9. In
the same area, there is a segregated cluster for sub-Saharan Africans, as it was
possible to see in figure 2.12. No other spatial association was present.
2.5.6 West
2.5.6.1 Chiusure
Bordered to the east by the river Mella. The neighbourhood borders to the north
with Urago Mella and the south with Strada Padana Superiore (the upper Po
Valley road), to the west it borders the Villaggio Badia. Chiusure neighbour-
hood was initially built as a little shantytown in early 30s for 250 evicted families
due to demolition of part of Centro Storico Sud neighbourhood. At the end of
the 30s public housing was built, however they were not assigned to those who
lived in the slum, their situation was solved only after the war by the presbyter
G. Vender. (Zane 2010).
The neighbourhood had a substantial development in the post-war period,
in the southern part the villas are dominant; instead in the northern part, the
buildings are dominant. South western area was called Sant’Anna, where there
are many social subsidised houses built in the 50s. near them there were many
semi-detached and single-family houses.
A strong Chinese segregation characterises the area both in terms of evenness
and isolation, as it was possible to see in table 2.6. Besides, spatial analysis
showed three areas of HL segregation for the Chinese, one in the Sant’Anna area
in a low-density housing area, one in the low-density area of Viale Colombo and
one in the high-density residential houses of Torricella, as it was possible to see
in figure 2.6 . Moreover, it is possible to see a strong South Asian segregation
both in terms of evenness and isolation,but much lower than the Chinese one.
For other groups, segregation was mild with low isolation level. The Chiusure
neighbourhood shows an LL cluster for ESEA, in a low-density area, as it was
possible to see in figure 2.8. There were also areas with low LL clustering in
areas of low population density in the area near Viale Colombo. The other
ethnic groups did not present statistically significant spatial segregation.
2.5.6.2 Fiumicello
The neighbourhood of Fiumicello includes the area that goes from the western
border of Porta Milano to the river Mella. The neighbourhood began to grow
in the second part of the 19th century with the opening of numerous factories
such as the Sant’Eustacchio foundry, the Brixia-Züst (now IVECO) car factory,
the Caffaro electrochemical company, the Ideal Standard, the Breda arms (now
Leonardo Finmeccanica) and many other industries that unfortunately heavily
damages the area from an environmental point (Turrio-Baldassarri et al., 2009).
The urban structure is characterised mainly by multi-story buildings; there is a
large part of the neighbourhood next to via Milan characterised by ancient and
characterised by poor maintenance houses. In the 70s there was a robust urban
development in the northern area of the neighbourhood characterised by high
density buildings (Zane, 2010).
In Fiumicello, segregation was not mostly high for any group, except for the
South Asian group that was strongly segregated in the area, as it was possible
to see in table 2.6. That was also confirmed by spatial association analysis.
SAS and MENA were mainly concentrated in this area, as it was possible to
see in figures 2.11 and 2.9. In the northern side of the neighbourhood, there
were two HH clusters for EAST EU,as it was possible to see in figure 2.7.
The neighbourhood showed particularity of having for each ethnic group little
exposure to Italians compared to any other neighbourhood in the city.
2.5.6.3 Quartiere Primo Maggio
The Quartiere Primo Maggio neighbourhood was born as a pure labourer dis-
trict. The name recalls the 1st of May on the day of the Labour Day. The
neighbourhood is bordered to the south by the Milan-Venice railway, to the
north by the neighbourhood of Fiumicello, to the west by the river Mella and
the west by the Centro Storico Sud. The neighbourhood is built entirely in
the 50s-60s, except for a large social housing complex located near the railroad
built in the 90s (Zane, 2010). The area of the neighbourhood is characterised
by a strong industrial presence, in Defense, Chemical and Mechanical fields.
The proximity with the area of the former chemical industry Caffaro makes it
the area with the highest organic pollution in Italy (Turrio-Baldassarri et al.,
2009). The inhabited part of the neighbourhood is near the railway station, that
is close to the Centro Storico Sud neighbourhood. In Quartiere Primo Maggio,
segregation was not unusually high for any group, except for the South Asian
group that was segregated in the area, as it was possible to see in table 2.6. The
neighbourhood had no statistically significant spatial segregation for any group.
2.5.6.4 Urago Mella
Urago Mella was practically depopulated, as the whole area of the Oltremella
(area beyond Mella river in the west of the city, like Chiusure, Villaggio Badia),
until the end of WWII the area remains for agricultural use, characterised by
farms and manor houses. From the late 60s to the late 70s there was a quick
transformation of the neighbourhood; population changed from 1500 to 10000
inhabitants. In the Pendolina district, several social houses were built, it was
characterised by high vertical buildings (Zane, 2010). The Torricella district
located on the border with the municipality of Cellatica was born as a district
of subsidised public housing. The Cesare Abba district was a bourgeois area
located between the two previous ones. The neighbourhood borders to the east
with the river Mella and the north with the municipality of Collebeato, besides
at west it has a border with the municipality of Cellatica. In Urago Mella,
segregation was not unusually high for any group, except for the South Asian
group that was segregated in the area, as it was possible to see in table 2.6. The
district showed numerous LL clusters in the northern are for Chinese community
as it was possible to see in figure 2.6 , higher population density was probably
the cause of segregation.
2.5.6.5 Villaggio Badia
Father Ottorino Marcolini and his cooperative La Famiglia built here the sec-
ond village of the cheap building that influenced the urban development of the
city. At the village of Badia, father Marcolini made his own entirely and on
a large-scale starting intuition (Zane, 2010). Unlike the first village that was
intended for the workers, the village of Badia was a large-scale operation aimed
at young couples and families with children. In 1958 350 houses were delivered
in semi-detached houses with gardens, in the following decade, new houses were
built up to over 500 houses. The neighbourhood was primarily inhabited by the
first or second generation of owners and is, therefore, one of the oldest neigh-
bourhoods in the city. Segregation in this neighbourhood was almost absent,
almost nil levels of isolation compensated high rates of evenness indices; more-
over, exposure to natives was high, as it was possible to see in table 2.6. For
the EAST EU, there was an HL-type isolation segregation cluster in the Badia
area, as it was possible to see in figure 2.7. This area was built more recently at
the beginning of the 2000s. It was made up of high-density residential buildings.
For the ESEA, there was an isolation-type cluster HL in the Badia area, as it
was possible to see in figure 2.8. This area consisted of small semi-detached or
terraced houses.
2.5.6.6 Villaggio Violino
Father Ottorino Marcolini and his cooperative La Famiglia built here the first
village cheap building that influenced the urban development of the city (Zane,
2010). In 1955 they inaugurated 126 semi-detached houses with a garden for the
workers of the OM (now IVECO), the houses are arranged with a Roman-style
urban structure. In 1993 the neighbourhood expanded with further new 134
housing units. The neighbourhood is isolated from urban traffic and is bordered
to the north to the south by two railway lines and the east by the river Mella.
These barriers limit Villaggio Violino expansion. The neighbourhood is one
of the neighbourhoods with the oldest population. Villaggio Violino shows a
high level of segregation combined to isolation only for South Asians, as it was
possible to see in table 2.6. For all other groups although there was a typical
high level of segregation, they displayed low levels of isolation and extensive
exposition to natives. Villaggio Violino displayed a segregation LL cluster for
SAM, as it was possible to see in figure 2.10, this was the only cluster in the
area, without any urban difference with other areas of the village.
2.6 Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter aimed to explore segregation in a Mediterranean welfare context.
We have therefore analysed segregation in a medium-sized Italian city with a
share of the immigrant population and highly composite population. This city
is Brescia, and it is embedded within a large area with a high presence of im-
migrants. We carried out the analysis on four dimensions of segregation, or
evenness, isolation, exposition and clustering. Besides, we performed the anal-
ysis on several levels of spatial aggregation, from a global segregation context
to a segregate context for the thirty-three neighbourhoods of Brescia. Besides,
an advanced spatial analysis methodology was used to assess the presence of
clusters of spatial association without neighbourhood constraints.
The global analysis at both the multinomial and binomial level shows segre-
gation levels measured as evenness, which is generally low for all communities
with the exclusion of the Chinese and East and South East Asian communi-
ties. EAST EU community differently from all others was characterised by high
exposure and low isolation and middle evenness. This exceptionalism derives
mainly from caregiver effect. A large part of EAST EU immigrants, especially
Ukrainian, Romanian and Moldovan women, work as caregivers and live in
homes with their employers or people that they assist. Moreover as shown by
Baldini and Federici (2011), EAST EU was less subject to discrimination in
the rental market. Besides, the long term presence of some EAST EU groups
like Albanian and former Yugoslavian has allowed them to buy houses and quit
from the discriminatory rental market. MENA groups, despite the discrimina-
tion suffered in the experimental literature, does not achieve levels of segregation
measured in terms of evenness, such as the other groups. ESEA and CHINA
show worrying segregation levels in terms of evenness, and CHINA is also wor-
rying in term of isolation. CHINA community always tend to auto-segregate
mainly for linguistic and cultural barriers as pointed out by Rose-Redwood and
Rose-Redwood (2013). ESEA people that mostly are Filipinos. SAM shows a
mild level in terms of evenness and low levels in terms of isolation and high
levels in term of exposure. SAM is the less isolated and highly exposed to Ital-
ians ethnic group. This might be justified by the low social distance between
Italian and SAM as in Mancini and Panari (2010). SAS shows worrying levels
of Isolation and lower level to exposure to Italians, despite their segregation
level as evenness was not the higher. Poulsen and Johnston (2006) and Peach
(1996), showed similar segregation levels for South Asian communities, in the
UK. From the analysis of neighbourhoods globally with a multinomial approach,
it was possible to see that segregation is on average low. However, if we anal-
yse the segregation differentiated by groups in each neighbourhood, the thing
changes clearly. The analysis by neighbourhoods clearly shows the presence of
segregation for all groups when measured in terms of evenness. However, there
is very little isolation for Eastern European and South American groups, and
explanations are the same as those given above. In terms of isolation, it is only
high in some areas and for certain groups. The SAS and the CHINA groups
tend towards greater isolation. In particular, the South Asian group presents
strong isolation segregation in almost all the neighbourhoods in which there is
significant segregation, with isolation rates higher than 5%. In neighbourhoods
such as Fornaci, Chiesanuova, Sant’Eufemia, San Polo Case, Buffalora, San Bar-
tolomeo, San Rocchino, Fiumicello and Villaggio Violino this isolation is more
than 10%. The group presents isolation in suburban neighbourhoods and neigh-
bourhoods close to the centre. Except for the district of Fiumicello where the
South Asian presence is maximum, in the other districts, this group tends to live
in the areas with the highest population density. Results confirm what found
by Busetta, Mazza, & Stranges (2015) in Palermo. The Chinese group shows
high levels of isolation in the neighbourhoods of Centro Storico Sud, Brescia
Antica and Chiusure. All these areas are of high population density. Except
for the Chiusure district, they live in the degraded areas of the neighbourhoods,
from which the natives prefer to stay away. Isolation segregation areas are also
present for North Africans and sub-Saharan Africans, in the San Polo wide area.
San Polo, generally speaking, is a cheap neighbourhood for the real estate mar-
ket, given the presence of areas populated by poor people, social housing and a
multi-ethnic composition, besides there is a strong penetration of micro-crime.
The East and South East Asian group shows high levels of isolation only in the
Villaggio Sereno area. Although at the global level as evenness segregation is in
Index SSA MENA ESEA CHINA EAST_EU SAM SAS
Gini 0.6918 0.6539 0.8299 0.8166 0.4266 0.6615 0.6834
Dissimilarity 0.5237 0.4937 0.6725 0.6616 0.3043 0.49 0.5192
Isolation 0.0576 0.0524 0.0575 0.0811 0.0495 0.0272 0.1069
Exposure 0.67 0.6679 0.6977 0.6756 0.722 0.7374 0.6334
Table 2.1: Global segregation by macro-ethnic group
line with the values found in other European countries. At the neighbourhood
level, there are micro-segregation phenomena for all groups and strong segrega-
tion for the South Asians and the Chinese. The spatial association analysis also
confirms this strong segregation. Immigrants tend to populate areas that are
poorly considered by the natives, such as former industrial areas that are pol-
luted, or peripheral parts of neighborhoods with some desiderable characteristic
that tend to be characterized by the presence high density building.
neighbourhood Multigroup Dissimilarity Multigroup Gini
BORGO TRENTO 0.2983 0.4138
BRESCIA ANTICA 0.3977 0.5262
BUFFALORA 0.5084 0.6198
CAIONVICO 0.3565 0.462
CASAZZA 0.3912 0.4861
CENTRO STORICO NORD 0.3125 0.4286
CENTRO STORICO SUD 0.4433 0.5815
CHIESANUOVA 0.422 0.5627
CHIUSURE 0.3539 0.4881
CROCIFISSA DI ROSA 0.291 0.3967
DON BOSCO 0.1989 0.2759
FIUMICELLO 0.3791 0.5019
FOLZANO 0.5542 0.6684
FORNACI 0.355 0.4785
LAMARMORA 0.2845 0.3972
MOMPIANO 0.429 0.56
PORTA CREMONA 0.2885 0.3958
PORTA MILANO 0.3067 0.4133
PORTA VENEZIA 0.3873 0.5038
PRIMO MAGGIO 0.3178 0.4253
S. BARTOLOMEO 0.339 0.4762
S. EUFEMIA 0.4136 0.5321
S. EUSTACCHIO 0.3856 0.5171
S. POLO CASE 0.3692 0.5159
S. POLO CIMABUE 0.5375 0.6707
S. POLO PARCO 0.3461 0.4581
S. ROCCHINO 0.4335 0.5663
SANPOLINO 0.441 0.5392
URAGO MELLA 0.3979 0.5183
VILLAGGIO BADIA 0.3926 0.5113
VILLAGGIO PREALPINO 0.4149 0.5499
VILLAGGIO SERENO 0.3528 0.4698
VILLAGGIO VIOLINO 0.5499 0.6543
Table 2.2: neighbourhood Multi Group Dissimilarity
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Chapter 3
Egohoods that segregate.
Immigrants, social contexts
and income penalties
3.1 Introduction
People from Northern, Western Europe, and the Americas have always migrated
in Southern European countries. However, since the ‘80s the improvement of
economic conditions of these countries has also attracted migrants from post-
communist Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America developing coun-
tries. For instance, in Italy foreigners increased from 1% of the population in
1991 to 8.4% in 2018, mostly in Northern regions, where industries and job
opportunities are concentrated. While the effect of such a fast demographic
change on the quality of interethnic relations is controversial (McMahon, 2018),
it is worth noting that migrations are now at the center of debate for institu-
tions and the public in Italy and elsewhere in Europe, especially after the recent
financial crisis. Today, hard lines against migration have also widespread politi-
cal support. Not only did concerns increase as regards to the social exclusion of
migrants and its possible negative consequences on the social fabric of hosting
countries; the residential segregation of migrants in some urban areas has been
highlighted by the media as one of the most critical factors nurturing criminality
and ethnic conflict (Body-Gendrot & Martiniello, 2016).
In this situation, reconstructing the economic and social nexus of immigrant
segregation is key to provide an informed, evidence-based analysis of immi-
gration, economic penalties, and social cohesion. However, this requires re-
constructing complex geographical and social processes by integrating different
administrative data sources, which are often not available. Our research has
been based on rich geo-localized micro-census data, which permitted us to ex-
amine the causal effect of residential segregation on the income of immigrants in
95
the manufacturing city of Brescia, located in eastern Lombardy, Northern Italy.
To our knowledge, this is the first study on residential segregation of immi-
grants in a Southern European context, which considered multiple dimensions.
Moreover, we used a relatively novel empirical approach, by linking spatial-
demographic migration patterns to socio-economic characteristics of migrants
through “egohoods.” This implied to reconstruct all individuals living in each
migrant’s spatial proximity, as his/her potential contacts. This procedure al-
lowed us examine certain individual factors and their effects, without assuming
population homogeneity due to administrative neighborhood boundaries.
Note that measuring segregation by means of egohoods is even more relevant
when studying a Southern European context. Previous research has indicated
that migrants’ residential patterns in these contexts greatly differ from those ob-
served in either Northern America or Central and Northern Europe as migrants
are spread across urban contexts and less concentrated in ethnic enclaves (Ar-
baci, 2008; Arbaci & Malheiros, 2010; Malheiros, 2002). This suggests the need
for exploring heterogeneous measurements of migrants’ residential segregation,
which is what egohoods permitted us to do.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the second section, we
review research on the link between segregation and immigrants’ income in Eu-
rope, while in the third we discuss the definition of neighborhood and present our
egohood approach. Our segregation measures are presented in the fourth sec-
tion, and the fifth illustrates the empirical context of our analysis, our dataset,
and indices while the sixth presents our modeling strategy, including our 2 Stages
Least Square (2SLS) estimator. The seventh section presents the results, and
finally, in the last one the findings and limitations of the study are discussed.
3.2 Immigrants’ residential segregation and in-
come
Research has generally shown that immigrant residence and income are neg-
atively associated1 . Indeed, settling in an ethnic clustered area may be dis-
advantageous for immigrants both socially and economically. For instance, in
a pioneering study on neighborhood effects in the U.S., Wilson (1987) showed
that living in a poor or segregated neighborhood penalized minorities, who
subsequently reinforced attitudes and behavior, for instance, adopting different
work ethics or being negatively considered by natives. In a study on the Boston
area, Case and Katz (1991) showed that living in a low-income neighborhood in-
creased the likelihood of adopting negative behavior, such as committing crime,
drug and alcohol abuse, and reduced school attendance. Similar social pat-
terns are often responsible for locking immigrants into poverty traps (Durlauf
2004, 2006). In a systematic review of 515 studies, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006)
showed that residential segregation could also stimulate inter-ethnic prejudices,
1Note that we defined “migrants” as persons coming from countries poorer than Italy, in
particular from Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America (for detail, see Section 5).
with significant implications on the persistence of poverty traps.
Several studies have suggested that social networks as key for these com-
plex outcomes: given that many resources relevant for getting a job come from
networks of acquaintances, it is likely that migrants whose contacts are dispro-
portionally among similar co-ethnics cannot access them. For instance, poor
contacts with natives and lack of language proficiency mean losing information
and advice on job openings and recommendations to possible employers. As
suggested by Granovetter (1973) for getting a job, ego’s contacts must be non-
redundant, i.e., composed by individuals with higher professional status and a
different position in the social structure (Granovetter 2017). Moreover, net-
works do not only convey resources and information, they also shape attitudes
and motivations, as suggested by the peer effects on education (Durlauf, 2004).
For instance, if most ego’s contacts are unemployed, they will be hardly useful
for information or direct job opportunities. However, the fact that these unem-
ployed contacts are investing in their own job search could influence ego’s efforts
in searching his/her.
Evidence suggests that these network-based mechanisms are key also in the
European contexts to explain systematic patterns of ethnic disadvantage. For
instance, Clark and Drinkwater (2002) found that in England and Wales, in-
dividuals living close to a relatively high share of co-ethnics were more likely
to be unemployed or self-occupied. In the UK, Frijters et al. (2005) showed
the importance of local social networks to account for immigrants’ weak per-
formance in job matching. Similarly, Battu et al. (2005) found that Pakistani
and Bangladeshi in the UK tend to overuse their social networks to find a job,
which penalizes them significantly. By using ‘bespoke neighborhoods’ (Buck
2001; Johnston et al. 2000), Bolster et al. (2007) analyzed the wage dynamics
of immigrants residing in a segregated micro-areas in Britain. They found that
segregation contributed to an immigrant wage gap. In a recent study, Zuccotti
and Platt (2017) found that high co-ethnic concentration penalized immigrants’
labor market participation in England and Wales, especially in the case of Pak-
istani and Bangladeshi women involved in caregiving.
However, when considering the self-selection of migrants into ethnic enclaves,
the effect of living “segregated” with many co-ethnics could also have positive
implications on income (Borjas, 1995). This seems to depend on certain group
specificities and especially on migrant skills and education (Lalonde & Topel,
1997). For instance, Topa (2001) showed that certain minority communities
could have higher job opportunities thanks to preferential attachment via eth-
nically cohesive social networks. In a study on Boston, Bayer et al. (2008)
showed that co-ethnics residing in the same block had a 33% probability of hav-
ing a job in the same location due to referrals via social networks, similar results
were also in Boeri et al. (2015).
It is worth noting that similar patterns have been also found in European
contexts. For instance, a natural experiment on immigrants in Sweden sug-
gested that while poor-skilled migrants would have better income when living
segregated, high-skilled migrants earned less (Edin et al. 2003). Similarly, in
a study conducted in Denmark, Damm (2009) found that the size of the eth-
nic enclave in which immigrants resided had a positive effect on their income.
However, note that these studies referred to immigrant refugees, who have a
special status and peculiar conditions. Indeed, Musterd et al. (2008)’s longitu-
dinal analysis on the migrant population of the three larger metropolitan areas
in Sweden indicated that concentration in ethnic enclaves could have negative
effects on migrant income when longer temporal dimensions are considered.
However, as pointed out by Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo (2006), ex-
planations in terms of “wrong networks” are consistent only if minorities are
underrepresented in each step of the recruitment process. This is the case of
Italy, where migrant employers are rare and migrants are mostly hired by local
firms or households (Chiesi et al. 2011; Reyneri, 2007). This would suggest
that (either positive or negative) network effects are important determinants
of immigrant occupations and income. The very same ethnic social network,
which can be helpful when immigrants arrive by providing jobs in ethnic en-
claves and firms, might in the following years lock them into a secondary labor
market characterized by low-paying jobs with fewer career opportunities. This
is typical of the ethnic economies in the metropolitan areas (Portes & Landolt,
1996; Portes & Zhou, 1993) and led Reardon et al. (2000) to consider ethnic
networks as sources of inadequate social capital because immigrants can benefit
from connections with local natives more than from contacts with co-ethnics.
To sum up, previous research suggests that social contexts matter for the
social and economic condition of immigrants. The labor market achievements
of migrants greatly depend on a complex link between individual and household
characteristics and their social connections when entering the destination coun-
try (Portes & Zhou, 1993). Here, Granovetter (2017) suggested that network
effects can greatly depend on context-specific conditions. Indeed, similar social
contacts could have different occupational or income effects on individuals de-
pending on the spatial, urban characteristics of the context in which they are
socially and geographically embedded.
However, a consensus on these findings has not been reached also due to
methodological and data constraints of empirical research. First, experimental
studies preferably examined certain immigrant groups, in particular refugees,
who have a special status and can be examined more easily however, this limited
findings generalizability. Secondly, examining residential segregation requires
fine-grained data on important geographical dimensions, which in turn have
important implications on segregation measures.
3.3 The definition of neighborhood
Since the Chicago School, neighborhoods have been a matter of significant con-
cern for sociologist (Park & Burgess, 1921): indeed, even if people behave ratio-
nally and respond predictably to cost-benefit evaluations, the contexts in which
they are embedded (Granovetter, 1985) might profoundly influence their occu-
pational choices and related outcomes. Indeed, information (or the lack of) and
peer pressure influence attitudes and behaviors.
Given that we were interested to look at the effect of segregation as the
prevalence of co-ethnics in one’s social network, we defined neighborhoods at
the individual level and not according to administrative units. Research on
segregation has followed standard geographical definitions of neighborhood, as
circumscribed areas of a city with fixed not-overlapping borders. This type of
neighborhood definition is key as it is instrumental to organize a variety of social,
economic, and political activities, e.g., running political elections, providing
social services, etc. However, space is not a mere “container,” whose aggregate
properties might be attributed in the same way to each individual inhabitant
and/or household (Batty 2013).
By following administrative definitions of neighborhoods, the heterogeneity
of individual and household conditions would be underestimated. This could
be reasonable if neighborhoods are expected to have the same effect on all in-
dividuals. For instance, this can happen in the case of a strong stigma related
to a given neighborhood or geographical area. However, if aggregate outcomes
depend on social contexts or networks, assuming that all residents in a neighbor-
hood share the same social contacts and are exposed homogeneously to context
effects can lead to misplaced attributions. For instance, in a study on the effect
of minorities’ social networks on their labor market outcome in England, Pat-
acchini and Zenou (2012) found that social network effects are relevant only for
people living nearby. Indeed, social contexts typically include families, friends
or peers whose connections do not respect fixed, aggregate geographical bound-
aries (Diez Roux, 2001). Indeed, networks are irrespective of any administrative
boundaries (Kwan 2009; Chaix 2009; Matthews 2008). On the one hand, any
administrative unit has a different size; on the other hand, the ethnic composi-
tion of adjacent neighborhoods is often more relevant than the administrative
boundary of a neighborhood (Lee et al. 2008).
In order to fill this gap and map each individual’s spatial and social em-
beddedness, we defined a different neighborhood for each individual, as a set of
egohoods with overlapping geographical borders. This means that individuals
can be part of various social spaces, which can, in turn, have different popula-
tion density and composition. This was initially suggested by Lee et al. (2008),
who proposed to use circular spatial buffers to overcome the checkerboard prob-
lem in measuring micro-segregation. More importantly, the idea of egohoods
is consistent with the fact that each perceives him or herself as the center of
his/her neighborhood or social network (Kwan, 2012).
It is important to note that egohood applications are still in their infancy.
For instance, in a criminological study on nine U.S. cities, Hipp and Boessen
(2013) used the egohoods to explain the variation of crime in the social envi-
ronment and claimed that this ensured better measures than traditional, more
aggregate methods. In an epidemiological study on tobacco diffusion in the
Boston Area, Duncan et al. (2014) showed that ego-based neighborhood defi-
nitions were crucial to measure tobacco diffusion, whereas analyzing the same
diffusion process via traditional large administrative neighborhoods would bias
any conclusion.
These early applications testify to the fact that this approach can improve
the analysis of the spatial dimension of complex social processes. First, it avoids
adopting a rigid definition of space, which conflates aggregate properties with
specific contexts and households, thus potentially biasing segregation measures.
Second, a more in-depth and precise definition of neighborhood could permit to
trace the empirical effects of segregation better.
Obviously, the definition of the size of the egohood is to some extent ar-
bitrary, and each egohood could be measured differently. In one of the early
egohood applications, Hipp and Boessen (2013) studied crime in nine US cities
using egohoods with different sizes (see also Gatens 2016 and Collins and Guidry
2018). Dinesen and Sønderskov (2015) studied ethnic diversity and trust rela-
tionship in egohoods with a radius of 250m, while replicating the analysis with
narrower egohoods, with a radius of 80 m. Sluiter et al. (2015) studied similar
effects in the Netherlands by using various size egohoods (200-400m radius).
Recently, Tolsma and van der Meer (2017) studied trust formation in egohoods
of various sizes until 4 km. In these studies on trust, which are conceptually sim-
ilar to ours, findings showed that effects were relevant when egohood radii were
between 250 and 500m, peaking at 400-500m, to evaporate at wider distances.
3.4 Segregation measures
Residential segregation is “the degree to which two or more groups live sepa-
rately one from another, in different parts of the urban environment” (Massey
and Denton 1988: 282). Research on the effect of neighborhoods has mostly
used the simple share of immigrants in the neighborhood as segregation proxy.
However, this absolute measure does not measure segregation, which requires
a comparison between (at least) two groups. In our case, we followed rela-
tive measures in order to relate the variation of migrants’ income to the ethnic
composition of people living in their respective proximity.
A relative measure of segregation is the dissimilarity index. Introduced by
Duncan and Duncan (1955), this has been the most popular segregation mea-
sure for at least three decades (Massey and Denton 1988). However, it has
certain weaknesses. First, the dissimilarity index is an index of evenness rather
than segregation, and this makes its interpretation not intuitive (Cortese, Falk,
& Cohen, 1976). More importantly, like all evenness indices, this index de-
pends on the way a given geographical area is fractioned into sub-units: the
smaller the units, the higher the index value is (Carrington & Troske, 1997).
Furthermore, it does not fully satisfy the so-called “transfer principle,” which
requires to reflect all transfers of minority members over neighborhoods where
they are differently represented (James & Taeuber, 1985). Considering that
the dissimilarity index depends on the difference that needs to be transferred
to obtain evenness, the index estimation can bias any segregation measure in
socio-geographical contexts characterized by only a few enclaves, such as the
Southern European countries.
Given that we aimed to examine how inter-ethnic contacts and intra-ethnic
contacts could influence immigrants’ income, we considered segregation indices
that reflected the expected probability for any immigrant to be in contact with
co-ethnics or natives. Here, we followed Bell (1954) who proposed the so-called
“index of exposure” (henceforth EXP), which measures the extent to which a
given group is exposed to another or relatively isolated in a given context.
In our case, EXP measured the exposure of each minority group to natives
as follows:
EXP =
N∑
i=1
(
xi
X
yi
ti
)
where X is the total population of ethnic group in the area, xi is the pop-
ulation of the ethnic group in the tract, yi is population of the natives in the
tract, tiis the total population of the tract.The index can be interpreted as the
probability that two individuals randomly extracted from the population of two
different groups can be in the same egohood, thus in contact with each other.
The index can be interpreted as the probability that two individuals ran-
domly extracted from the population of two different groups can be in the same
egohood, thus in contact with each other.
We then built an index of “ethnic isolation” (henceforth ETH) as follows:
ETH =
N∑
i=1
(
xi
X
xi
ti
)
wherexi was the number of co-ethnics in the area, X was the total number of
co-ethnics, and ti was the total population of the tract of interest. This allowed
us to derive the expected probability that each individual has to interact with
another one from the same ethnic group. This allowed us to derive the expected
probability that each individual has to interact with another one from the same
ethnic group. Note that for the sake of readability, we multiplied both indices
by 100. Considering the explorative nature of our study, we calculated these
indices for each egohood exploring two different radii, 250 and 500 meters from
the targeted individual respectively.
Table 3.1 shows the correlations between our two indices. Besides the pos-
itive correlation between the same measures with different radii, it is worth
noting that the EXP and ETH were positively correlated, yet only weakly. This
probably reflects certain context-specific characteristics, such as the lack of eth-
nic enclaves mentioned above, which is a typical residential pattern of migrants
in Southern European urban areas.
3.5 The context and the data
With about 195,000 inhabitants, the urban core of a highly productive, labor-
intensive, export-oriented manufacturing area, Brescia is an Italian city with
one of the more composite ethnic population. On February the 5th, 2018, Le
Monde featured Brescia as one of the most brilliant examples of a multicultural
EXP250 ETH250 EXP500 ETH 500
1.0000 0.0435 0.7969 0.0707 EXP250
1.0000 0.0967 0.9840 ETH 250
1.0000 0.1027 EXP500
1.0000 ETH 500
Table 3.1: Correlation indices between segregation indices measured as exposure
(EXP) and isolation (ETH).
urban context in Europe. Migrants grew from about 1% in 1990 to over 18%
in 2018, and the city now has an immigrant density similar to many Northern
European cities. Furthermore, Brescia developed a unique residential pattern,
with immigrants concentrated both in city center (as in most Southern European
cities) and in the suburbs (as in most Northern European cities). The city
has a varied ethnic composition of immigrants, including Africans, Asians, and
Eastern Europeans.
3.5.1 Data
Our data were extracted from Archimede, an ISTAT (Italian National Statis-
tics Institute) register-type dataset linking a number of administrative sources
to provide individual-level economic and demographic data for the entire Bres-
cia population for the year 2012. First, we geo-localized the social, economic
and demographic data for Census Micro-zones (CM), which reproduce (often
irregular) administrative blocks.
Starting from these micro-areas, we created egohoods by imposing buffer
circles of predefined diameter (250 or 500 m) around the spatial location of
individuals, using Quantum GIS. Using these egohoods as the spatial area of
reference, we calculated our segregation indices as well as the instruments used
in the statistical analysis (see below). Figure 1 shows an example of egohoods
representing the small community of Poles in Brescia (a), with a zoom on its
city center (b), with a radius of 250m.
The dataset included information concerning the individual place of birth
and citizenship, in a population of 195,387 inhabitants, 42,363 of them with an
immigrant background from 141 different national/ethnic groups. Italians were
defined as those individuals who both have Italian citizenship and were born in
Italy.
Considering previous migration patterns of Italians and the frequency of
returns of migrant Italian families after an extended period abroad, we classified
any individual as being Italian who had Italian citizenship in 2012 and was born
before 1971 from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Switzerland, and Belgium. This
also applied for all Italians who had been expelled by post-colonial regimes from
former colonies, namely Libya, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and who were born before
1948 in Croatia, a country with some Italian ethnic enclaves who became part
of Yugoslavia after WW2.
Figure 3.1: Egohoods of 250m with the distribution of Polish immigrants in the
whole city. (Our elaboration on Google images maps)
Figure 3.2: Egohoods of 250m with the distribution of Polish immigrants with
a zoom in the city centre.(Our elaboration on Google images maps)
After calculating our indices, we dropped from the dataset all Italians, West-
ern Europeans and citizens of wealthy countries, defined as countries whose GDP
per capita in purchase power parity was at least equal to Italians. Such migrants
settle down in Italy following a totally different selection and choice process, and
their integration into Italian society is hardly a problem: given the substantive
interest of this paper, we excluded them from the definition of migrant, as it is
often the case in European migration research. For the same reason, we also
cut off all wealthy foreigners with yearly income higher than €150000. We then
removed any subject aged less than 16 and more than 65. After this procedure,
we are left with an analytical sample of 28,706 migrants.
3.5.1.1 Dependent variable
Our dependent variable was individual income, which was defined as the total
income including earnings from self-employment, employment and public trans-
fers (maternity allowance, income subsidies), earnings from collaborations and
shareholding (either from partnerships or limited companies). As a robustness
check, we also considered each individual’s household total income, adjusted
according to the OECD income equivalence scale. Note that results were qual-
itatively similar but less statistically robust (available from the corresponding
author upon request).
3.5.1.2 Independent variables
Our key independent variables were EXP and EHT, i.e., the two segregation
measures described above. They represented each immigrant’s probability to
meet a co-ethnic or an Italian in his/her egohoods. As said, we calculated
outcomes within radii of 250 and 500m from the targeted individual.
Education. Considering the importance of education for labor market achieve-
ments, we measured the number of years of education spent by each im-
migrant by considering the amount of time usually required to fulfill each
level of the Italian education system (“pseudo-years of education”). The
variable included seven levels, from “not educated” (0) to “university mas-
ter’s degree” (18). Note that data were partially self-reported in the 2011
Census, and were completed using available data from the Italian Minister
of Education register.
Job-stability. Considering the variety of unstable, flexible, and temporary jobs
characterizing the Italian labor market, we calculated the job stability as
one minus the annual proportion of months in which the migrant officially
worked multiplied by 12, such that any marginal loss of a working month
was considered.
Naturalized. Considering the significant advantage that citizenship has on
the job market, we added a dummy variable indicated if the foreign-born
individual had obtained Italian citizenship, and so had a long permanence
in Italy.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
EARNINGS 28,822 8290.153 9689.464 0 129036
MALE 28,822 0.484665 0.499773 0 1
NATUR 28,822 0.074943 0.263304 0 1
EDU 28,822 10.41382 3.986939 0 18
JOB INSTABILITY 28,822 6.266942 5.293866 0 12
ETH250 28,772 10.97142 19.94783 0.078989 100
ETH500 28,789 11.11127 20.06466 0.078989 100
EXP250 28,822 67.68126 16.65084 0 99.17355
EXP500 28,789 66.85439 17.01287 0 99.17355
AVERAGE_RENT 28,706 6.094574 1.455208 4.5 10.9
EMPLOYMENT PROBABILITY500 28,821 0.096596 0.043078 0.038372 0.679389
EMPLOYMENT PROBABILITY1000 28,821 0.097558 0.02518 0.059398 0.382514
DISCRIMINATION 28,805 0.12466 0.092844 0 1
URBAN DEGRADE 28,822 783.3064 602.5778 4 4748
Table 3.2: Variables and Instruments descriptive statistics.
Male. This was a dummy variable indicating migrant’s gender. Table 2 shows
descriptive statistics.
3.6 Models
Estimating the effect of residence on income requires to consider possible si-
multaneous effects. For instance, the possibility of renting or buying a home
depends on the family’s capacity to pay. This implies that low-income families
have fewer opportunities to afford a house in a “good” location. This constraint
could determine endogeneity problems and might bias our estimations by cor-
relating our dependent variable with the regression residuals.
To deal with any possible correlations between independent variables and
residuals and control for endogeneity effects, we used a 2 Stages Least Square
(2SLS) regression model (Basmann, 1957) with Instrumental Variables (IV),
a technique increasingly used in similar sociological studies. While the first-
stage regression is reported in Appendix (see Table A1), Table 3 includes the
estimates of a set of Ordinary OLS and IV models, one for each of the segregation
indicators presented above.
3.6.1 Instruments
Our analysis aimed to look at the effect of egohoods composition on immigrants’
income, thereby making the estimated composition of any egohood of paramount
importance. To do so, we considered the possible estimation bias due to simul-
taneity and unobserved variables, which could influence both housing decision
and labor market achievements. For instance, our sample included immigrant
workers and their families, which usually could not afford a house in a high or
middle-class area. This can create a downward distortion in the classical lin-
ear models making the estimation of any egohood composition effect on labor
achievements problematic. To deal with these potential sources of endogeneity,
we used a 2SLS regression model (Basmann, 1957), whose consistency depends
on statistical testing and instrument persuasiveness. This was key to explore
causal relationships.
We then identified our instruments following previous research on neighbor-
hoods and segregation. First, research on housing market discrimination showed
that the name of the potential renter often predicts the probability of closing
a contract. Note that immigrants cannot afford to buy a house and so depend
more on the local rental market, which in Southern European countries has
typically a rigid supply (Accetturo et al. 2012). Experimental research showed
that house-owners are less likely to rent to immigrants (Ahmed and Hammarst-
edt 2008; Bosch et al. 2010; Baldini and Federici 2011). Boeri et al. (2015)
found that the owners of the oldest buildings (over ten years old) were likely to
discriminate more. In their intentions, avoiding interactions with strangers is a
means to minimize the risk of decreasing their house prices due to immigrants’
presence. This led us to choose discrimination as the first instrument, which
we proxied by considering the average age of buildings in each block. Secondly,
we followed Boeri et al. (2015)’s suggestion to use the share of commercial
buildings in each block as a proxy of employment probability. Given that most
immigrant workers in Brescia work in the manufacturing or commercial sector,
we measured the local share of buildings devoted to these economic activities
and extended each egohood radius respectively to 500 and 1000 meter to capture
the access to potential resources better.
Our third instrument was the average rent price by square meter for an eco-
nomic house. Here, we followed the neoclassical theory of segregation, according
to which property buyers or rentier would choose their houses depending on their
individual willingness to pay for specific characteristics of buildings and areas
(Bayer et al. 2004; Wong 2013). Although prices could be influenced by the
share of migrants, the willingness to pay would consider other characteristics of
the area, such as the provision of public or private services, traffic or pollution.
Finally, our fourth instrument was urban degradation proximity. Here, we
followed Cristaldi (2002) and Mudu (2006), who studied segregation in Rome
and found that immigrants are segregated in the most degraded urban areas.
We measured this variable by calculating the minimum distance of each egohood
center from the closer abandoned industrial area, a good measure of proximity
to urban degradation and marginality. In order to do so, we had to map and
to geo-localize all abandoned manufacturing and military facilities in Brescia.
According to the tests reported in the lower panel of table 3, no instrument is
weak, and the over-identification condition is satisfied for all models. We move
now to our results.
3.7 Results
Our hypothesis was that the ethnic composition of egohoods could have an ef-
fect on immigrant income. Table 3 confirmed that the presence of co-ethnics in
individual egohoods had an adverse effect on immigrant income. According to
our IV estimates, any marginal percentage increment of our ETH segregation
index determined an individual annual income loss of 83.4€ and 133.3€ in 250m
and 500m radii, respectively (see Models 5 and 6). As expected, larger egohoods
revealed more pronounced statistical effects. These differences, however, were
not proportional to a similar increase of the egohood size. This probably re-
flects the simple fact that smaller egohoods make higher levels of segregation
statistically more probable.
On the other hand, unlike our expectations, our regression results also
showed that the presence of Italians in individual egohoods did not affect immi-
grant income. Indeed, the OLS estimates indicate that the presence of Italians
had only a weakly positive effect (see Models 3 and 4). Note that in the 2SLS
estimates the effect is still positive but small and statistically non-significant
(see Models 7 and 8)2 . The fact that the presence of co-ethnics had a negative
effect could be due to the fact that migrants are more likely to interact with their
co-ethnics in their local surroundings, whereas they do seldom develop relation-
ships with Italians, though this could be instrumental to their occupation and
income. However, it must be said that here we estimated only average effects
on a migrant population that is potentially heterogeneous in terms of ethnic
segregation and exposure to Italians, depending on their group characteristics.
To disentangle these effects, we performed different regressions for each sub-
sample of immigrant macro-group in the two measured radii. For the sake of
readability, Table 4 reports only the second-stage 2SLS estimates of ETH and
EXP parameters3.
Results showed that EXP was positive and significant in case of Eastern
Europeans, who had an income increment of more than 17€ per percentage
point. This is understanding when considering that many Eastern European
immigrants work as caregivers and typically exploit contacts with natives to
find a job. Furthermore, they are religiously, culturally and linguistically more
similar to natives than other ethnic groups. This could have positive implica-
tions on potential network formation. Interestingly, we found similar effects also
in case of Northern Africans and Middle Eastern migrants, which are the ethnic
groups having the most significant historical presence in Brescia, especially with
Egyptians and Moroccans pioneering migrations according to historical records
(Corsini & Zane, 2014). We found a positive value of EXP also in case of Sub
Saharan Africans, who benefitted from exposure to Italians, albeit significant
only for a 500m radius, and in case of Eastern Asians, but only in case of a
250m radius.
2Note that these models are identical to 7 and 8 except that ETH was sensitive to endo-
geneity. However, it is worth noting that the magnitude of EXP estimates are similar. All
models are available upon request from the corresponding author.
3All estimates are available upon request from the corresponding author.
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More importantly, Southern Asians were those penalized by both ETH and
EXP effects the most. In case of these immigrants, living in a highly co-
ethnically concentrated egohood determined an income loss of more than 100€
yearly for any ETH additional percentage point. Note that we did not find any
significant effects in case of Southern Americans, while in case of Southern and
Eastern Asians our models were limited by the lack of over-identification.
As regards to our control variables, we found a significant effect of education
on immigrant income (see Table 3). For instance, eighteen years of education
increased immigrant annual income by at least 1,584€ compared to the expected
income by illiterate migrants. The fact that these differences were minimal could
be due to the propensity of immigrants to seek a secure stable (even unskilled)
job rather than waiting for a better-paid job (Dustmann 2000; Kogan & Kalter
2005). Note that this tendency has been confirmed by previous research on
immigrants also in Italy by Fellini (2018) and Fellini & Guetto (2018).
We also found that being naturalized had a prominent effect on income,
with a premium of about at least 9,167€ in annual earnings. Note that except
when an immigrant is married to an Italian, the Italian law requires at least
ten years of residence and a stable level of income for any citizenship applica-
tion. On the other hand, a prolonged permanence in Italy allows immigrants to
improve their knowledge of the local labor market, increase their contacts with
natives and improve language proficiency, thereby minimizing their exposure to
discriminative practices (Friedberg, 2000).
Furthermore, we found that job instability penalizes immigrant income, as
expected. We found a monthly marginal loss of 1,287€, which means a loss
of 15,444€ yearly from unemployment. Note that these penalties were gender
related. We found a difference of at least 2,391€ per year in favor of male immi-
grants. This is because either immigrant women especially from underdeveloped
countries are mostly housewives and do not work (Bono & Vuri, 2006) or work
as caregivers or domestic workers, especially those coming from the Philippines,
Moldova, and Ukraine (Marchetti & Venturini, 2014). Indeed, caregivers and
domestic workers usually live in the same employer or assisted person’s house
and so could accept lower paid jobs.
3.8 Conclusions
Our paper aimed to explore the relationship between residential segregation
of migrants coming from high migratory pressure countries and their income
in Brescia, a wealthy industrial Northern Italian town, where immigrants cur-
rently make up almost one-fifth of the population. We used an ego-centered
empirical definition of neighborhood (“egohood”), which allowed us to avoid
certain biases connected to the standard use of administrative units to define
the neighborhood of residence of each individual and its population characteris-
tics. As we have suggested above, this approach permitted us to reflect certain
context-specific features of Southern European urban areas, where migrants are
not typically concentrated in ethnic enclaves such as in Western Europe and
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Northern America.
In particular, we wanted to check whether a high number of co-ethnics in
one’s egohood decreased income, with an inverse relationship between density
of immigrant networks and their income well documented by previous research.
Moreover, we measured the income-effects of natives in immigrant egohoods. We
used different sizes of egohood, for a better understanding of the mechanisms
underlying its effect.
Estimating a set of OLS and 2SLS models, the latter robust to endogeneity,
we found that the presence of co-ethnics determines a decrease of immigrant
earnings, though with varying conditions among certain ethnic groups. The
presence of natives in the same area did not have any significant effect on immi-
grants’ income, except for certain ethnic groups, such as the Eastern Europeans
and North Africans, who greatly benefitted from potential contacts with natives.
Although residential segregation, be it on a socioeconomic or an ethnic base,
is relatively weak in Italy (Barbagli & Pisati, 2012; Mingione, 2009), in line with
other Southern European countries (Arbaci and Malheiros 2010), we found it
had a not-negligible effect on immigrants’ household income. Our evidence,
therefore confirms the importance of social networks based on residential prox-
imity as a form of social capital: the local availability of individuals belonging
to different groups structures an immigrant’s access to knowledge, information,
trust, and other occupationally relevant resources. Moreover, networks expose
immigrants to peer effects which can have a significant effect on their attitudes
and motivations towards work.
Unlike our original expectations, we did not find any robust positive effect
of social contacts with natives, except for certain groups. We expected that ties
with natives could help immigrants to access relevant information to find a job,
giving them the opportunity to, directly and indirectly, inform prospective em-
ployers about their skills and capabilities. The weak effect of potential contacts
with natives could be explained by fact that migrants settled down only recently
in Brescia, thus having insufficient time to build effective contacts with natives.
Perhaps, contacts with natives would require linguistic proficiency that most
immigrants do not have, or even are difficult due to purposive or “statistical"
discrimination (Takács et al. 2018).
Here, the positive effect of the exposure to natives on Eastern European
immigrants probably reflects the fact that they mainly work as caregivers and
typically exploit contacts with natives to find a job. Furthermore, they are
religiously, culturally and linguistically more similar to natives than other ethnic
groups, with probable positive implications on potential network formation.
Coherently with our expectations, we found that ethnic concentration could
reduce the availability of occupationally relevant resources. Since migrants and
their co-ethnics are less embedded than natives in the local context, and most
of their occupationally relevant networks include ties with their co-ethnics em-
ployed in the secondary labor market, most have low-paying jobs. The more
ethnic-based social networks are the primary source of job information, the more
this mechanism can lead to severe difficulties in the labor market. Here, the fact
that the opposite was not true requires further examination.
When considering the concentration of co-ethnics, we found that chang-
ing the radius of the egohood has some impact on estimated statistical effects,
notably increasing its magnitude (although disproportional to the increase in
the size of the area). This is consistent with previous research on egohoods
and would confirm our explanation regarding network mechanisms conveying
labor market information and peer effects. The more individuals included in
the egohood’s spatial radius, the more prominent is the effect of the spatial
concentration of such individuals on ego’s income. However, in the case of the
exposure to natives, the magnitude of the egohood does not have any relevant
implication.
Although we believe that we have provided a promising approach to residen-
tial segregation, our study has certain limitations. First, although our empirical
findings emphasize the importance of the social network process, we did not
have any data on the actual social networks of immigrants. We assumed that
people’s co-location in the same space implies the probability of social ties and
relationships, via ethnic homophily. However, research suggests that there is
a difference between potential and actual ties, as networks are not static but
dynamic and ties can convey both positive and negative resources to individu-
als. This would require direct empirical network measures (Bravo et al. 2012;
Vacca et al. 2017; Bianchi et al. 2018). Indeed, some network characteristics,
such as network closure and openness, and the structural position of individuals
in more complex networks, could have a significant influence on labor market
achievements.
Secondly, by linking ethnicity to citizenship, we reduced the heterogeneity of
conditions among individuals. Immigrants with the same citizenship might have
different cultural attitudes and beliefs, different religious preferences and lan-
guage, which could all influence economic opportunities and social connections
as well as residential choices. The larger and more heterogeneous the population
of the country of origin, the weaker the role of a common citizenship to establish
social contacts.
Third, our segregation measures were somehow “a-spatial,” since the defi-
nition of each individual egohood actually splits the remaining population in
two, i.e., those inside and those outside the egohood, regardless of the actual
distance between ego and each alter. Considering a more detail definition of
geographical and social space as an endogenous force of segregation might be
the next step of our work (Leszczensky et al. 2016).
Finally, our empirical design was motivated by the idea that income effects of
segregation were due to certain social network-induced mechanisms. However,
there are other mechanisms that could determine income effects of residential
segregation. For instance, living in certain urban areas that are stigmatized due
to their low prestige could influence segregation and its income effects. Theoret-
ically, a distinction should be made between segregation mechanisms based on
homophily, i.e., attitudes and beliefs driven by a “taste for the similar” (McPher-
son et al. 2001; Merton & Lazarsfeld, 1954), and those based on “opportunity
hoarding” (Tilly, 1998), i.e., attitudes and beliefs based on social closure by
a majority against minorities. We believe that future research on residential
segregation and its effects should try to measure both types of mechanisms in
order to assess their explanatory relevance on the economic and social nexus of
segregation.
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Chapter 4
Is Ethnic Educational
Inequality a Matter of
Choice? A Study on the
Immigrant Population in
Brescia, Italy
4.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates ethnic differentials in primary school choices as fu-
ture determinants of education inequality. Not only do relevant technological
changes in post-industrial societies have made education a key factor for so-
cial mobility and professional carriers; school choices by families are critical for
social inclusion of immigrants. It is relevant mainly for the second generation
of immigrants. Indeed, while first-generation immigrants faced labour market
penalties due to low standards of education received in their country of origin,
in case of the second generation, these gaps could persist due to the inequality
of educational opportunities in the receiving countries (e.g. Heath, Rothon, &
Kilpi, 2008). Understanding the socio-economic determinants of sub-optimal ed-
ucational choices by migrants is essential to avoid social exclusion and stimulate
social mobility (Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993).
In this chapter, we wanted to investigate primary school choices by migrant
families. Usually, research on ethnic education inequality has focused on the
secondary or tertiary education, because their outcomes have a direct effect on
occupations and the job market. Findings suggest that certain ethnic groups
are short-sighted in their educational choices (e.g. Silberman & Fournier 2009;
Herzog-Punzenberger 2003), thus reproducing social inequality patterns.
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However, considering the cumulative nature of learning, examining primary
school choices is vital to understand the formation of cognitive skills and the
origin of certain educational traps that can have severe consequences for mi-
grants. Here, research has suggested that achievements during primary schools
tend to amplify eventually shaping secondary school achievements (Heyneman
& Loxley (1983), Sammons et al. (1995) and Goldstein & Sammons (1997)).
Moreover, primary schools have a significant impact on pupil’s life, considering
that pupils spend much of their time in class with schoolmates. The class is
where they socialise, build social networks outside relatives, learn role-models
and incorporate social norms and identities. Primary school choices have a di-
rect effect on socialisation and assimilation (Portes & Zhou, 1993). Considering
these critical initial steps is therefore essential to explore the roots of certain
penalties that might lead to educational inequality choices.
Schools are even more important in countries which have high migration
rates. It is the case, for instance, of Italy, which increased ten times its im-
migrants share in the last thirty years; it occurred primarily in Northern cities
such as Brescia, a middle-sized city of about 195.000 inhabitants reaching an
immigrant share of 19% of the whole population which. Indeed, it is now the
Italian city with the higher immigrant density with Milan. 24.8% of children
under ten years old in Brescia come from an immigrant family and have in their
educational investments the only chance to improve their social and economic
condition. Sub-optimal school choices can perpetuate social and economic in-
equality.
It is important to remember that compulsory education in Italy has been
divided into primary and secondary education for total training of ten years in
three cycles. Half of this period includes the primary school, with subsequent
secondary education divided into two cycles. In each cycle, pupils have the same
classmates and usually the same teachers. Italian school system grants parents
the freedom to chose whether to enroll children in school, upon the availability of
places and teachers. It makes choices strategic, considering that private schools
are expensive for families.
Understanding factors that determine these strategic choices have long-time
consequences especially for migrants; we used an original micro data-set from
the public register from the year 2012, which was built by ISTAT (Italian Statis-
tical Institute) by integrating different data sources. Through GPS individual
coordinates, we were able to geo-locate households at each block level. Note
that the full representation of the entire population allowed us to avoid some
typical issues of data surveys, such as sample selection, unbalanced sample and
over or under-representation of certain ethnic groups. This type of data allows
us to understand how the embeddedness of citizens in the geographical-social
context in which they live can affect their educational choices.
Considering that families can freely choose among forty-nine primary schools
located in Brescia, reconstructing their choices via geolocalization helped us
to understand the role played by certain factors, such as the school quality,
the home-school geographical distance, the effect of the ethnic composition of
the neighbourhood as well as its diversity and co-ethnic share. Note that the
neighbourhood is a nexus of social networks which could affect school choices. To
map these effects in due detail, we built egohoods (Sluiter, Tolsma, & Scheepers,
2015), i.e., egocentric neighbourhoods with a circular radius buffer of 500m
around each block. It could be considered as social spaces in which households
have exposure to more proximate social influence pressures.
While research on ethnic education inequality in Italy found an ethnic, ed-
ucational gap between natives and immigrants in cognitive tests in primary
schools (e.g. Ballarino et al. 2014; Contini 2013), previous studies in other
contexts have suggested that neighbourhood effects can be crucial role in educa-
tional choices (e.g., Sykes & Musterd 2011; Böhlmark et al. 2016). Furthermore,
it is probable that also homogamy could influence these choices (e.g., Bifulco
& Ladd, 2007; Kristen, Reimer, & Kogan, 2008; Saporito, 2003; Saporito &
Lareau, 1999).
Our aim was, considering these studies, to understand if (1) the ethnic com-
position of schools and neighbourhoods could predict primary school decisions
by recent migrants and if (2) these effects were sensitive to the ethnicity of the
households. Although it is difficult to quantify the link between primary school
choices and following occupations, we hypothesised that certain socio-geographic
context-specific factors leading to school choices could have a long-term effect
on economic conditions via learning skills and social capital. Indeed, the Italian
context is interesting here because unlike Centre-Northern European countries,
the country attracted a variety of migrants from different ethnicity, which is
typical of recent migration trends.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: In the 4.2 section, we show
the theoretical background and formulate our hypotheses. In the 4.3, we show
the Italian education context, moreover in the section4.4 we show the case of
Brescia, the city of which we have analyzed the data.4.5 illustrates our data-set,
variables that we used and conditional logit statistical methods. The 4.8 section
presents our results, and finally in the last one we discuss these findings and
limitations of our study.
4.2 Theoretical Background
Considering school choices, we can assume households are rational and maximise
their utility functions under given financial and information constraints (Erikson
& Jonsson 1996; Breen & Goldthorpe 1997; Glazerman 1998). . In the literature
about school choice, we can focus on some factors that were usually determinant
of parent choice regardless of their embeddedness. These factors were also an
influencer of social mechanism as quality, distance, school composition, school
fees.
Among the factors that could influence these decisions, we could consider
the school quality and the social status of schoolmates as predictors of student’s
expected gains (e.g., via learning, social contacts and social capital), whereas
costs related to home-school distance and student enrollment fees could be con-
sidered as financial constraints. It is likely that given a set of alternatives,
parents choose the school that fits their preferences the most.
However, the reality is more complicated. Decision makers are embedded in
a complex social context (Coleman 1988) in which family bonds, social networks,
peer effects and asymmetric information can be instrumental for these decisions.
Literature about primary school choice was very tiny, due to absence of direct
measurable outcome of school quality. Despite it, we added to theoretical review
some relevant literature about also secondary school choice.
4.2.1 Hypotheses
In a study in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina (USA), Hastings et al.
(2009) found that academic quality was the critical driver of school choices.
In a study on the school district of Wuppertal (Germany), Riedel, Schneider,
Schuchart, & Weishaupt (2010) found less robust effects of school quality, but
it still an important determinant of school choice. These findings have been
confirmed by Borghans, Golsteyn, & Zölitz (2015) in a study on 15000 Dutch
schools. Indeed every one want to have a good quality education. This deter-
minant seems obvious, but the quality was not a purely objective parameter.
Some households might evaluate quality not as pure educational quality, but as
a quality of social relationships.
School composition was an active school choice determinant, mainly in a
period of migrations. It is possible to see ethnic composition as Socio-Economic
Status and Ethnic Composition. Kristen (2008) in a study on the North Rhine
Westphalen Region in Germany, showed that Turkish households were more
likely to enroll their children in schools with a high number of foreigners. Riedel
et al. (2010), in an analysis about school choices in Wuppertal (Germany), found
that the ethnic composition school was a strong determinant of school choices
on both Turkish and German sides. While Germans enrolled their children to
tendentially mono-ethnic schools, Turkish enrolled their children in more multi-
ethnic schools. Note that Schneider et al. (2012) found similar evidence for
non-primary school choices in the same city. Burgess et al. (2015) also had
similar results in a sample study on English families; they showed how native
households chose schools with more homogeneous ethnic composition. In the
US in an analysis of school choices in the Philadelphia metropolitan area in
Pennsylvania (USA), Saporito & Lareau (1999) showed that school composition
strongly matters in households school choice. The composition effects were
persistent independently from the school quality, lower safety schools or higher
poverty rates (see also Saporito 2003 and Bifulco and Ladd 2007).
(H1): households prefer to enroll their children in schools with a high
share of co-ethnics.
The Socio-Economic Status could influence the fact that households prefer
schools with a disproportionate rate of similar ethnic groups. Middle or upper-
class majorities do not tend to enroll their children in schools attended by minor-
ity pupils. Lankford andWyckoff (2001) in a study about primary and secondary
school in the US about school moving. In the US where there is no free choice
for public school, the School Socio-Economic status has a determinant link with
the status of the neighbourhood where households live. Therefore, households
bought houses and preselect the Socio-Economic status of the schoolmates as
alleged by Holme (2002).
(H2): households prefer to enroll their children in school with a high
share of high socioeconomic status pupils.
Finally, it is probable that home-school distance constraints household choices.Kristen
(2008) in a study on primary school choices in North Rhine Westphalen Region
(Germany) found that distance was a determinant of school choice. Similar
findings were also in non-primary school (e.g. Karsten et al., 2003; Saporito,
2003; Schneider et al., 2012). In a study on 36 households in Detroit, Michigan
(USA) by Bell (2009), in which she found that distances could also influence the
community switching. Denessen et al. (2016) in an analisys of school choices
of 10000 Dutch families found that home school distance distance was a school
choice. Östh, Andersson & Malmberg (2013) in a research about school choice
in Sweden underlined the importance of home school distanced in the household
school choice, similar findings also in Bunar (2010). Distance was a transaction
cost that households have to pay in terms of time and money as alleged by Lang,
Collins & Kearns (2011).
Although existing literature in school choice and neighbourhood effects, this
kind of literature has its focus on secondary school. It also often focused on
segregation and school performances. Sykes and Musterd (2011), for example,
had analysed 9897 secondary school students in the Dutch context; they found
a significant and robust association between Neighbourhood and School choices,
this segregation also hinders immigrants performances. Similar results were also
in Böhlmark, Holmlund and Lindahl (2016) in an analysis of high school choice
in Sweden found that neighbourhood segregation affects school choice.
(H3): Households choice is related to geographical preferences.
In this work, we aim to fill the research gap by analysing how the spatial distri-
bution of immigrants leads immigrants to had different school choices in primary
school.
In particular, we hypothesise that immigrants had little confidence in natives
community (Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 2008). According to Holme (2002) and
Sikkink & Emerson (2008) school choice happen through social network infor-
mation. Actors, therefore, had information on which school was appropriate
to send their children from their network of contacts, and educational social-
network had a robust racial determinant as argued by Schneider et al. (1997).
Moreover, the neighbourhood is not context-free, their social status and income
determine the place where people live. Even without considering economic fac-
tors, people tend to live close to their peers and having relationships with them
is more comfortable especially in migration contexts, among them there is the
absence of linguistic and cultural barriers. According to Yoon & Gulson (2010)
language, based networks in the multi-ethnic neighbourhood affect school choice
in urban contexts. It was appropriate to think that the natives had a more ex-
tensive social and information network and were, therefore, able to assess the
quality of schooling better. Ethnic-based mistrust generates an asymmetrical
information penalty that is paid by some ethnic group.
4.3 The Italian Context
Like other south European countries, Italy has shifted from a mono-ethnic to
a multi-ethnic country since the early 90s, with an immigration rate increasing
ten times in the last thirty years. The immigrant’s distribution has been asym-
metric, with a concentration in the Northern regions (57.8%, in 2017), which
are the richest ones. It is worth noting that the second immigration occurred
in a period of low economic growth compared to the favourable conditions ben-
efitting earlier migrants. Furthermore, the transaction from an industrial to a
post-industrial economy hurt the welfare systems, while globalisation and in-
ternational trade reshaped the international division of labour, with increasing
rates of unskilled migrants (Atkinson 2003). Also, Italy faced some structural
issues, such as economic stagnation and a big sovereign debitor crisis, which
exacerbated social inequality (e.g. Atkinson & Brandolini, 2001).
The number of immigrant pupils in Italian schools significantly grew in the
last years. They were 200,000 in 2001 to reach 815,000 (9.2% of all pupils) in
2014. For instance, in many urban areas in Italy, there was a well documented
“escape” of natives from public compulsory education in some area (e.g. Pacchi
& Ranci, 2017; Barberis & Violante 2017). To limit this outcome, in 2009 the
Ministry of Education of the Italian government imposed a ceiling of max 30%
of non-Italian under-skilled students. This law, however, was often bypassed
by certain schools because most students without Italian citizenship who were
enrolled in the first year were born in Italy, and so had appropriate language
skills.
Note that the Italian educational system has a structure divided into five
cycles, ranging from kindergartens and primary schools to universities and art
academies. The public school is financed entirely by the state. There are two
kinds of private schools, Paritarie (equivalent) or Purely private. Paritarie
school have financially supported by private individuals or local authorities,
such as regions or municipalities, follow the same programs of state schools
and give the same legal diploma of schools. The other private schools that are
entirely financed by families and they do not give any legal diploma.
Although choices are in principle free, the households can select three schools
in order of preference; pupils will be assigned to a school according to the avail-
ability of places and teachers. Unlike what happens in other European coun-
tries, from the 1977-78 school year (Law n. 517/1977), pupils with mental and
physical disabilities receive special attention; they do not have to face discrimi-
nation, therefore, they should take part to regular classes often with dedicated
assistance by individual support teachers.
4.4 The Case of Brescia
With about 195,000 inhabitants, the urban core of a highly productive, labour
intensive, export-oriented manufacturing area, Brescia is an Italian city with
one of the highest composite ethnic population. Migrants grew from about 1%
in 1990 to about 20% in 2012, and the city now has an immigrant density similar
to most North-European cities. At the same time the city is surrounded by a
vast area with a high percentage of immigrants; this characteristic is typical of
a large part of the Centre and North Italy.
Athough, Brescia has a Mediterranean segregation pattern, characterised by
low segregation levels, high composite ethnic population Brescia has an immi-
grant population share of about 20% typical of Centre-North European coun-
tries, where immigration started decades before. If we focus to new generation,
the city has almost a quarter of the population (24.8%) under age of ten that
have both parent with an immigrant background. The main part of them were
born in Italy, a minor part were born abroad and successively migrated with
parents.
Projections indicate that these cohorts are key for the future of the city and
this mostly depends on their education. Brescia has 49 primary schools, with 8
private equivalised institutes. We excluded from our analysis a temporary hospi-
tal school because its households could not have a choice here. All eight private
schools in the sample were Catholic, while all public schools were organised in
seven comprehensive institutes.
4.5 Data and Methods
Data come from an aggregation of different sources. First, we used Archimede,
an ISTAT (Italian National Statistics Institute) data-set including individual-
level economic and demographic data for the entire Brescia population in 2012.
It included information concerning the individual place of birth and citizen-
ship of 195,387 inhabitants, 19% of them immigrants belonging to 141 different
national/ethnic groups.
The second source was Italian Ministry of Education and Research open
data, for year 2010/2011 for class size data used as proxy of quality of public
schools. The third source was the school’s self-assessment reports for the year
2014-15, for class size data used as proxy of quality of public schools.
After considering all primary schools in Brescia and the entire population
records available, excluding homeless family groups, we obtained a sample of
1598 school choices. We first considered all students having an Italian citizenship
as “natives”. Note that while Italian citizenship follows “jus sanguinis”, a person
can obtain citizenship after 18 if he/she was born in Italy from foreign parents
who were legally resident. Another exception is for those ones having at least
ten years of residency in the country of which at least the last three with a
regular employment contract; in this case, even minor cohabiting children can
receive their citizenship, with a reduction to 4 years for EU citizens.
In order to consider previous Italian migration patterns, we classified as
Italian everyone who was born in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Switzerland and
Belgium but being living in Brescia since 1971. Considering previous migration
patterns of Italians and the frequency of returns of migrant Italian families after
an extended period abroad, we classified any individual as being Italian who had
Italian citizenship in 2012 and was born before 1971 from Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, Switzerland and Belgium. All others ethnic group were approximated
by country of birth, although this classification was not precise it was useful
because it reduced the already extremely high diversity.
4.5.1 Variables
The calculation of the attributes of the school is done on the sample of pupils
that go from the second to the fifth year. The attributes of the school are the
average attributes of the attending students, therefore including the students of
the first years, would have created a problem of simultaneity.
For each student, we calculated all possible potential alternative schools that
his/her parents could have chosen and assigned 1 for the for the school which
was eventually chosen and 0 for all other possible alternatives.
We divided the independent variables in three groups, i.e., pure school at-
tributes (e.g., school diversity, school quality), school attributes that depended
both from certain individual or school attributes (e.g., home school distance)
and individual variables (e.g., immigrant status or the ethnic composition of the
neighbourhood).
4.5.1.1 School Attributes
School Exposure(SEXP). This variable measured the share of natives
Italian over the total population in the school. This indicates the native’s
propensity towards homogamy and reveals the propensity of immigrants to in-
teract with natives.
School Quality(QUALITY). In absence of trust-able, public available
and accessible for families measure for school quality, a proxy of school quality
was used. This proxy is class size. It was average class size of year 2010/2011
for public schools, for private school instead we used the average value of 5th
class and 2nd class of first year available, i.e. 2014-15 school’s self-assessment
reports.
School Socio-Economi Status (SSES). SSES measured the school’s
socioeconomic status by considering the average of the yearly Equivalent Fam-
ily Income (EFI) of all families having children enrolled in it. EFI is the net
disposable income of each family according to Eurostat criteria. It is calculated
by weighing the net household income for 1 for the first adult, 0.5 for any other
adult over 14 years and 0.3 for any child under 14 years in the family, it was
expressed in thousand of Euro.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CHOICE 76,704 0.0208333 0.1428271 0 1
QUALITY 76,704 19.94401 2.185799 16 27
PRIVATE 76,704 0.1875 0.3903149 0 1
HSD 76,704 4.629777 2.570679 0.0355902 15.25483
SCE 76,704 55.72661 38.36007 0 99.32886
SEXP 76,704 78.64934 17.84255 20.17544 99.32886
NICES 76,704 0.1433489 0.7134819 0 10.21814
IMMIGRANT 76,704 0.2966208 0.4567709 0 1
GEN2 76,704 0.2315394 0.421819 0 1
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
Private School (Private). This variable was a dummy variable taking
one the school was private, zero if it was public. The choice of private school is
economically onerous for the family, so it bound the school choice.
4.5.1.2 School and Individual Attributes
Home School Distance (HSD). HSD measured the distance between
home and schools for each family. Distances were calculated in meters by using
a Quantum GIS software. It does not take into account the real routing distance
travelled by parents to bring children to school which could be influenced by
traffic regulations.
School Co-Ethnics Share (SCES). This measured the share of co-
ethnic students in each school.
4.5.1.3 Individual Attributes
Neighbourhood Immigrant Co-Ethnic Share (NICES). This mea-
sured the percentage of non-natives co-ethnics in an egohood, i.e. an ego-
centered neighbourghood, of 500m radius around the block where the house-
holds lives. We considered any value above the average, otherwise the assigned
value was zero. It is calculated only for immigrants for separate the immigrants
over Italian effects.
Immigrant. (IMMIGRANT) This was a dummy variable that as-
sumed the value of one in case the pupil was an immigrant, otherwise it was
zero.
Generation 2 (GEN2). This was a dummy variable that assumed the
value of one in case the pupil was an immigrant born in Italy, otherwise it was
zero.
4.6 The space
To calculate the effect of the neighbourhood on school choice, rather than using
the standard administrative definition of “neighbourhood”, we built ego-centered
neighbourhoods, called “egohoods” (Lee et al. 2008). By using geo-localised
data from the Brescia Census microzones (CM), which represented (often irreg-
ular) administrative blocks, we created egohoods of 1 Km diameter around each
household’s spatial location using a Quantum GIS. We assumed this egohood
dimension to represent ideally a minimum approximate social space in which
it is probable that people socialise more (Hipp & Perrin 2009). This approach
was followed by Dinesen & Sønderskov (2015) and Sluiter et al. (2015) who
explored varying egohood radii to conclude that the most effective measures
were between a diameter of 500m and 1km. Moreover, considering that the
dimension of Brescia consists of 90.34 square km in total a diameter of 1km is
to be considered appropriate to capture ego-centered neighbourhoods.
4.7 Statistical Modelling
School choice modelling is based on random utility models (Manski, 1975, 1977;
McFadden, 1973). They followed McFadden (1973) in using a conditional logit
estimator (e.g., Hastings et al. 2009; Glazerman 1998; Simon Burgess et al.
2015). In our case, we assumed that school choices depended primarily on
the interaction between schools and households characteristics. and estimated
our models with R, with the package Surv and procedure clogit. Additionally,
to provide a robustness check, we estimated our models with Stata with the
command clogit and asclogit.
4.8 Results
It is possible to see result in table 4.2. Models (1) and (2) tested the school
choice without any interaction with individual variables, while Models (3) and
(4) tested the school composition effect on school choice. Model (5) tested
school composition about co-ethnics and related neighbourhood effects. Model
(6) tested all main, variables interacting with immigrant status variables. Model
(7) tested also the effect of begin a second generation migrants born in Italy.
Model (1) showed that there was a strong orientation to choose closer schools.
Indeed, an increment of 1km of distance affected the odd of school choice of 0.23.
Unlike previous research, here this was a strong determinant of school choice
in all models. Secondly, we found that the presence of more Italian pupils
was not influential on school choices. Note that private schools were chosen less
frequently, which could be due to their limited places and some other constraints.
In line with previous research, (e.g. Burgess et al., 2015), the school status had
a positive effect. Quality measured by class size has a negative effect also if in
table 4.2 is positive, because smaller class means better potential quality, but
the odds was not too strong with a value of 1.07. This result was explainable
by the fact that schools were all financed in the same way and the teachers were
all selected in the same way, with the exception of private schools, therefore the
global expectation on school quality has a low impact.
Model (2) showed similar results regarding the home-school spatial prox-
imity. Furthermore, households were less likely oriented to choose schools by
socioeconomic status. The homophily variable SCE, which measured the effect
of choices by natives and immigrants together, had a little positive correlation
with an odd of 1.023 . Private schools were chosen less frequently, while school
quality did not have any statistically significant effect.
Models (3) and (4) were similar and confirmed that the quality of schools
influence households choices, where as socioeconomic status was more effective.
When considering interactions between the condition of immigrant, the school
native exposure and the school co-ethnic share, homophily had a significant
influence. As did native preferably choose schools with higher share of natives,
so did immigrants. They choose schools with more co-ethnics. More precisely,
whole the odds of an ethnic-based school choice for a native was 1.022, those for
an immigrant was 1.2259. Moreover, immigrant choose schools less attended by
Italians. Here, socioeconomic status was still relevant like school quality.
In model (5), we tested the effect of the neighbourhood in which immigrants
live by considering an equal exposure to natives locally. Results confirmed
previous models. However, we did not find any association between the neigh-
bourghood of residence and the degree of exposure to co-ethnics.
In model (6), we tested the interaction of the immigrant status with all de-
terminant variables. Results confirmed the importance of the home-school dis-
tance, which is stronger immigrants than for natives. The presence of co-ethnics
and the propensity of immigrants to choose schools with a lower socioeconomic
status were confirmed. In this case, higher exposure to Italians was irrelevant.
Finally, in model (7), we looked at the difference between immigrants of sec-
ond and first generations. Note that model 7 is equivalent to model 6 except the
interaction variable GEN2. This variable allowed us to disentangle the effect of
being born in Italy for minority people and so having enjoyed a higher expo-
sure to linguistic and cultural standards of the country from later immigration.
Moreover they have the possibility to have contact with Italian families dur-
ing kindergarten, and therefore more information. For the sake of comparison,
we assumed the mean of an immigrant of 1.5 generation, i.e. they were born
abroad and immigrated with parents later. Immigrants of 1.5 Generation have
lower probability to choose a private school, compared to immigrants of second
generation, with an odd of 0.0178 compared to an odd of 0.044, private school
was almost an Italian only choice with an odd of 0.3175. Families with children
of 1.5 generation tend to choose schools closer on an odd 0.10, compared to the
second generations that have a proximity odds of 0.13 and the natives who have
one of 0.27. This means that families with children born abroad and enrolled in
first grade tend to had more significant needs for savings in terms of time and
means of transport and it was therefore probable that they are poorer. Families
with 1.5-generation children chose schools with larger classes with an odds of
1.40, this choice was similar but much lower as odds for the second generation
1.10 immigrant families, the natives showing a lower propensity to choose large
size with an odd of 1.05. This means that the second-generation information
contact with the natives leads to basically similar choices, while the families
with foreign-born children who probably have not attended kindergarten in the
city have less access to information on schools. For immigrant families, expo-
sure to Italians had very little value, tending to be irrelevant, but positive. On
the contrary, the presence of co-ethnics was the greatest driver of choice after
the distance both for families with children of 1.5 and second generation. This
means that ethnic social information networks were important and that they
were not embedded in the residential neighbourghoods.Social status was impor-
tant for Italians only. Foreigners tended to choose low-status social schools, and
this for the same presence of co-ethnic.
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4.9 Conclusions
In this chapter, we investigated ethnic differentials in primary school choices as
future determinants of education inequality. We focused on Brescia, a wealthy
industrial Northern Italian city, where immigrants currently make up about one-
fifth of the population and immigrant pupils are almost a quarter of the primary
school population. We started from certain hypotheses regarding household
chooses, by considering three main factors: the quality of schools, the ethnic
and status homophily tendency and certain geographical constraints, i.e., the
home-school distance and the neighbourhood composition. Unlike other studies,
we used an official register data, with higher informative value than standard
surveys.
Our results show that even in the presence of free choice, school proximity
was crucial for the school choice, this result was much stronger for immigrant
families, these results were not going to confirm literature, in which distance
was a marginal factor. Moreover, school composition is the primary determi-
nant of school choice in particular for immigrants, that often choose a school
with high share co-ethnics. It compared to the literature that shows us an atti-
tude of exclusion by natives; our results show a critical attitude of self-exclusion
by immigrants to select schools with high co-ethnic presence. Moreover, com-
pared to what reported in the literature, the measured academic quality, was
significant weak a determinant for natives, but but bad quality was a strong
determinant for immigrants . School Socioeconomic status variable is a relevant
variable almost only for an immigrant that tend to choose schools with lower
socioeconomic status. Embeddedness of immigrants in communities with a high
share of co-ethnics is a strong determinant of school choice.
We found that school was not the main predictor of household choices. Al-
though there was a correlation between school quality and school ethnic com-
position, we found that choices reflected other factors. This provides a different
picture of the problem compared to so not corroborating previous research (e.g.
Hastings et al., 2009; Riedel, Schneider, Schuchart, & Weishaupt, 2010; Schnei-
der et al., 2012; Borghans, Golsteyn, & Zölitz, 2015). The school quality is diffi-
cult to estimated by households; this could explain why quality has no effect on
primary school choices. The availability of public schools with common teach-
ing standards could induce immigrant households to believe that the quality is
homogenously distributed among schools regardless other school attributes.
We found that when choosing schools, households are influenced by the cer-
tain school characteristics such as the share of co-ethnics (H1) and the school’s
status (H2). In line with previous research, we found that immigrants tend
to prefer schools with a high share of co-ethnics. The same is true, though
with a weakest intensity, for natives, (e.g. Kristen, 2008; Riedel, Schneider,
Schuchart, & Weishaupt, 2010; Schneider et al., 2012). We also found that
households consider the school’s socioeconomic status even in primacy schools.
This extends previous findings on secondary schools (e.g. Lankford and Wyck-
off, 2001). Furthermore, in contrast with previous research, we found that the
difference in school choices between natives and immigrants is lower when con-
sidering second generation immigrants, i.e., children who were born in Italy by
immigrant parents. In particular, we found that 1.5 generation parents tend to
choose schools preferably with a lower socioeconomic status, more proximate
and school of lower quality.
We confirmed our hypothesis regarding spatial proximity (H3). Home-school
distance is key for primary school choices, in line with previous research (e.g.
Bell, 2009; Kristen, 2008 and Denessen et al., 2016), also we did not find any
effect of neighbourhoods composition.
In general, H1 and H2 are fully confirmed. We found that immigrants ap-
proach school choice differently. Households with second generation children
have a behaviour that tend to approximate natives choice. It confirm the liter-
ature about native behaviour (e.g. Kristen, 2008; Riedel, Schneider, Schuchart,
& Weishaupt, 2010; Schneider et al., 2012). Instead, households in which chil-
dren were born abroad have a preference for the closest school. In this case,
this difference can be explained by the fact that second-generation children have
attended a kindergarten with children from native families. So their educational
orientation had influence from native’s choice.
H3 is confirmed. We found that household chose the more proximate school,
so neighbourghood of residence affects the households primary school choices
for their children. School proximity effect are stronger for generation 1.5. In-
stead we cannot confirm that ethnic minority neighbourhood composition affects
school choice, in other words the co-ethnic are not the main source of informa-
tion in school choice. Besides, to be free to choose schools at a greater distance
it is necessary to pay a cost in terms of time and transport, this can mean having
a car available, which for immigrant families can be expensive, especially if they
live in peripheral areas of the city. In addition it could be an effect of different
kind of migrant segregation in southern European countries.
The generalization of our results refers to southern European states in which
there is free or bounded free school choice, such as Spain or Portugal, due to
similar welfare and segregation model. A limitation stems from the fact that all
schools are available for family choice. However linear distances often clash with
the presence of natural or artificial barriers, such as river, motorways, railways
or orographic differences, these barriers limit the possibility of choice, or instead,
they increase the costs of choosing differently.
Our findings corroborate here Barban & White (2011), who found that
1.5 generation immigrants have more penalties in the transition to secondary
schools. Our study suggests that this disadvantage does not originate from
the first level of secondary school, but probably even from the choice of primary
schools. This suggests the need for measures to improve information and aware-
ness of immigrant households concerning the importance of their school choice
since from the primary level, especially if targeted to communities of new or
recent immigration.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
This dissertation aimed to improve our understanding of the link between mi-
grant ethnicity, space and socio-economic inequality. Our focus was mainly on
socio-economic issues, such as immigrant segregation, immigrant earnings and
immigrant education choices. We tried to consider the interplay of social and
economic factors with attention to micro-processes. More specifically, we tried
to explain how the social space, i.e., the community in which people are physi-
cally embedded, might influence immigrant behaviour. We focused on the city of
Brescia, a wealthy industrial city in the North part of Italy. Our study has ben-
efited from the ISTAT-ARCHIMEDE database, a rich data-set with census-like
data. The possibility of using this database gave us an interesting opportunity
to have an accurate representation of the behaviour of immigrants, which is
impossible with survey-based data. The dissertation shows migration-related
problematics in a South European context. It has its peculiar characteristics
compared to Centre-North European given by welfare model differences. Firstly,
we explored the presence of segregation by macro-groups in the city. Segregation
was analysed by four dimensions, evenness, isolation, exposure and spatial clus-
terisation. We found that segregation was globally mild, but differentiated by
groups some groups in particular Asiatic groups such Chinese, East and South
East Asians and South Asians. Moreover, on the opposite side a low presence
of segregation for South Americans and East Europeans. Despite the presence
of segregation measured as evenness, the isolation of groups on a city scale is
considered low, and exposure to Italians is high. Our analysis shows no hyper-
segregation or the presence of enclaves. From the results on a global level, there
is a presence of microsegregation. By exploring segregation at the local level,
in each of thirty-three neighbourhoods, it is possible to note that some groups,
in particular, the South Asian and Chinese one, show higher levels of segrega-
tion as evenness and in relative terms higher levels of isolation compared to the
other groups. South Asians have strong isolation tendencies in almost all the
neighbourhoods where they live. Segregation of South Asians confirms study on
segregation about the UK and Southern Italy (Peach 1996, 2009; Busetta et al.,
2015). Except for Villaggio Violino and Fornaci, south Asian show segregation
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in high-density areas, this might be explained by the greater likelihood of finding
flat rentals in such areas. Particularly noteworthy is the presence of Chinese im-
migrants in the southern area of the historical centre, in the neighbourhoods of
the Centro Storico Sud and Brescia Antica, remarkable is also their presence in
the Northern side of Chiesanuova neighbourhood and Chiusure neighbourhood.
Chinese segregation was usually a self-segregation due to linguistic and cultural
barriers al explained by Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood (2013). Segregation
for Chinese and South Asian Communities was also confirmed by spatial associ-
ation analysis. Differently, East Europeans and South Americans have not the
same segregation problems. Low segregation level of Eastern Europeans was
mainly determined by the strong presence of caregivers especially by Ukrainian,
Moldovan and Romanian ethnic groups; however, this corroborates the result
of Pan Ké Son (2010) that found a low level of segregation for East Europeans.
Secondly, we analysed the personal segregation effects on immigrants’ earnings.
For doing this, we linked socio-economic and spatial-demographic characteris-
tics of immigrants by following an “egohood” approach, which jointly considers
socialisation and proximity effects. Besides, we evaluated these effects through
isolation index, i.e. the probability to meet co-ethnics and exposition, i.e. prob-
ability to meet natives. Estimating the model with an instrumental variable
model we found a causal link, in a statistic sense, that shows the effect of ego-
hood ethnic characteristics on immigrants’ income. We, therefore, confirm the
importance of social networks based on residential proximity as a form of social
capital. Moreover, networks expose immigrants to peer effects which can have a
significant effect on their attitudes and motivations towards work. Besides, we
did not find any robust positive effect of social contacts with natives, except for
certain groups. Eastern Europeans have a positive effect by exposure to natives.
It probably reflects the fact that they mainly work as caregivers and typically ex-
ploit contacts with natives to find a job. Furthermore, they are culturally more
similar to natives than other ethnic groups, with probable positive implications
on potential network formation. Similarly happened for Middle Easterns and
North Africans by their exposition to natives increased their income with no ef-
fects on ethnic segregation. The composition of the neighbourhood as egohood
has a powerful negative impact on the incomes of South Asians. The South
Asians have, as can be seen in the second chapter, a very high level of segrega-
tion. Above all, they are the groups with the least exposure to Italians and with
the most significant exposure to co-ethnics. Thirdly, ethnic differentials in school
choices in primary school as a determinant of education inequality. Education
inequality becomes crucial in countries that receive migrations. We hypothesise
that household choice is determined by homophily, in particular households pre-
fer a school with a high share of co-ethnics, and households prefer schools with a
high share of high socioeconomic status pupils. Moreover, we hypothesise that
the household’s choice is related to geographical preferences. We found that the
household chooses a school by socioeconomic status, ethnic composition and
home-school distance. Households of second-generation immigrants’ children,
i.e. born in Italy, have less difference from natives. Instead, the families of
children born abroad make different choices. In this case, this difference can be
explained by the fact that second-generation children have probability attended
a kindergarten with children from native families. Therefore, their educational
choices were influenced by native’s choice.
Coming to limitations the major limitation of the second chapter is that
it shows aggregates and not national groups — aggregations where possible
should be made from a linguistic rather than a geographical point of view,
furthermore we consider nationalities as the ethnic group, but ethnic groups not
always follows citizenship. In the second chapter and marginally in the third, we
talk about social networks. However, we do not have any actual data on their
presence. We can assume their existence based on the existing literature. The
fourth chapter also has limitations. A limitation stems from the fact that all
schools are available for family choice. However linear distances often clash with
the presence of natural or artificial barriers, such as river, motorways, railways
or orographic differences, these barriers limit the possibility of choice, or instead,
they increase the costs of choosing differently. If we had available a dataset with
also the municipality of the countryside, it would be possible to see how people
move within and outside the municipality of residence in the school choices for
their children. It would also be interesting to be able to replicate the study on
other levels of the school, i.e. lower secondary and upper secondary schools. To
conclude, we found that in Italy there is segregation, it is much less if compared
to the Centre-North of Europe. Also, segregation has economic consequences;
people who live in the segregated area have much fewer personal earnings due to
peer effects and access to wrong networks. About the choice of the school, the
presence in the district of residence of co-ethnic does not influence the choice
of the school. Instead, measured quality does not matter in school choice, and
the primary determinant of school choice is home-schooling distance. This is
a fundamental finding because it shows that also in the presence of free choice
households prefer the neighbourhood school. Therefore, the place of residence
influences the family status and the future status of pupils.
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